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I. A BIT OF HISTORY
You shall appoint for yourselves judges and officers, tribe by
tribe, in every settlement which the Lord your God is giving you,
and they shall dispense true justice to the people. You shall not
pervert the course of justice nor shall you lift up faces nor shall
you take a gift for a gift blinds the eyes of the wise and makes the
just answer crookedly. Justice and justice alone shall you
pursue ....
Deuteronomy 16: 18-20

A. The 19681 Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics.
Until 1968, Wisconsin judges had no compilation of ethics rules
specifically governing their behavior as judges. There were a few
statutes regulating judicial behavior in some respects, 2 and fewer
constitutional provisions,3 but no comprehensive set of rules describing
1. During the work of the Commission on Judicial Elections and Ethics, the Code of
Judicial Ethics adopted by the supreme court in 1967 was referred to as the 1967 Code. In
this article, the code is referred to as the 1968 Code since it did not become effective until
January 1, 1968 and because it is most frequently referred to by Wisconsin judges as the 1968
Code. See infra text accompanying note 11, at 874. References in Appendix B [Final Report
of the Commission] and Appendix D [Initial Report of the Commission] to the 1967 Code
simply reflect the Commission's practice of so referring to what is here called the 1968 Code.
2. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 19.01 (1965) (oath of office); Wis. STAT. § 253.142 (1965)
(disqualification).
3. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504 (1946);
State v. McCarthy, 255 Wis. 234, 38 N.W. 2d 679 (1949) (dealing with the 1946 candidacy of
Circuit Judge Joseph R. McCarthy for the office of United States senator). In Wettengel, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the provision of the Wisconsin Constitution that judges
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and prescribing ethical norms of behavior by judges. The American Bar
Association adopted the Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1924, but
Wisconsin adopted them only in piecemeal fashion and only decades
later.' The Wisconsin Bar Association did adopt the American Bar
Association Canons of Professional Ethics for Lawyers, but until 1956
the bar association was a voluntary association with no authority over
nonmembers, much less over members of the judiciary. In 1956, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered integration of the bar. At that time,
the Canons of Professional Ethics for Lawyers were made applicable not
only to all lawyers, but also to judges! Grievances against judges were
referred to various grievance committees which investigated and made
recommendations to the Board of Bar Governors.9
In 1963, responding to a request from the State Bar Association's
Board of Governors, the Wisconsin Supreme Court appointed a
committee ° to study the question whether the court had the power to
create a code of judicial ethics and to make a recommendation whether
the court should promulgate such a code if it had such power." In 1965,
the committee answered both questions in the affirmative. Thereafter,
the court asked the committee to draft a proposed code, which was

shall not hold any public office, except a judicial office, during the term for which they were
elected and that all votes for them for another office shall be void, did not invalidate Judge
McCarthy's primary election as the Republican nominee for the U.S. Senate. 24 N.W.2d at
508-09. The court held that Wisconsin could not "prescribe qualifications of a candidate for
nomination for the office of U.S. senator in addition to those prescribed by the U. S.
Constitution." Id. In McCarthy, however, the court held that Judge McCarthy's successful
candidacy violated Article II, section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution, his oath of office as
judge, and his Attorney's Oath. Although the court made reference to the American Bar
Association Canons of Judicial Ethics, see 38 N.W. 2d at 685, the decision was based on
McCarthy's duty as an attorney: "We are here inquiring into the conduct, duties and
obligations of the defendant as an attorney at law under the laws of the state of Wisconsin."
Id. at 682.
4. William R. Moser, Populism, A Wisconsin Heritage: Its Effect on Judicial
Accountability in the State, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 64-65 (1982).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 18-29.
6. See Moser, supra note 4, at 64-65.
7. See In re Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281,77 N.W.2d 602 (1956).
8. Moser, supra note 4, at 65.
9. See id.
10. Circuit Judge A. W. Parnell chaired the committee. Other members were circuit
judges Elmer W. Roller and Edwin M. Wilkie, county judges James H. Levi, Marvin Holz,
and Francis Wendt, and attorneys John A. Kluwin, John C. Whitney, and Francis J. Wilcox.
See In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis.2d 252, 153 N.W.2d 873 (1967).
11. See id.
12. See id.
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prepared and presented to the court in October, 1966."3 After a public
hearing, the court modified the proposed code and promulgated the
modified code with an effective date of January 1, 1968.4 The code was
comprised of two parts, sixteen "Standards" setting forth "the significant
qualities of the ideal judge" and sixteen rules, the violation of which
would subject a judge to sanctions.'5 Tying the parts together, the
sixteenth rule provided that an "aggravated and persistent failure to
comply with
the Standards of this code shall be deemed a rule
'6
violation.'
The 1968 Code made no reference to political or campaign activities
by judges in the "Standards."'7 Six rules, however, addressed political
and campaign activities.
Rule 2, repeating the language of Article VII, section 10 of the
Wisconsin Constitution, prohibited a judge from holding, "any office of
public trust, except a judicial office, during the term for which [the judge
was] elected.""
Rule 3, based on Canon 30 of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, 9
prohibited a judge from becoming "a candidate for a federal, state, or
local non-judicial office.., without first resigning [the] judgeship."'

13. See id.
14. See id. at 875. The new Rule 7, which prohibited judges from holding any office or
directorship in any public utility, bank, savings and loan association, lending institution,
insurance company, or any other corporation or business enterprise or venture affected with a
public interest had a delayed effective date of January 1, 1970, to avoid possible hardship
from immediate application of the rule.
15. Id. at 874-78.
16. Id. at 878.
17. Id. at 875-76.
18. Id. at 877.
19. The original version of Canon 30: "Candidacy for Office," provided, in part: "While
holding judicial office he should decline nomination to any other place which might
reasonably tend to create a suspicion or criticism that the proper performance of his judicial
duties is prejudiced or prevented thereby." LISA MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA
JUDICIAL CODE 140-41 (1992). The Canon was amended in 1933 to provide, in part:
While holding a judicial position he should not become an active candidate at either
a party primary or at a general election for any office other than a judicial office. If
a judge should decide to become a candidate for any office not judicial, he should
resign in order that it cannot be said that he is using the power or prestige of his
judicial position to promote his own candidacy or the success of his party.
Id at 141.
20. In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis.2d 252,153 N.W.2d at 877.
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Rule 8, based on Canon 32 of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics,2'
prohibited a judge from accepting gifts "from lawyers, groups, or
persons whose interests are, are likely to be, or have been before him in
his official capacity."' The Comment to the rule stated: "This section
does not prohibit reasonable financial contributions to a voluntary
campaign committee in behalf of a judicial candidate. The non-partisan
elective process as now constituted is an expensive one and until other
means of conducting and financing judicial elections are devised, this
rule should be so construed."'
Rule 10, based on Canon 12 of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics,24
prohibited exercise of the power of appointment for "personal,
financial, or partisan advantage.""
Rule 12, based on Canon 28 of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics?
21. The ABA version, entitled "Gifts and Favors," provided: "A judge should not accept
any presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers practicing before him or from others
whose interests are likely to be submitted to him for judgment." MILORD, supra note 19, at
142.
22. In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 153 N.W.2d at 877.
23. IM.
24. Canon 12 ("Appointees of the Judiciary and Their Compensation") provided, in
part:
Trustees, receivers, masters, referees, guardians and other persons appointed by a
judge to aid in the administration of justice should have the strictest probity and
impartiality and should be selected with a view solely to their character and fitness.
The power of making such appointments should not be exercised by him for
personal or partisan advantage.. He should not permit his appointments to be
controlled by others than himself. He should also avoid nepotism and undue
favoritism in his appointments.
MILORD, supra note 19, at 134.
25. In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial of Ethics, 153 N.W.2d at 877.
26. ABA Canon 28 ("Partisan Politics") provided, in part:
While entitled to entertain his personal views of political questions, and while not
required to surrender his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion
of being warped by political bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active
promoter of the interests of one political party as against another. He should avoid
making political speeches, making or soliciting payment of assessments or
contributions to party funds, the public endorsement of candidates for political
office and participation in party conventions.
He should neither accept nor retain a place on any party committee nor act as
party leader, nor engage generally in partisan activities. Where, however, it is
necessary for judges to be nominated and elected as candidates of a political party,
nothing herein contained shall prevent the judge from attending or speaking at
political gatherings, or from making contributions to the campaign funds of the party
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prohibited a judge from (a) membership in any political party, (b)
participation in its activities, (c) making or soliciting contributions in
support of its causes, and (d) publicly endorsing or speaking on behalf of
its candidates or platforms. 7

Rule 13, based on Canon 30 of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics,'
provided:
A judge who is a candidate for judicial office shall not make, or
permit others to make in his behalf, promises or suggestions of
conduct in office which appeal of the cupidity or partisanship of
the electing or appointing power. He shall not do, or permit

others to do in his behalf, anything which would commit him, or
appear to commit him in advance, with respect to any particular
case or controversy, or which suggests that, if elected or chosen,

he would administer his office with partiality, bias, or favor.'
B. The Beilfuss-DeWitt Committee.

In 1969, the American Bar Association appointed a commission
chaired by California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor to draft a
code of conduct for judges. The Code was adopted by the Association in
that has nominated him and seeks his election or re-election.
MILORD supra note 19, at 139-40. The last sentence of the Canon was added in 1950. See id.
at 139-40, n.2.
27. The Comment to Rule 12 stated:
As an individual, a judge is entitled to his personal view on political questions, and
to his rights and opinions as a citizen. However, as a member of Wisconsin nonpartisan judiciary, a judge must avoid any conduct which associates him with any
political party. This rule does not preclude a judge from attending a political
meeting as a member of the public, but he shall not attend as a participant.
In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 153 N.W.2d at 877-78.
28. The Canon provided, in part:
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to make for him,
promises of conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices of the
appointing or electing power; he should not announce in advance his conclusions of
law on disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do nothing while a
candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office with
bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
MILORD, supra note 19, at 141.
29. In re Promulgation of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 153 N.W.2d at 878.
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1972, replacing the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics.' The 1972 Code, in
some form or another, was eventually adopted by the federal judiciary
and all but three of the states-one being Wisconsin.' Canon 7, based
in large measure on Canons 28 and 30 of the 1924 Canons, stated: "A
Judge Should Refrain From Political Activity Inappropriate To His
Judicial Office."' The new rules improved on those they replaced in a
number of respects. They recognize merit selections processes33 and the
use of personal campaign committees to solicit and accept contributions
and endorsements?' They also make nonincumbent candidates subject
to the campaign and political rules applicable to judge candidates,3 5 and
forbid certain misrepresentations by candidates for judicial office.3
Like the 1924 ABA Canons however, the 1972 Model Code was not
adopted in Wisconsin. By the mid-1980s, however, the ABA and
30. 97 REP. ABA 556 (1972). See MILORD, supranote 19, at 129.
31. Rhode Island and Montana also declined to adopt the 1972 Code. MILORD, supra
note 19, at 7.
32. MILORD, supra note 19, at 127.
33. Canon 7B(3), for example, provides: "An incumbent judge who is a candidate for
retention in or re-election to office without a competing candidate, and whose candidacy has
drawn active opposition, may campaign in response thereto and may obtain publicly stated
support and campaign funds in the manner provided [elsewhere in the Canon]."
34. Canon 7B(2) provides:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by
public election between competing candidates should not himself solicit or accept
campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support, but he may establish committees
of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his
campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such
committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public
support from lawyers. A candidate's committees may solicit funds for his campaign
no earlier than [90] days before a primary election and no later than [90] days after
the last election in which he participates during the election year. A candidate
should not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of
himself or members of his family.
MILORD supra note 19, at 128.
35. This result was accomplished by amending the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1974 to include Disciplinary Rule 8-103 ("Lawyer Candidate for Judicial
Office"), which provides: "A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with
the applicable provisions of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-103(A) (1974).
36. Canon 7B(1)(c) provided: "[A candidate, including an incumbent judge] should not
make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political
issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact." MILORD
supra note 19, at 128.
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Wisconsin judges became dissatisfied with the 1972 Model Code and the
1968 Wisconsin Code, respectively.
In 1985, the Wisconsin Supreme Court on its own motion appointed
a Code of Judicial Ethics Review Committee "to study and recommend
a comprehensive revision of the [1968] Code of Judicial Ethics."3 The
committee came to be known as the "Beilfuss-DeWitt" committee, after
its successive chairpersons: former Wisconsin Supreme Court Chief
Justice Bruce F. Beilfuss and Attorney Jack R. DeWitt, who assumed
leadership of the committee upon Chief Justice Beilfuss' death.3
In 1986, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility conducted a survey of authorities on judicial ethics and
concluded that the 1972 Model Code needed to be updated. 39 Between
1987 and 1989, a subcommittee of the Standing Committee produced a
draft of what came to be the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 4
While the ABA subcommittee was revising the 1972 Model Code, the
Beilfuss-DeWitt committee was working to adapt that code to the
perceived needs of Wisconsin judges. The Wisconsin committee filed its
report and recommendations on May 11, 1987 and the supreme court
held a public hearing on November 17, 1987, before the ABA's revision
efforts were known.
The supreme court withheld action on the
recommendations pending the completion of the ABA's revision.42 The
ABA adopted the revised Code of Judicial Conduct on August 7, 1990,
and on October 15, 1991, the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee filed a revised
report. 3 On March 17, 1992, the supreme court held a public hearing,
and on June 24, 1992, the court, on a 4-3 vote, rejected the BeilfussDeWitt proposals in toto.44
The majority's wholesale rejection of the Beilfuss-DeWitt
recommendations and the opinions written to justify the rejection
caused a considerable stir within and outside the legal community.S
37. In re Review of the Code of Judicial Ethics, SCR Chapter 60, 169 Wis. 2d xv, xxvii
(1992).
38. See id. at xxxii.
39. MILORD, supra note 19, at 3.
40. See id.
41. See In re Amendment of Supreme Court Rules: SCR Chapter 60 - Code of Judicial
Ethics, 202 Wis. 2d xvii, xix (1996).
42. See id.
43. Report of the Code of Judicial Ethics Review Committee, October 15, 1991
(hereinafter Beilfuss-DeWitt), on file with the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and
with the author.
44. See In re Review of the Code of Judicial Ethics, SCR Chapter 60, 169 Wis.2d xv.
45. Perhaps as surprising as the refusal to accept any of the committee's
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The committee, a group of distinguished judges, attorneys, and other
citizens, had worked on the recommendations and report over a seven
year period and had the benefit of the ABA's nationally vetted work on
the 1972 Model Code and the 1990 revision.47 The committee's report
and recommendations were unanimous and supported by the Wisconsin
Judicial Commission.4
In any event, although no person or organization had urged the
retention of the 1968 code,' 9 the effect of the majority's decision was to
leave the old code in place, with its political and campaign activities
provisions largely based' on the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics
promulgated when Calvin Coolidge was President, William Howard
Taft was Chief Justice of the United States and Aad J. Vinje was Chief
Justice of Wisconsin.
Although the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee's proposed rules relating
to political and campaign activities comprised more than six pages of
rules and commentary," only one sentence of one commentary was
recommendations, in any form, was the derisive tone of the majority opinion. The Milwaukee
Sentinel reported the majority opinion as "unusually harsh in tone." Day Delivers Some
Scorching Lines on Ethics Measure,MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, June 29, 1992, available in 1992
WL 8815433. An editorial in the Milwaukee Journal opined that the majority "bring
disrespect to themselves and the justice system." Editorial, Old Boy Bigotry on the Bench,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, July 5,1992, available in 1992 WL 8816194.
46. The original membership included Hon. James C. Boll, Hon. Dennis D. Conway,
Atty. Gregory B. Conway, Hon. Frank T. Crivello, Atty. Theophilus C. Crockett, Mr. Nelson
I. Cummings, Jr., Hon. Patricia S. Curley, Atty Jack R. DeWitt, Hon. Vivi Dilweg, Rev. J.
Thomas Finucan, Hon. Frederic W. Fleishauer, Atty. Henry G. Gergen, Jr., Hon. William H.
Haese, Atty. Charles J. Herro, Atty. Janet A. Jenkins, Hon. Moria G. Krueger, Hon. Richard
W. Orton, Hon. Earl W. Schmidt, Hon. Patrick T. Sheedy, Hon. Jon B. Skow, and Hon.
Harold J. Wollenzien. The reporter was Professor and Associate Dean Eva Soeka of the
Marquette University Law School. See In re Review of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 169
Wis.2d xv, xxxii (1992).
47. In her concurring opinion in which she dissented from the wholesale rejection of the
proposed code, Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson wrote: "The Committee's drafts circulated
widely and benefited from comments and suggestions from the Center for Judicial Conduct
Organization of the American Judicature Society, the Wisconsin Judicial Commission, judges
across thl state, and professors in legal ethics from several law schools." Id.at xxxiii. The
professors identified were Geoffrey C. Hazard of Yale Law School, Leslie Abramson of the
University of Louisville School of Law, Ronald D. Rotunda of the University of Illinois Law
School at Champaign-Urbana, and Steven Lubet of Northwestern University Law School.
See id., at n. 18.
48. See id. at xxxiv-xxxv.
49. See id.at xv.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 18-29.
51. The proposed rules, bearing a date of October 7, 1991, and filed with the supreme
court on October 15, 1991, are on file in the office of the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.
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referred to in the opinions of members of the majority. 2 Perhaps not
surprisingly, that sentence pertained to a judge's vulnerability to charges
of bias (or worse) deriving from acceptance of campaign money from
lawyers who appear in the judge's court. 3 (As the epigraph to this
section suggests, the moral, ethical, and political dimensions of this
problem have been around at least since the time of Deuteronomy.)'
The proposed Code, as does the present Code, recognizes the
propriety of attorney contributions to judicial campaigns. But
the proposed Code has this provision:
Canon 5, Section 5C(2), Commentary:
Though not prohibited, campaign contributions of which a judge
has knowledge, made by lawyers.., who appear before the
judge, may be relevant to disqualificationunder Section 3E.
Apparently, this refers to self-disqualification ....
So after a
disappointed litigant checks the campaign reports and finds his
opponent's lawyer contributed to the judge's campaign, that
"may" provide a ground for filing a grievance against the judge?
So the judge is hauled in and asked if he "knew" the attorney
gave x-number of dollars to the judge's campaign, and if he did,
should the judge have disqualified himself? At what figure?
$25.00? $50.00? $100.00? And if this is to be the merry-goround, what lawyer will want to have anything to do with a
judicial campaign? The fact of the matter is that most judges are
not wealthy enough to finance their own campaigns and must
rely on some attorney help, both financially and organization
wise.5
The majority's sardonic reaction to what most readers might
consider simply a truism demonstrates some of the difficulty in devising
rules of ethics for candidates for elected judicial office. Disregarding the
tendentious language about "the merry-go-round" and judges' being
"hauled in," the majority opinion accurately (if captiously) reflects one

52- See In re Review of the Code of Judicial Ethics, SCR Chapter 60, 169 Wis.2d at xxiii.
53. See id.
54. "You shall not pervert the course of justice nor shall you lift up faces nor shall you
take a gift for a gift blinds the eyes of the wise and makes the just answer crookedly."
Deuteronomy 16:19.
55. In re Review of the Code of Judicial Ethics, SCR Chapter 60, 169 Wis.2d at xxiii.
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of the two great areas of tension in the ethics of judicial elections.! To
pay for a contested election campaign, most candidates need more
money than they have or are willing to spend on the campaign. Thus
they must solicit and accept gifts (to use the less euphemistic
Deuteronomic term for campaign contributions) from the very people
over whom they exercise or will exercise judicial power if elected.
Soliciting and accepting such gifts inevitably opens the judge to
suspicions of favoritism "for a gift blinds the eyes of the wise and makes
The judge finds herself in at least a
the just answer crookedly."'
dilemma, perhaps a trilemma. If she eschews campaign contributions
from others and personally finances all the costs of the contested
election, she may be accused of lacking broad electoral support in the
community and of trying to buy the judgeship.' If she solicits and
accepts contributions, she may be suspected of influence-peddling,
venality, or at least favoritism, and her contributors may be accused of
trying to buy the election." If she declines to accept contributions and
declines or is unable to spend "a sum sufficient" of her own resources,
she may lose the election to a less qualified but wealthier or better
financed opponent. Probably more commonly, she will choose not to
seek the judgeship.
In light of these unappealing choices for both incumbent and
nonincumbent judicial candidates, the defensive and ad terrorem tone of
the majority opinion is understandable, if still regrettable. In any event,
since the quoted language is all the court said about the political and
campaign rules in the Beilfuss-DeWitt report and recommendations,
neither the public nor the legal profession learned much of the justices'
specific thinking about the various political and campaign proposals in
Beilfuss-DeWitt (or about related provisions in the 1972 and 1990 ABA

56. The other pertains to campaign speech and promises of conduct in office. See infra
text accompanying notes 239-85.
57. Deuteronomy 16:19.
58. See, eg., David Calender, Vitriolic Race Rewrites the High Court's Script, CAPITAL
TIMES, April 3, 1999, at 2A available at 1999 WL 5296505; Dave Daley, Appeals Seat Cost
$238,000 Curley's Victory Over Sullivan May Have Set Court Spending Record, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, August 28, 1996 at (News) 3, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnews File; Mike Christopulos, Kahn Leads Dugan in Bitter Race, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL
April 9, 1992, at A8, available at 1992 WL 8804816; Jim Stingl, Money Now Big Factor in
CourtRaces, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL April 5, 1992, at B3, availableat 1992 WL 8804173.
59. See, e.g., Eldon Knoche, Campaign Remark Puts Lawsuit on Hold, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL, February 20, 1990, available at 1990 WL 4933464; Patrick Jasperse, Donations by
Lawyers Stir Debate, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, February 20, 1990,at 1, available at 1990 WL
493322.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

Model Codes).
C. The FairchildCommission.

On December 29, 1994, the Committee of Chief Judges
petitioned the supreme court to re-examine the report of the BeilfussDeWitt Committee.' On July 1, 1996, the court entered an order61
adopting much of the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee's work, with an
effective date of January 1, 1997.62

The court declined, however, to

adopt the proposed Canon 5 of the rules, relating to political and
campaign activity.
The court's revision of the Code of Judicial Ethics does not
include that portion of the Review Committee's proposal
addressing the political activity of judges and judicial candidates.
Because the Wisconsin judiciary is elective and nonpartisan, the
court considers that the Review Committee's recommended
provisions governing political and campaign activity require
additional attention and formulation. The court has determined
to refer the matter of political and campaign activity to a
committee the court will appoint in the coming months,
composed of judges, lawyers and public members, to examine the
ethical and practical issues involved and to consult persons and
entities experienced in judicial ethics pertaining to political and
campaign activity. The committee will submit for the court's
consideration proposed ethical rules addressing judges' and
candidates' political and campaign activity, and the court will
invite comment on them from the judiciary and from the public
and will hold a public hearing in the matter. For the interim, the
60. See In re Amendment of Supreme court Rules: SCR Chapter 60-Code of Judicial
Ethics, 202 Wis.2d xvii (1996).
61. See Wisconsin Supreme Court Order 95-05; In the Matter of the Amendment of
Supreme Court Rules: SCR Chapter 60 - Code of Judicial Ethics, 202 Wis.2d xvii (1996).
62- See id. The membership of the court had changed considerably in the four years
between the court's wholesale rejection of the Beilfuss-DeWitt proposals in 1992 and the
court's adoption of most of them in 1996. Three of the justices who had joined in the majority
opinion rejecting the proposals left the court. Justice William G. Callow retired at the end of
the court's term in 1992, replaced by Justice Jon P. Wilcox; Justice Louis J. Ceci retired in
1993, replaced by Justice Janine P. Geske; and Justice Roland B. Day retired at the end of the
term in 1996, replaced by Justice N. Patrick Crooks. Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan
retired at the end of the court's term in 1995, replaced by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley. See
WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1997-1998 BLUE
BOOK 687-688 (1997). Justice Donald W. Steinmetz, who was one of the 1992 majority,
remained on the court until 1999 and joined in the court's per curiam order adopting the new
rules in 1996.
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court promulgates as part of the revised Code of Judicial Ethics
those provisions of the predecessor Code that deal with political
and campaign activity.'
On March 7, 1997, the supreme court appointed a Commission on
Judicial Elections and Ethics chaired by the Honorable Thomas E.
Fairchild of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 6 The
author of this article was appointed as a member of the Commission and
as its Reporter. The court directed the Commission:
[F]irst [to] review the relevant provisions of the current Code of
Judicial Conduct, as well as the provisions recommended by the
[Beilfuss-DeWitt Committee] in its report filed with the court
October 15, 1991 and the provisions of the 1990 American Bar
Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and identify the
political and campaign issues inherent in the election of nonpartisan judges and in the activity of those judges while in office.
The Commission will then submit the identified issues to the
court, and after reviewing them, the court will grovide the
Commission further direction as may be appropriate.
Appendices A through D to this article contain the work product of
the Commission.
Appendix A contains the rules proposed by the Commission.
Appendix B contains the Final Report of the Commission.
Appendix C contains a Survey of Commissioners drafted by the
Reporter and used to gauge the degree of support and opposition to
particular potential regulations."
Appendix D contains the Initial Report of the Commission.
Appendix E is a table comparing selected provisions of the proposed
rules, the rules proposed by the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee, the current
Code, and the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
63. Review of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 169 Wis.2d at xviii.
64. Members are identified in the Final Report of the Commission, Appendix B infra.
65. Memorandum from Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice, to Commission on
Judicial Elections and Ethics (March 7, 1997)(on file with author).
66. The votes of the commissioners were tallied by the Reporter and shared with the
commissioners. The votes are not reported in Appendix C because they were never
considered to be binding on the commissioners. The Survey results were used as a
preliminary aid in the drafting and deliberation processes. Additionally, the positions of
individual commissioners on different issues changed as a result of the exchange of ideas at
commission meetings.
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II. BACKGROUND DATA REGARDING WISCONSIN COURTS AND
JUDICIARY

A. Supreme Court
The Wisconsin Supreme Court is comprised of seven justices elected
to ten year terms in state-wide nonpartisan elections. 6 The justice with
the longest service on the court is the chief justice and the administrative
head of the state judiciary. 6' The annual salary of a supreme court
justice is $112,318, with an additional $8,000 paid to the chief justice.
When a vacancy occurs on the court, the governor may make an
appointment to fill the vacancy until the next election.' Since 1853,
when the state stopped having circuit judges serve collectively as the
supreme court, there have been seventy-one supreme court justices.
Forty-five of them, or sixty-three percent, originally came to the court as
gubernatorial appointees. Of the seven justices currently on the court,
four were originally appointed by a governor.
Chief Justice
Abrahamson was appointed by Governor Patrick Lucey in 1976. Justice
David T. Prosser, Jr. was appointed by Governor Tommy Thompson in
1998, succeeding Justice Janine P. Geske, a 1993 Thompson appointee.
Justice Jon P. Wilcox was appointed to the court by Governor
Thompson in 1992. Justice Donald Steinmetz' resignation at the end of
the 1998-1999 term has led to the appointment of Justice Diane S. Sykes
by Governor Thompson.
There have been seven supreme court elections since 1990.71 Six
were contested.' In five of the seven, an incumbent faced a challenger
with no incumbent losing. 3 Indeed, no incumbent justice has been
defeated by a challenger since Chief Justice George R. Currie lost his
seat to Robert W. Hansen in the 1968 election.
The cost of supreme court campaigns has risen dramatically in recent
years. The 1999 race between twenty-two year incumbent Chief Justice
67. See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4(1); WIS. STAT. §§ 5.02(21), 5.58,5.60 (1995-96).
68. See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4(2)-(3).
69. See Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
70. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIvE REFERENCE BUREAU, 1997-1998 BLUE BOOK at 687-

88 (1997). Robert G. Siebecker of Madison was a member of the court between 1903 and
1922, serving as chief justice from 1920 to 1922. See id. He was elected to the court on April
7, 1903 but was appointed on April 9, 1903 to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Justice
Charles V. Bardeen of Wausau. See id. at 688, n.5.
71. See Wisconsin's Courts,Wis. TAXPAYER, June 1999 1, at 10.
72. See id.
73. See id.
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Shirley S. Abrahamson and Sharren Rose cost a record $1,361,929 or
$1.85 per vote with 737,307 people voting.' Chief Justice Abrahamson
reported spending $727,547: $93,011 or thirteen-percent her own money
and $634,536 or eighty-seven percent from contributions.7 5 Attorney
Rose reported spending $634,382: $506,501 or eighty-percent her own
money and $127,881 or twenty-percent contributions. 6 In Chief Justice
Abrahamson's preceding election, in 1989, she was opposed by Court of
Appeals Judge Ralph Adam Fine.' In that race, Abrahamson spent
$209,485, or twenty-nine percent of the cost of the 1999 race. 8 In the
1997 race between incumbent Justice Jon P. Wilcox and Milwaukee
attorney Walt Kelly, Wilcox spent $426,458, $59,260 of which was his
own money, and Kelly spent $440,892, $172,500 being his own money. 9
Contributions and expenditures and other data respecting supreme
court races during the last ten years are reflected in the following

tables'S°

CONTRIBUTIONS & EXPENDITURES:
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 1989-1999

I 1989 11990

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997 I 1999

Contributions 443,400 388,256 20,745 253,890 642,187 275,689 888,932 1,319,220
Expenditures 451,566 385,195 9,058 259,275 639,360 282,125 864,683 1,361,930
CONTRIBUTION SOURCES:
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS, 1989-1999

Individuals
Self
PACs &
Committees
WECF

1989
246,245
3,093
0

1990
243,868
8,000
60,349

1993
18,745
0
2,000

1994
151,679
5,000
29,675

1995
431,512
119,796
59,925

1996
185,418
10,417
53,455

1997
489,495
231,760
141,520

1999
613,674
599,512
105,480

194,062

76,039

0

67,536

30,954

26,398

26,148

27,005

74. Court CandidatesSpent Most on TV, CAPITALTIMES, July 22, 1999, at A2, available
in 1999 WL 22054238.
75. See Richard P. Jones, Supreme court Race Crushed Old Spending Mark, Report Says,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, July 22,1999.
76. See iL
77. See ld.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Except for the 1999 data, the data compilations in the tables were assembled by
researchers for Wisconsin Citizen Action and are reported in WISCONSIN CITIZEN ACTION,
COURTING THE SUPREMES: BIG MONEY IN WISCONSIN STATE SUPREME COURT
ELECTIONS 1989-1999. The report was written by Roger Bybee with the assistance of David
Julseth, a researcher for the Wisconsin Cooperative Campaign Database. The researchers
restricted their data to election years running from July 1 of the year preceding the Spring
election to June 30 following the election. The data were derived from reports filed with the
State Elections Board. The report was published before the final reports for the Spring, 1999
election were filed. Those data, and computations based on them, have been' supplied by the
author. Copies of the Wisconsin Citizen Action report are on file with the author and with
the Marquette Law Review.
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CONTRIBUTION PERCENTAGES:
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS, 1989-1999

Individuals
Self
PACs &
Committees
WECF

1989
55.6
0.75
0

1990
62.8
2.1
15.5

1993
90.4
0
9.6

1994
59.8
2
11.7

1995
67.2
18.7
9.3

1996
67.2
3.8
19.4

1997
55.15
26.1
15.9

1999
45.6
44.5
7.8

43.7

19.6

0

26.64

4.85

9.6

2.9

2.0

CUMULATIVE CONTRIBUTION SOURCES:
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS, 1993-99

Percentage
55.1
28.2
11.4
5.1

Amount
1,890,523
966,485
392,055
178,041

Contribution Source
Individuals
Self
PACS & Committees
WECF

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Contributors'
Cumulative
Contributions
$5,000 or more
$1000 to $4,999
$500 to $999
$100 to $499
Less than $100

Percentage
of
Contributors
0.2%
1.4%
2.5%
20.1%
75.8%

Amount
1993-1999
$331,097
$336,039
$231,403
$505,291
$386,109

Percentage of
Individual
Contributors
18.5%
18.7%
12.9%
28.2%
21.6%

INTEREST GROUP CATEGORIES, 1993-1999
Percentage
Amount
Interest
Category

Lawyers and lobbyists
Miscellaneous Business

$413,475
$179,060

29.5%
12.8%

Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Unknown

$174,485
$117,759

12.4%
8.3%

Retired
Government
Agriculture
Health
Education
Communications/Electronics
Construction
Transportation

$112,343
$86,985
$74,045
$56,662
$50,823
$40,182
$36,460
$28,754

8.0%
6.2%
5.3%
4.0%
3.6%
2.9%
2.6%
2.0%

Other
Energy & Natural Resources
Labor

$12,757
$8,800
$7,598

0.9%
0.6%
0.5%

Ideological/Single Issue

$3,642

0.3%
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B. Courtof Appeals

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals is a unitary court with sixteen
judges serving in four districts." District I, with four judges, is
comprised solely of Milwaukee County and sits in the city of
Milwaukee.' District II, with four judges, includes twelve southeastern
counties. 3 Its chambers are in Waukesha and it sits there and in Fond du
Lac and Racine.' District III, with three judges, includes thirty-five
counties in the northern half of the state.8 Its chambers are in Wausau
and the court also sits in Eau Claire, Superior, and Green Bay.8 District
IV, with five judges, includes twenty-four central and southern
Wisconsin countiesY The District IV chambers are in Madison; it also
sits in LaCrosse and Stevens Point."
Court of Appeals judges are elected to six-year terms in districtwide, nonpartisan elections.' As with the supreme court, only one
election per year may be held in each district.' The governor may
appoint judges to fill vacancies pending the next election."
In 1999, the salary of a Court of Appeals judge is $105,960.
Between 1990 and 1998, there were twenty-six court of appeals
elections.9 Twenty featured an incumbent, only two of whom were
opposed.9 In the six races without an incumbent candidate, four had
only one candidate. Thus, only fifteen percent of the court of appeals
elections have been contested since 1990.' 5
C. Circuit Courts.

Wisconsin has seventy-two counties9 and sixty-six of the counties
§§ 752.03,752. 11 (1995-96).
STAT. § 752. 13 (1995-96).
STAT. § 752.11(i)(b) (1995-96).
STAT. § 752.15 (1995-96).

81. See WiS.
82. See WIS.
83. See WIS.
84. See WIS.

STAT.

85. See WIs.
86. See WIS.
87. See WIs.
88. See WIS.
89. See Wis.
90. See id.

STAT. § 752.11(1)(c) (1995-96).
STAT. § 752.17 (1995-96).
STAT. § 752.11(i)(d) (1995-96).
STAT. § 752.19 (1995-96).
STAT. § 752.04 (1995-96).

91. See WIs. CONsT. art. VII, § 9.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Wisconsin Courts,supra note 73, at 10.
See id.
See id. at 9.
See id at 10.
See Wis. STAT. ch. 2 (1995-96).
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Three circuits combine two

into one circuit: Buffalo-Pepin, 9' 8 Florence-Forest,

and

Menominee-Shawano. '°° As of 1998, those 69 circuits had 234 judges."°
Thirty circuits had one judge.'O Thirteen circuits had two judges."W Nine
had three judges."° Five had four judges.' ° Two had five.'0

One had

six.' Three had seven.' Brown County had eight.'" Racine County
had ten."
Waukesha County had twelve." ' Dane County had
2
seventeen and Milwaukee County had forty-six."'
Circuit court judges are elected to six-year terms1 4 in nonpartisan

elections within the circuits, with the governor able to fill vacant
unexpired terms by appointment."'
Between 1990 and 1998, there were 381 circuit court elections in

Wisconsin.11 6 In 325, or eighty-five percent of these, there was an
incumbent on the ballot. 1 7 In 282, or eighty-seven percent of these 325
elections, the incumbent had no opponent."8 In forty-three, the

incumbent's re-election was contested."9 In fifty-six elections, there was
no incumbent on the ballot.12' In fourteen, or twenty-five percent of

97. See WIS. STAT. § 753.06 (1995-96).
98. See WIS. STAT. § 753.06(7)(a) (1995-96).
99. See WIS. STAT. § 753.06(9)(c) (1995-96)
100. See Wis. STAT. § 753.06(9)(h) (1995-96).
101. See WIs. STAT. § 753.06 (1995-96); See also Wisconsin's Courts,supra note 73, at 10.
The same sources were used for notes 81 through 88 and accompanying text.
102. Wis. STAT. § 753.06 (1995-96).
103. Barron, Chippewa, Door, Douglas, Dunn, Grant, Marinette, Monroe, Oconto,
Oneida, Polk, and Waupaca counties and the combined Menominee-Shawano circuit. See id.
104. Columbia, Dodge, Jefferson, Manitowoc, Ozaukee, Portage, St. Croix, Sauk, and
Wood counties. See id.
105. Fond du Lac, LaCrosse, Marathon, Walworth, and Washington counties. See id.
106. Eau Claire and Sheboygan counties. See id.
107. Winnebago County. See id.
108. Kenosha, Outagamie, and Rock counties. See id.
109. See Wis. STAT. § 753.06 (1995-96).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. WIS. STAT. § 753.01 (1995-96).
115. See Wisconsin Courts, supra note 71.
116. See id. at 10.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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these elections, there was only one candidate; in forty-two, the election
was contested.
In 1999, the salary of a circuit court judge is $99,961.
D. Municipal Courts
Wisconsin has 217 municipal courts, with twenty-two courts serving
from two to thirteen communities.' These courts have jurisdiction over
actions in which a city, town, or village "seeks to impose forfeitures for
violations of municipal ordinances of the municipality that operates the
court."1 With the exception of Milwaukee and Madison, municipal
court judgeships are part-time positions. Milwaukee has three full-time
municipal court judges and five part-time commissioners. 4 Of the 217
municipal court judges, 117 are non-lawyers."
Salaries, job
descriptions, and terms of office are decided by the municipalities that
create the municipal courts.' 6 Municipal judges are elected in
nonpartisan elections."
III. PROPOSED RULES
A. ProposedSCR 60.06: The Canon.
The proposed Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.06 is identical to
ABA Model Code Canon 5 and the Beilfuss-DeWitt proposed Canon 5.
It simply provides that "A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain
From Inappropriate Political Activity." Like the other Canons, it is a
broad norm or statement of principle. The ABA's Introductory Note to
Canon 5 of the Model Code makes reference to the wide variation in
methods of judicial selection among jurisdictions and even within
jurisdictions, but contains no substantive or policy statements.'12 The
Beilfuss-DeWitt committee's Introductory Note, on the other hand,
states:
Canon 5 of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct has been
121. See id.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See id.
at 6.
See Wis. STAT. § 755.045(1) (1995-96).
See Wisconsin Courts,supranote 71.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5, introductory note (1990).
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significantly amended by the drafters to allow for the realities of
the elective process. Wisconsin is committed to the non-partisan
elections of judges. The elective process requires that the public
be informed about the issues and the candidates. It further
requires that a candidate raise substantial funds and nonfinancial support. These activities necessarily conflict with some
of the basic goals of the Code. The provisions of Canon 5 should
not be used to interpret language elsewhere in the Code because
of its specific purpose to encourage fair and informed elections."
The significant differences between the ABA Model Code and the
Beilfuss-DeWitt proposals were:
ABA Model Code

Beilfuss-DeWitt

CampaignRhetoric:
No "pledges or promises of
conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of
the office."'

No "pledges or promises
of conduct in office that
would appeal to the
partisanship
of
the
electorate." 131

No "statements that commit
or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues
that are likely to come before
the court."'32

No
"statements that
commit or appear to
commit the candidate
with respect to cases or
controversies that are
likely to come before the
court. ,133

Campaign Contributions:
"Candidate's committees may
solicit
contributions.. .no
earlier than [one year]
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

"Candidate's committees
may
solicit
contributions.., for a

Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at 33.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr, Canon 5A(3)(d)(1) (1990).
Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5A(3)(d)(1).
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990).
Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5A(3)(d)(2).
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before.. .nd no later than
[90] days after the last
election
in
which
the
candidate participates during
the election year.13

reasonable period of time
before and after the last
election in which the
judicial
candidate
participates. "135

Endorsements:

No personal solicitation by
judicial candidate. 3

A candidate may solicit
oral
or
written
endorsements directly or
by committee.

Candidate
may
publicly
endorse or oppose only other
candidates for the same
judicial office in a public
election
in
which
the
3s
candidate is running.

Candidate
may
not
"publicly endorse
or
publicly oppose another
candidate
for
any
139
nonjudicial... office.,

PoliticalActivity:

Party membership permitted."

A judge or candidate for
judicial office shall not
"be a member
of a
141
political party."

Judge and candidate may
identify42 self as member of a
party.

Judge and candidate may
not
appeal
to
partisanship.43

134. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCr, Canon 5C(2) (1990).
135. Beilfuss-DeWitt, supranote 43, at Canon 5C(2).
136. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5C(2).

137. Beilfuss-DeWitt, supranote 43, at Canon 5C(2).
138. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5C(1)(iv) (1990).
139. Beilfuss-DeWitt, supranote 43, at Canon 5A(1)(b).
140. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCT, Canon 5A(1), 5C(1)(a)(ii) (1990).
141. Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5A(1)(d).
142. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canons 5A(1)(a)(ii) (1990).
143. See Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5A(3)(d)(I). The specific prohibition
is against making "pledges or promises of conduct in office that would appeal to the
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Judge and candidate may
"contribute to a political
organization." 14

Judge and candidate may
not contribute to political
organization or candidate
for nonjudicial office.145

Judge and candidate may
purchase tickets for and
attend political gatherings at
any timeY 6

Judge and candidate may
purchase tickets for and
attend political gatherings
only when a candidate for
election. 47

A non-judge candidate for
appointment to judicial office
may retain an office in a
political organization, attend
political
gatherings,
and
continue to pay ordinary
assessments and ordinary
contributions to a political
organization."

A
candidate
for
appointment to judicial
office may not be a
member of a political
party, "act as a leader or
hold ...

office

in

a

political organization,...
pay an assessment or
make contributions to a
political organization. 11149

B. Proposed Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.06(1): Candidatefor
Office

The rule, requiring a judge first to resign her judgeship before
becoming a candidate for a nonjudicial elective office, is identical to the
current SCR 60.01. The rule originated in the 1933 amendment to
Canon 30 of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics." The rule, generating
little controversy, is found in the ABA Model Code and was
partisanship of the electorate." Canon 5A(1)(d), however, would prohibit a judge or judicial
candidate from "in any other way giv[ing] the appearance of being partisan."
144. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5C(1)(a)(iii).
145. See Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5A(1)(e).
146. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5C(1)(a)(i).
147. See Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon5C(a)(a).
148. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5B(2)(b) (1990).
149. Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5A(l)(a), (d), (e).
150. See McCarthy, 255 Wis. 234,38 N.W.2d 679 (1949) and Canon 30, supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
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recommended by the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee."'

In Clements v.

Fashing,"2 the U. S. Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the
Texas Constitution limiting an incumbent public official's ballot access
do not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution."
C. ProposedSCR 60.06(2) Partymembership and Activities155

The current SCR 60.06(2) provides:
Except for activities concerning his or her own election, a judge
shall not be a member of any political party or participate in its
affairs, caucuses, promotions, platforms, endorsements,
conventions or activities. A judge shall not make or solicit
financial or other contributions in support of its causes or
publicly endorse or speak on behalf of its candidates or
platforms."6
The proposed rule" differs in a number of respects.
First,the rule applies equally to judges and to non-judge candidates
for judicial office. In this regard, it parallels the recommendation of the
Beilfuss-DeWitt committee and is intended to strengthen the
nonpartisan nature of judicial elections in Wisconsin. The ABA Model
Code would permit judges and nonincumbent candidates for judicial
office to hold membership in a political party."s Although the Model
151. See Appendix E, infra.
152. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
153. The first limitation provided that "no judge of any court... or other person holding
a [federal, state, or foreign] lucrative office... shall during the term for which [the person]
was elected or appointed, be eligible for the [Texas] legislature." Id.at 960 (quoting TEX.
CONST. ART. III, § 19). The second provided that if any one of certain specified state and
county officers becomes a candidate for any state or federal office other than the office then
held, at any time when the unexpired term of the office then held shall exceed one year, such
candidacy "shall constitute an automatic resignation of the office then held." Id. at 960
(quotingTEX. CONST. ART. XVI, § 65).
154. See also Morial v. Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, 565 F.2d 295 (5th
Cir. 1977) (upholding against First Amendment and equal protection challenges Louisiana
statute and canon of judicial ethics requiring judges to resign their position before announcing
their candidacy for nonjudicial office); Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2"' Cir. 1980);
Adams v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 502 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
155. The text of the rules appears in Appendix A, infra.
156. Wis. STAT. § SCR 60.06(2) (1997).
157. See proposed SCR 60.06(2), Appendix A, infra.
158. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCt, Canon 5A(1), 5C(1), 5C(3) (1990).
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Code prohibits candidates for election from active participation in the
distinctly partisan activities of political organizations,' 9 a non-judge
candidate for appointment to a judicial office would be permitted to
retain an office in a political organization, attend party gatherings, and
continue to pay ordinary assessments and make ordinary contributions
to the organization.' 6 The Beilfuss-DeWitt committee rejected the
provisions of the Model Code that provided different rules for judge
candidates and non-judge candidates for appointment.
In a
Commentary to the proposed rule, the committee stated: "Canon 5,
Section B(2)(b) was omitted to insure that all candidates, judicial and
nonjudicial, have the same restrictions on their political activities when
they become candidates for judicial appointment." The Fairchild
Commission shared the desire of the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee to
"level the playing field" for incumbent and nonincumbent judicial
candidates, at least so far as practicable. In addition to the fairness
concerns, however, the underlying substantive concerns about partisan
political activities by nonpartisan judges obtain with respect to
nonincumbent candidates for judicial office. Thus, the proposed SCR
60.06(2) would apply with equal vigor to sitting judges and to other
candidates for judicial office.
The proposed rule would have a significant impact on a subset of
potential non-judge candidates for judicial office, i. e., those who seek
judicial office while holding a partisan nonjudicial office.16 A number of
former State Assembly members have run for and been elected to
judicial office during their term of service in the legislature. Justice
William A. Bablitch was elected to the supreme court while a member
of the Wisconsin Senate. Under the proposed rule, similarly situated
candidates would be required to resign their party membership and to
cease participation in party affairs, including party caucuses. A judicial
159.
160.
161.
162.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5A(1) (1990).
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5B(2)(b) (1990).
See Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5B(2).
WIS. STAT. § 13.04(3)(1997-98) provides:

Any incumbent member of the legislature may, during the term for which the
member was elected to the legislature, seek election to any judicial office or state
elective office for a term commencing upon the expiration of the member's current
legislative term and shall, if so elected, upon the commencement of the new term be
entitled to the full compensation, expense reimbursement or other emoluments for
such office or position established by laws as of the date on which the term begins.
See also WIs. CONST. art. IV, § 12; 63 Op. Att'y. Gen. 127 (1974).
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candidate who holds a legislative leadership position, including
committee chairmanship, based on party membership would perforce
forfeit the leadership position.'
Second, the proposed rule applies to judges-elect. The Model Code,
1997 Wisconsin code, and Beilfuss-DeWitt proposals make no reference
to that period during which a successful nonincumbent candidate for
judicial office is no longer a candidate but has not yet been sworn in as a
judge. That period for Wisconsin judges-elect is between the first
Tuesday in April of the election year 1" and the succeeding August 1,"' a
period of almost four months. It would be anomalous to permit partisan
political activity during this period while forbidding it during the
bracketing periods of judicial candidacy and judicial service.
Third, the proposed rule expressly permits judges, judicial
candidates, and judges-elect to purchase tickets for and attend public
events sponsored by political parties and candidates for partisan office.
'1
The current rule does not expressly address the issue of attendance,
although the Comment to the rule does. 67 The Beilfuss-DeWitt
proposed rules would permit a judge or judicial candidate to attend
political party meetings as a member of the public,1" but not purchase a
ticket for a political party dinner or other function 6 9 except during a
period of candidacy.17 Under the Commission's proposed rule, judges
and judges-elect and judicial candidates could at any time attend
political gatherings open to the public and pay for tickets as long as the
163. Then Senate Majority Leader Bablitch voluntarily resigned his leadership position
when he ran for the supreme court, but not his party membership.

164. See WIs. STAT. § 5.02(21) (1995-96).
165. See WIs. STAT. §§ 751.01,752.04,753.01 (1995-96).
166. Wisconsin SCR 60.06(2) provides:
Party membership. Except for activities concerning his or her own election, a judge
shall not be a member of any political party or participate in its affairs, caucuses,
promotions, platforms, endorsements, conventions or activities. A judge shall not
make or solicit financial or other contributions in support of its causes or publicly
endorse or speak on behalf of its candidates or platforms.
WIS.STAT. § SCR 60.06(2) (1997).
167. The Comment states, in part: "This rule does not preclude a judge from attending a
political meeting as a member of the public, but he or she shall not attend as a participant."
Neither the rule nor the Comment addresses the issue of purchasing a ticket. Wis. STAT. §
SCR 60.06(2) ct. (1990).
168. Beilfuss-DeWitt, supranote 43, at Canon 5A(7)(d)(I), (ii).
169. Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5A(e).
170. Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5C(1)(a).
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cost does "not exceed an amount necessary to defray the sponsor's cost
of the event reasonably1 71 allocable to [the judge's, judge-elect's, or
candidate's] attendance.
The Commission's proposed rule,'" like related provisions of the
Model Code,"' the Beilfuss-DeWitt recommendations,174 and the present
code ' 75 prohibits those subject to it from publicly endorsing or speaking
on behalf of political parties, candidates, and platforms. There is, of
course, no bright line between "private" and "public" statements on
behalf of parties or candidates. Nor will it always be clear whether a
statement constitutes an "endorsement" or speaking "on behalf" of a
party or candidate.
In states that explicitly prohibit or restrict endorsements, the real
problem has been to determine what constitutes an
"endorsement." A public statement of support for another
candidate clearly qualifies, but less direct statements, and some
actions, can constitute endorsements as well. Advisory bodies
appear to agree that a judicial candidate's simple appearance at a
political function held for another candidate does not constitute
an improper endorsement, but any greater involvement has
raised objections. Between the extremes of passive attendance
and active participation in the campaign events of others lies a
large gray area of activity whose ethical status remains
uncertain."7

Like other citizens, judges and others subject to judicial codes would
like to know what they may and may not say about public persons,
including candidates for office, and about public issues, especially issues
related to the judiciary and the administration of justice.1"

The

members of the Commission learned early on in their deliberations of
the desire by many Wisconsin judges to have more precise guidance in
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Appendix A, infra, proposed SCR 60.06(2).
See Appendix A, infra, proposed SCR 60.06(2)(d).
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5A(1)(b), (c) (1990).
See Beilfuss-DeWitt, supranote 43, at Canon 5A(a)(b), (c).
See WIS. STAT. § SCR 60.06(2) (1997).

See PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 95 (1990).
177. "[B]ecause we assume that [persons are] free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he [or she] may act accordingly." Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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the standards governing judicial behavior. In its Initial Report, the
Commission identified as an issue whether the concept of endorsement
needed to be defined."
When surveyed on that issue, 9 the
commissioners substantially agreed that the concept should be defined.
Nonetheless, by the conclusion of its deliberations, the Commission
opted not to propose a definition of "endorsement."180 In its Final
Report, the Commission stated: "Because of time restraints and
feasibility concerns, the Commission has not attempted to draw ethical
lines in the 'large gray area"' (referring to the term used in the
American Judicature Society monograph quoted above)."'
It would probably have been more accurate to attribute the lack of
attempted rule-drafting in this area entirely to feasibility concerns. All
rules respecting political speech bump up against-and sometimes
collide with-the First Amendment 1 2 Rule-makers who attempt to
identify specifically the constellations of factual circumstances in which
free speech interests may have to be weighed against a government's
interest in an independent and nonpartisan judiciary are doomed to
futility and failure. In Buckley v. Valeo,'" the Supreme Court,
addressing the constitutionality of several provisions of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971,"4 ("FECA") said: "Discussion of
public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral
to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to
such political expression...

."'

Buckley v. Valeo was not a case

involving the constitutionality of ethical restrictions on judges' political
expression. It is nonetheless instructive in noting the difficulty of
"clearly mark[ing] the boundary between permissible and impermissible
178. See Appendix D, infra at 151.
179. See Appendix C, item 181 infra at 125.
180. See Appendix B, infra at 99-101, 106.
181. See Appendix B, infra at 106.
182. U.S. CONST. amend. I, provides in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech ... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." The Wisconsin
Constitution is at least as formally absolute as the First Amendment in protecting freedom of
expression. Article I, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: "Every person may
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects... and no laws shall be passed
to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." For a case upholding the
constitutionality of an ethical rule forbidding judges from endorsing candidates for public
office, see In re Code of Judicial Conduct (Canons 1, 2, and 7A(1)(b)), 603 So. 2d 494 (Fla.

1992).
183. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

184. As amended in 1974. See id.
at 6, n.1.
185. Id. at 14.
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speech. " ""
[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve
in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are
intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and
governmental actions.' 8
The Supreme Court preserved the constitutionality of the
M and disclosure requirements"
expenditure limits'8
of FECA, as against
First Amendment challenges, by interpreting them as applying only to
expenditures for political communications that "expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 9° The "expressly
advocates" language was incorporated into Wisconsin's campaign
finance law (containing registration and disclosure requirements)
through an amendment to the statutory definition of acts done for a
"political purpose." Section 11.01(16) provides:
An act is for a "political purpose" when it is done for the purpose
of influencing the election or nomination for election of any
individual to state or local office ....
(a) Acts which are for "political purposes" include but are not
limited to:
(1) The making of a communication which expressly advocates
the election, defeat, recall or retention of a clearly identified
candidate ....
186. Id. at 41.
187. See id. at 42.
188. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 11 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1).
189. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 11 U.S.C. § 434(e).
190. 424 U.S. at 80.
191. WIS. STAT. § 11.01(16) (1999); see also WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ElBd 1.28 (1999)
(discussing scope of regulated activity; election of candidates).
Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) "Contributions for political purposes" means contributions made to 1) a
candidate, or 2) a political committee or 3) an individual who makes contributions to
a candidate or political committee or incurs obligations or makes disbursements for
the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of an identified candidate.
(2) Individuals other than candidates and committees other than political
committees are subject to the applicable disclosure-related and recordkeepingrelated requirements of ch. 11, Wis. Stats., only when they:
(a) Make contributions for political purposes, or
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At the end of its 1999 Term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed
down Elections Board of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Manufacturers and
Commerce,19 in which it declined to rule whether certain television and
radio ads,1" aired during election season and directed at specific

legislators, constituted express advocacy.
We conclude that the respondents, when they broadcast the
advertisements, lacked fair warning that the ads could qualify as
express advocacy in Wisconsin under a context-based approach.
The Board, in effect, engaged in retroactive rule-making in
attempting to apply such an approach.
Since this violation of due process - fundamental fairness - is

determinative of the issue of whether these respondents can be
prosecuted for the ads involved, there is no need for us to decide
whether the ads are express advocacy.1 "
The majority eschewed the opportunity to provide definition to the
(b) Make contributions to any person at the requestor with the authorization of a
candidate or political committee, or
(c) Make expenditures for the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat
of an identified candidate.
Wis. Admin. Code § ElBd 1.28 (1999).
192. 597 N.W.2d 721, No. 98-0596,1999 WL 457729 (Wis. July 7,1999).
193. Examples include:
This year, Wisconsin homeowners received their property taxes cut by almost 17%.
No thanks to Senator Alice Clausing. She voted against the largest property tax cut
in Wisconsin history. Then Clausing voted against an additional 36 million dollars
for schools - right in her own district. Alice Clausing. Liberal on Taxes... Wrong
on education. Call Senator Clausing. Tell her to stop voting with those Madison
liberals.
Id. at *18, n.79.
and
What has Gary Drzewiecki done for Northeast Wisconsin? Homeowners will see
their property taxes cut by an average of 11.5%. Our children's schools will receive
millions in additional state aid. And taxpayers will get spending controls on local
government. Lower taxes, less spending, better schools. It's a record we can all be
proud of. Call Gary Drzewiecki and tell him thanks.
Id. at n.81.
194. Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
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concept of "express advocacy."
[W]e decline the Board's invitation to craft a new standard of
express advocacy for the state of Wisconsin. The creation of
such a standard is properly the role of the legislature and the
Board, not this court ....

The level of regulation desirable in

this area depends upon public policy considerations more
appropriately explored in a forum other than this court. We
have described our role in areas "peppered with political
perceptions and emotionally laden views," as one restricted to
interpreting the scope of constitutional requirements.
We stress that this holding places no restraints on the ability of
the legislature and the Board to define further a constitutional
standard of express advocacy to be prospectively applied. We
encourage them to do so, as we are well aware of the type of
compelling state interests which may justify some ver limited
restrictions on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights."
Justice David T. Prosser concurred in the court's dismissal of the
suit, but dissented "from much in the majority opinion," stating, "[i]t is
probably ill-advised to make any comment about express advocacy in
this case because it really amounts to an advisory opinion. "'16 Justice
William A. Bablitch joined in the majority opinion but in a concurring
opinion stated:
I would have preferred that a majority could have found its way
to expressing a standard by declaring that, in the future, ads such
as these constitute "express advocacy." I would have joined that
result. Nevertheless, a half loaf in this instance is far better than
no loaf at all. The dissent presents a well reasoned and
persuasive case as to why these ads constitute "express
advocacy." Does the dissent express an acceptable standard?
For me, yes. Are there the votes for it? No.1 7
Dissenting Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, joined by Chief Justice
Abrahamson, stated that the majority was "dodging the issue and
relegating the task of defining express advocacy to the legislature or
195. Id. at *40 (citation omitted).
196. Id. at *12.
197. Id. at *11.
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Elections Board."1" Perhaps not surprisingly, neither the legislature nor
the Elections Board seems eager to accept the majority's tender of the
hot potato by legislating or rule-making on the meaning of "express
advocacy. "'99
Buckley v. Valeo

and its progeny, including Elections Board of the

State of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce,'1 deal

with regulation of campaign finance, not with judicial ethics. The law is
well settled that a state has a compelling interest in "[m]aintaining the
impartiality, the independence from political influence, and the public
image of the judiciary as impartial and independent"2° and that interest
is sufficient to justify narrowly drawn regulations that restrict or burden
the exercise of a judge's First Amendment freedoms.' The excursus to
reflect on Buckley and Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce,
however, is not irrelevant to the current and proposed versions of
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.06(2), for those cases reveal the
difficulties of attempting to regulate conduct entitled at least to First
Amendment scrutiny and possibly to First Amendment protection.
Neither the current nor the proposed rule prohibits private activity.
Neither prohibits discussion of issues and candidates, but only public
endorsement or speaking on behalf of partisan candidates or platforms.
Where lies the line between private and public? What acts constitute an
"endorsement"?2
What does it mean to speak "on behalf of" a
198. Id.at *13.
199. See, e.g., Don'tExpect Campaign Reform Soon, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL,
July 30, 1999, at 18, available at 1999 WL 21524496; Matt Pommer, Narrow Campaign Ad
Rule May Pass, CAPITAL TIMES, July 29, 1999, at A6, available at 1999 WL 22054823;
Elections Board Steering Clear of Issue-Ad Rules; Panel Says Legislature Should Decide on
Regulation of Political Advertising, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, July 26, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 21523776; Elections Board: Pols Should Rule on Issue Ads, CAPITAL
TIMES, July 26, 1999, at A3, available at 1999 WL 22054464.
200. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
201. 1999 WL457729.
202. Code of Judicial Conduct (Canons 1, 2, and 7A(1)(b)), 603 So. 2d at 497 (citing
Morial, 565 F.2d 295; In re Caulkin, 351 A.2d 740 (1976); In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (Wash.
1988)).
203. See Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7h Cir. 1993); Stretton v.
Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
204. In Code of JudicialConduct (Canons 1, 2, and 7A(1)(b)), Florida Court of Appeals
Judge Hugh Glickstein faced discipline from the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission
for writing an open letter to the electors of Florida urging them to vote for the retention of
Chief Justice Leander Shaw. 603 So.2d 494. A number of newspapers published the letter.
See id. The Florida version of Wisconsin SCR 60.06(2)(d) forbade public endorsement of any
candidate for public office. See id. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the ethics rules. See id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kogan wrote:
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candidate or platform?"5 Regrettably, but perhaps inevitably, the
proposed ethical rules will be no more help to a judge seeking guidance
than the "express advocacy" rules are to those seeking to comply (or to
avoid compliance) with the campaign finance laws.
D. ProposedWisconsin Supreme CourtRule 60.06(3) Campaign
Rhetoric

1. Paragraph (a) "In General"
This proposed rule requires judges, judicial candidates, and judgeselect to maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office "in campaign
conduct and otherwise."'
It is similar to 1990 ABA Model Code

In fact, if Judge Glickstein had merely praised Justice Shaw without indicating any
opinion regarding the merit retention election, we would not be confronting this
case today. For example, Judge Glickstein clearly would have had a right to appear
in a television interview and advocate adherence to equal-rights laws, the bettering
of conditions for children, and judicial impartiality. He even could have praised
Justice Shaw and the Court for their adherence to these same principles, as he did in
his letter. The majority apparently finds fault with Judge Glickstein solely because
he coupled the following sentence with these other remarks: "I am voting "YES" to
retain Chief Justice Leander Shaw for the following reasons ....
I do not see how
this single statement brings down the wall of protection afforded by the guarantee of
free speech.
Id. at 502, n.10. Perhaps Judge Glickstein should have consulted the lawyers and political
consultants who composed the ads at issue in Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce. See
supra text accompanying notes 192 to 199.
205. In the Final Report, Appendix B, infra, the Commission stated:
It should be noted that there is nothing in the proposed SCR 60.06(2) itself that
broadly prohibits judges and judicial candidates from speaking at party-sponsored
public events. Proposed SCR 60.06(2)(d) specifically prohibits judges and judicial
candidates and judges-elect from publicly endorsing or speaking on behalf of a
party's candidates or platforms. Proposed SCR 60.06(2)(b) prohibits them from
"participating" in the "affairs... or activities of a political party or of a candidate
for partisan office", but the concluding sentences of proposed SCR 60.06(2) would
permit judges and candidates for judicial office and judges-elect to attend "as a
member of the public" and at cost public events sponsored by a political party or
partisan candidate. The commissioners discussed the question of what if any public
comments or greetings, of a nonpartisan nature, a judge or judicial candidate may
make at such a gathering, but did not attempt to draft a rule governing this conduct
beyond the strictures of SCR 60.06(2)d).
Appendix B, infra at 101.
206. Proposed Rules, Appendix A, infra. Wisconsin SCR 60.06(3)(a) provides: "While
holding the office of judge or while a candidate for judicial office or a judge-elect, every
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The ABA rule, however, also calls upon candidates for

judicial office to "act in a manner consistent with the integrity and
The proposed rule omits that
independence of the judiciary."'
language as duplicative of the current Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule
60.02 and Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.03.210 Those rules,
however, apply only to judges. The proposed rule would be better

drafted if it incorporated the ABA language so as to make Wisconsin
Supreme Court Rule 60.02 and Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.03
expressly applicable to non-judge candidates for judicial office and to

judges-elect.'

The ABA rule also calls upon the judicial candidate to

"encourage members of the candidate's family" to adhere to the same

standards of political conduct in support of the candidate as apply to the
candidate. 212 The Commission did not propose such a rule. Even the
judge, candidate for judicial office, and judge-elect shall maintain, in campaign conduct and
otherwise, the dignity appropriate to judicial office."
207. "A candidate for a judicial office: (a) shall maintain the dignity appropriate to
judicial office and act in a manner consistent with the integrity and independence of the
judiciary, and shall encourage members of the candidate's family to adhere to the same
standards of political conduct in support of the candidate as apply to the candidate."
208. Id.
209. Wisconsin SCR 60.02 provides:
A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A
judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of
conduct and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary shall be preserved. This chapter applies to every
aspect of judicial behavior except purely legal decisions. Legal decisions made in
the course of judicial duty on the record are subject solely to judicial review.
(1997).
210. Wisconsin SCR 60.03 provides, in part:

WiS. STAT. SCR 60.03

A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the
judge's activities.
(1) A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in he integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Vis. STAT. SCR 60.03 (1997).
211. "The requirement that candidates 'act in a manner consistent with the integrity and
independence of the judiciary' was inserted by Committee Amendment in Section 5A(3)(a)
at the urging of the American Judicature Society, to require a high standard of conduct of
non-judge candidates as well as of judges who are candidates and thereby to remove an
inequality in the conduct of campaigns for judicial office." MILORD, supra note 19, at 49.
212. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 5A(3).

MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

ABA rule-drafters were wary of proposing political rules involving
judges' and judicial candidates' families.213
A revision of the text of section 5A(3)(a) and a new first
paragraph of Commentary make clear that candidates are not
required to encourage members of their families to adhere in
every respect to the same standards of political conduct as apply
to the candidate; their adherence is sought rather with respect to
their conduct in support of the candidate's campaign. This
change reflects the Committee's awareness that the families of
judges and judicial candidates are composed of individuals with
independent lives, interests and rights, and that any requirement
that a judge or judicial candidate seek to influence or control the
behavior of those individuals must be narrowly tailored.2"'
Recent related cases out of the Ohio Supreme Court and the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
ethics rules requiring judges to maintain the dignity appropriate to

judicial office.215

In In re Complaint Against Harper,6 the Ohio

Supreme Court publicly reprimanded an Ohio Court of Appeals judge
for a television ad she ran in her campaign against an incumbent Ohio
Supreme Court justice. The court described the ad as follows:
The video itself begins with a group picture of Justices of the
Ohio Supreme Court, but in succeeding frames, focuses on
Justice Resnick's picture only. The audio portion of the
commercial states as follows:
"On the Ohio Supreme Court, one Justice has a problem. It's
money. Most of Resnick's money comes from just one place,
213. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5A(3)(a) commentary (1990).
214. See MILORD, supra note 19, at 49.
215. The first case is In re Complaint Against Harper, 673 N.E.2d 1253 (Ohio 1996).
After disciplinary proceedings were commenced against Judge Harper, she filed an action in
the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, seeking to restrain and enjoin the
defendants from conducting disciplinary proceedings against her. See Sara J. Harper v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio, No. 96-00087 (N.D. Ohio 1996). The
district court abstained from interfering with the disciplinary proceeding and dismissed the
complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court
dismissal, using reasoning that paralleled that of the Ohio Supreme Court in In re Harper.
Harper v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio, 113 F.3d 1234 (6th Cir.
1997).
216. 673 N.E.2d 1253 (Ohio 1996).
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the plaintiffs lawyers who sue, sue, sue. Over $300,000.00 just
from them. This small group of suing lawyers wants Resnick
with her liberal rulings to make it easier for them to collect
millions in fees. It's time for a change to Judge Sara Harper.
Recommended, endorsed, highly rated, 20 years as a Judge,
Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel. Judge Sara Harper."
While the above text is playing, a series of pictures appear.
The first is a group picture of the Justices of the Ohio Supreme
Court. In the next frame, only Justice Resnick is featured, and
the accompanying text says, "Justice Has Problem." The third
frame again shows Justice Resnick's picture, and repeats the
phrase "Justice Has Problem." However, this time, the phrase
".... It's Money!" is added. The fourth frame once more features

Justice Resnick's picture, with the caption, "Resnick's Money."
The fifth frame of the ad is the same as the fourth, except that a
large check is displayed, with the words "Trial Lawyers" and
"'Sue & Sue"' on the top left-hand comer of the check. In the
portion of the check where one would normally see the dollar
amount is the figure "Over $300,000.00," and the check is signed
by "Cheatem Good."
The next two frames of the ad state that "Resnick's Liberal
Rulings Help Lawyers Collect Millions." These frames also
picture individuals, next to what appear to be ads making various
claims, such as "Experienced in recovering large money awards,"
"NO FEE UNLESS YOU COLLECT," and "No Fee if No
Recovery." 17
A disciplinary proceeding was commenced against Judge Harper,
charging her with violating five Canons of the Code of Judicial Ethics:
Canon 1 (failing to uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary);218 Canon 2A (failing to conduct herself in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary);2' 9 Canon 7B(1)(a) (failing to maintain the
dignity

appropriate

to judicial

office);"

Canon

7B(1)(c)

(announcing views of disputed legal or political issues or
217. Id. at 1256.
21& Id. at 1257. In the Wisconsin Code, the canon is found at SCR 60.02.
219. 1d. In the Wisconsin Code, the canon is found at SCR 60.03(1).
220. Id. This canon is not found in the current Wisconsin Code, but appeared as §
5A(3)(a) in the Beilfuss-DeWitt recommendations and is found in SCR 60.06(3)(a) in the
rules proposed by the Fairchild Commission.
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misrepresenting facts);221 and Canon 7C(9) (publishing or
distributing a written or printed false statement concerning a
candidate, knowing the statement to be false or with reckless
disregard of its falsity). m
The Ohio Supreme Court's Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline recommended dismissal of the charges based on Canons
1, 7B(1)(c), and 7C(9).'
However, the board concluded that violations of Canons 2A and
7B(1)(a) had occurred, because the ad as a whole undermined
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of Justice
Resnick. The board also found that the ad portrayed a lack of
dignity appropriate to judicial office by suggesting to Ohio voters
that a justice's decisions were influenced by receipt of campaign
contributions. In particular, the board found that the ad raised
the following impermissible implications: "(1) Certain lawyers
are dishonest; (2) One justice is associated with those lawyers; (3)
There is something improper about lawyers contributing to a
judicial campaign; (4) A justice appears to be the captive of one
class of litigants, group of lawyers, or special interests." 4
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the board and publicly
reprimanded Judge Harper. The court upheld the constitutionality of
Canons 2A and 7B(1)(a) against charges of vagueness and overbreadth
and a claim that they otherwise impermissibly infringe on rights
protected by the First Amendment.225
Regarding the vagueness issue, the court relied heavily on Parkerv.
Levy 26 in which the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a regulation that punished commissioned officers of the military services
for "conduct unbecoming an officer."227 The Court based its decision on
221. This canon, based on Canon 7B(1)(c) of the 1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
is not found in the current Wisconsin Code, nor did the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee or the
Fairchild Commission recommend such a rule.
222. See proposed Wisconsin SCR 60.06(3)(c), Proposed Rules, Appendix A, infra at 75.
223. See In re ComplaintAgainst Harper,673 N.E.2d at 1257. Concerning Canon 7C(9),
it was found that the relator had failed to establish that the trial lawyer contributors had not
made the contributions as alleged by the ad. Concerning Canon 7B(1)(c), it was "found that
the statements in the ad were not sufficiently specific to violate the Canon." Id. at 1257.
224. Id. at 1257-58.
225. See id. at 1268.
226. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
227. Id. at 733.
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the facts that (1) the military is a "specialized community governed by a
separate discipline from that of the civilian;"' (2) the military had
developed customs and usages that imparted meaning to the "seemingly
imprecise standards;"' 9 and (3) the military regulated broad aspects of
life unregulated in the civilian area, accompanied by sanctions "more
akin to administrative or civil sanctions than to civilian criminal ones." '
The Ohio court held that the judiciary was similar to the military in
these regards.3 1 The court further stated:
[W]e find nothing unfair in the imposition of sanctions for
violation of either Canon 7B(1)(a) or 2A. First and foremost,
fair warning of the prohibited conduct existed in the form of an
interpretative board opinion and preexisting case law cited in the
opinion. Specifically, the board issued an advisory opinion in
1989 in response to the following question:
"How much negative criticism of an incumbent judge is
permissible before such comments infringe on the dignity
appropriate to that judicial office?" In response, the board
commented:
"The threshold test to apply is whether the statements
regarding an opponent are indeed truthful. * * * Once this is

satisfied, there is a further requirement that the candidate must
maintain the dignity appropriate to the office being sought. * * *
This standard is not a precise one to apply; instead, it requires
each candidate to exercise his or her own personal and
professional judgement as to the implication and effect of the
proposed criticisms." 2
The court also rejected the overbreadth argument.
Overbreadth is avoided if the regulation or legislation in
question may be narrowed by reasonable construction, including
interpretation by the agency responsible for enforcement.... At
the outset, we observe that many years ago, the [Ohio] Supreme
Court approved the right of attorneys to criticize the judgments
and conduct of judges during an election campaign, but
228. Id. at 744.
229. Id. at 746-747.
230. Id. at 751.
231. See Harper,673 N.E.2d at 1264.

232. Id. at 1263 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
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emphasized that the criticism must be done in a decent and
respectful manner.... In addition, Gov. Bar. R. V(2)(C) has
been adopted, and affords interested parties an opportunity to
obtain advice from the board about proposed conduct. In this
vein, the board issued the advisory opinion previously cited,
which provided guidance for candidates considering criticizing
opponents in an election campaign.'
Although respondent agrees that the state has a compelling
interest in protecting public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary, she is not willing to concede that this compelling
interest overrides her right to publish truthful criticism of a
Supreme Court justice. She argues that to the extent the Canons
are interpreted to prevent truthful criticism of the judiciary, they
are unconstitutionally overbroad. We wholeheartedly agree, but
also conclude that the Canons do not prohibit truthful criticism,
so long as the criticism is done fairly, accurately, and upon facts,
not false representations. Accordingly, given the construction
that truthful criticism of the judiciary in a dignified manner is not
sanctionable, the Canons are not overbroad.
More than 15 years earlier, in In re Seraphim,35 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court dealt with a number of alleged violations of the 1968
Code of Judicial Ethics, including charges of "gross personal
misconduct" and of making comments which might affect the outcome
of judicial proceedings or preclude fair trial.23 The court stated:
There is no dispute between the parties that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines apply to the judicial conduct regulations at
issue here. While these doctrines are generally used to challenge
the validity of laws defining criminal conduct, respondent is
correct in his assertion that the prohibitions against vagueness
and overbreadth extend to regulations affecting conditions of
government employment as well as penal statutes.
However, it would appear from those cases which have
addressed the question of unconstitutional vagueness in this
context that a greater degree of flexibility and breadth is
233. Id. at 1264-65.
234. Id. at 1265.

235. 294 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1980).
236. Id. at 492-93.
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permitted with respect to judicial disciplinary rules and statutes
than is allowed in criminal statues. Cf. Parkerv. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). As the Minnesota
Supreme Court noted in In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 809
(Minn. 1978), "the constitutionality of necessarily broad
standards of professional conduct has long been recognized."'
The court's analysis in Matter of Seraphim suggests that it would
come to the same conclusion respecting the constitutionality of the
"dignity appropriate to judicial office" language proposed in Wisconsin
Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3)(a) as the Ohio Supreme Court did in
Harper.'
2. Paragraph (b) "Promises and commitments"
The proposed rule is based on 1990 ABA Model Rule 5A(3)(d)(ii).
Its most significant-and probably most controversial provision-is its
ban on judges and judicial candidates doing anything that would commit
or appear to commit the judge or candidate in advance with respect to
any particular case, or controversy, or legal issue likely to come before
the court to which election or appointment is sought. It differs from the
Beilfuss-DeWitt recommended rule insofar as the Beilfuss-DeWitt
committee deleted the prohibition against committing or appearing to
commit with respect to issues that are likely to come before the court.
In the commentary to its recommended rule, the committee stated:
"The drafters specifically omitted the words "or issues" in the ABA
Model Code to allow the voters to receive valuable information in
judicial elections. "' What this commentary means, and indeed what
the recommended rule was intended to mean, is hardly clear, although it
should be noted that the Beilfuss-DeWitt form of the rule, with the
reference to "issues" deleted, is the same as the current Wisconsin
Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3).2'
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
673 N.E.2d at 1257-58.
Appendix E, infra.
Wis. SCR 60.06(3)(1997-98) provides:

(3) Promises. A judge who is a candidate for judicial office shall not make or permit
others to make in his or her behalf promises or suggestions of conduct in office
which appeal to the cupidity or partisanship of the election or appointing power. A
judge shall not do or permit others to do in his or her behalf anything which would
commit the judge or appear to commit the judge in advance with respect to any
particular case or controversy or which suggests that, if elected or chosen, the judge
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Some historical review may help (or perhaps not). Canon 30 of the
1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics forbade promises appealing to
"cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or electing power" and forbade
a judge's announcing in advance "his conclusions of law on disputed
issues to gain class support."2 1 Canon 30 was replaced in the 1972
Model Code of Judicial Conduct by Section 7B(1)(c), which provided
that a candidate, including an incumbent judge, "should not make
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on
disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identify,
qualifications, present position, or other fact."24 '
Section 7B(1)(c) of the 1972 Code was deeply problematic. For one
thing, various judicial ethics bodies interpreted it as forbidding
discussion of almost everything of interest to anyone involved or
interested in judicial selection - especially for example, nominators,
screeners, appointing authorities, and electors. The list of forbidden
topics included pretrial release, plea bargaining, criminal sentencing,
capital punishment, abortion, gun control, equal rights amendment, drug
laws, gambling laws, liquor licensing, dram shop legislation, property tax
exemptions, regulation of condominiums, court rules, prior court
decisions, specific legal questions, and hypothetical legal questions.243
For another thing, it was held, in some jurisdictions at least, to be
unconstitutional.2 '

would administer his or her office with partiality, bias or favor.
241. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30, (1924), supra note 28. This Canon
seems as good as any in demonstrating the accuracy of Professor Charles Wolfram's
description of the 1924 Canons:
The 1924 judicial canons were a curious, and anachronistically phrased, amalgam of
pithy advice to judges on how to decide cases, and general directions to a judge on
proper judicial etiquette and mores. Both broad hortatory admonitions and specific
rules for precise conduct were interspersed haphazardly into most of the judicial
canons.
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 966 (1986). See generallysupra notes 1928(containing the texts of Canons 12,28,30, and 32 of the 1924 Canons.)
242. MILORD, supra note 19, at 128.
243. MCFADDEN, supra note 176, at 86-87.
244. See Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993); J.C.J.D. v.
R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991); Beshear v. Butt, 863 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Ark. 1994),
rev'd 966 F.2d 1458 (8th Ci. 1992); but see Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct. of
Pennsylvania, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
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Section 7B(1)(c) was replaced in the 1990 Model Rules by Section
5A(3)(d) which provides that a candidate for judicial office shall not
[M]ake pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate
with respect to cases, controversies or issues likely to come
before the court; or knowingly misrepresent the identity,
qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the
candidate or an opponent. 45
The 1990 rule replaced the prohibition on announcing a candidate's
views on "disputed legal or political issues" with a prohibition of
statements "commit[ting] or appear[ing] to commit" the candidate "with
respect to cases, controversies, or issues likely to come before the
court."2 6 This apparent limitation on the limitation probably shores up
the rule against First Amendment attacks2 a7 but as Chief Judge Richard
Posner pointed out in Buckley v. IllinoisJudicialInquiry Board:
The district judge's contribution to narrowing the rule was to
interpret the "announce" clause as confined to issues likely to
come before the judge in his judicial capacity.... But the district
judge's interpretation does not in fact circumscribe Rule
67(B)(1)(c) significantly, and this apart from the fact that it does
not touch the "pledges or promises" clause, which is as
overbroad as the "announce" clause. There is almost no legal or
political issue that is unlikely to come before a judge of an
American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction. The
civil war in Yugoslavia? But we have cases in which Yugoslavs
resist deportation to that nation on the ground that they face
persecution from one or another side in that nation's multisided
civil war; and some years ago the Illinois courts were embroiled
in a custody fight involving a child who didn't want to return to
the then Soviet Union with his Soviet parents.2

245.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr

§ 5A(3)(d)(1990).

246. It.
247. See Stretton v. Disciplinary Board, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991); but see Buckley v.
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d at 230 ("'The fact that some of the statements forbidden
by the [1972 version of the] rule, notably promises to rule in particular ways in particular
cases or types of case, are within the state's regulatory power cannot save the rule.").
248. 997 F.2d at 229.
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Judge Posner's observation highlights the question whether the 1972
and 1990 versions of the "pledge or promise" and the "commit or
appear to commit" rules are really substantially different, or only
facially so. Related to but distinct from that question is the significance
of the omission of the phrase "or issues" from the current Wisconsin
rule and the rule recommended by the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee.
How is one to distinguish "cases or controversies" likely to come before
the court from "issues" likely to come before the court?
One possible reading of the current code and of the Beilfuss-DeWitt
recommended rule is that omitting the words "or issues" from the clause
prohibiting committing or appearing to commit in advance was intended
to permit position-taking with respect to administrative or management
issues, as opposed to legal issues. The Beilfuss-DeWitt commentary
does say, "[This section] does not prohibit a candidate from making
pledges or promises respecting improvements in court administration."
If this were the intended meaning, then that proposal and the
Commission's proposal are similar, for the Commission's proposed rule
provides expressly: "Nothing herein shall restrict a judge or judicial
candidate from making statements of position concerning court rules or
administrative practices or policies." That seems unlikely, however, to
be the intended meaning. The "Commentary" to the 1990 Model Code
Section 5A(3)(d) and the "Commentary" to the related Beilfuss-DeWitt
proposal contain identical language about the absence of a prohibition
on pledges or promises respecting improvements in court
administration, but the ABA rule contains the "or issues" language in
the rule itself while the Beilfuss-DeWitt proposal intentionally omits it.
Another interpretation of the current rule and the Beilfuss-DeWitt
proposed rule is that candidates are forbidden to make or appear to
make commitments with respect to cases or controversies likely to come
before the court, but are free to make or appear to make commitments
with respect to issues that are likely to come before the court.29
Presumably the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee understood "controversies"
and "issues" to be different although by dictionary definition and

249. It should be remembered that the "commit or appear to commit" rule is distinct
from the rule prohibiting public comments on pending or impending proceedings. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3B(9) (1998) provides, in part: "A judge shall not,
while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that
might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or make any
nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing." See also
Wis. STAT. SCR 60.04(1)0).
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common usage they appear to be largely synonymous.' Otherwise, the
sentence in the Commentary about "omit[ing] the words 'or issues' in
the ABA Model Code [while leaving the reference to "controversies" in
the rule] to allow the voters to receive valuable information in judicial
elections" makes no sense. The reporter's notes to the 1990 ABA Model
Code give some support to this interpretation, suggesting that the
phrase, "or issues," was added to the Section 5A(3)(d)(ii) to avoid a
"narrow, technical"5' interpretation of "cases" and "controversies. ,252
The presumed evil to be avoided by the "announce" and "appear to

commit" rules is the same whether one speaks of cases, controversies, or
issues likely to come before the court. s Judge Posner's opinion in
Buckley v. IllinoisJudicialInquiry Board is again instructive.

250. The AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICrIONARY 410, 957 (3d. ed. 1992), for
example, defines "controversy" as: "1. A dispute, esp. a public one, between sides holding
opposing views... 2. The act or practice of engaging in such disputes." The same source
defines "issue" as: "4.a. A point or matter of discussion, debate, or dispute. b. A matter of
public concern."
251. "Narrow, technical" suggests, to this writer at least, jurisdictional and constitutional
under U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 2. The Reporter's Note does not so elaborate however.
252.
In the Committee's view, the revised rule also will serve to protect candidates from
the increasing practice of improperly questioning candidates in questionnaires and
opinion polls, and from other requests from interested persons or groups for specific
responses on issues. The phrase "or issues" was added by Committee Amendment
to clarify that the prohibition extends to comments on issues, as well as on cases or
controversies in a narrow technical sense, that are likely to come before the
candidate's court.
MILORD, supra note 19, at 50.
253. Consider, e.g., In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422
(Ohio 1999), involving a candidate's advertisements claiming that the candidate "will be a
tough Judge that supports the death penalty and isn't afraid to use it," and that the candidate
"favors the death penalty for convicted murderers." 705 N.E.2d at 425. The committee of
judges appointed by the Ohio Supreme Court to consider the charges against the candidate
held that the advertisements were in violation of the Ohio version of proposed SCR
60.06(3)(b).
While these statements may be appropriate in nonjudicial elections, judicial candidates must
guard against making statements in the course of their campaigns that adversely reflect on
their impartiality. At the very least, the respondent's statements imply to a reasonable person
that she will use the death penalty in a capital case regardless of the evidence produced
during the mitigation phase of trial and notwithstanding the statutory standards a judge or
jury must consider in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.

I& at 426.
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[T]he concern which animates the rule is precisely that a
candidate in a judicial election might, in order to attract votes or
to rally his supporters, make commitments to decide particular
cases or types of cases in a particular way and having made such
a commitment would be under pressure to honor it if he won the
election and such a case later came before him.
This
commitment, this pressure, would hamper the judge's ability to
make an impartial decision and would undermine the credibility
of his decision to the losing litigant and to the community."
The Fairchild Commission's proposed rule avoids the problem of
distinguishing between "controversies" likely to come before the court
as opposed to "issues" likely to come before the court by adopting the
language of the 1990 Model Rule which prohibits equally with respect to
both, thus dispensing with the need to distinguish the two concepts. Like
the proposed rule prohibiting endorsements and speaking on behalf of
candidates and platforms, however, the rule provides little practical
instruction to judges and judicial candidates. To paraphrase Buckley v.
Valeo,"5 the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
committing or appearing to commit in advance with respect to a case,
controversy, or issue, may often dissolve in practical application. Again,
Judge Posner's observations in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry

Board are instructive.
The difficulty with crafting a rule to prevent the making of such
commitments is that a commitment can be implicit as well as
explicit. And this in two ways. The candidate might make an
explicit commitment to do something that was not, in so many
words, taking sides in a particular case or class of cases but would
be so understood by the electorate; he might for example
promise always to give paramount weight to public safety or to a
woman's right of privacy. Or he might discuss a particular case
or class of cases in a way that was understood as a commitment
to rule in a particular way, even though he avoided the language
of pledges, promises, or commitments.z
The Commission did not attempt to solve the problem so well
described by Judge Posner in large measure for the same reasons it
254.
255.
256.
257.

Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d at 228.
See supra text accompanying note 187.
997 F.2d at 224.
Id. at 228.
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eschewed the challenge of defining with some precision what constitutes
an "endorsement" or "speaking on behalf of" a candidate or platform.
The proposed rule also prohibits judicial candidates from suggesting
that, if elected, the candidate "would administer his or her office with
partiality, bias or favor." This part of the rule is less difficult and less
controversial than the "commit or appear to commit" part, although it is
not without its ambiguities. In a speech to the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, then Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist
reflected on the difference between partiality and bias.
Though the Canons of Ethics are extraordinarily detailed and
specific about what shall constitute a "financial interest," they
have virtually nothing to say about what constitutes "bias." ...
One of the definitions of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of "impartiality" is "freedom from bias or favoritism";
one of the definitions of "bias" in that same volume is "an
inclination of temperament or outlook." In that broad definition
of "bias," one can scarcely escape the-conclusion that all judges,
to a greater or lesser extent, are biased. What can explain five to
four or four to three decisions of appellate courts by judges all
sworn to faithfully uphold the same laws and the same
Constitution, other than a difference in attitude or outlook,
which leads to the ascription of different meanings to the same
words of a statute or of a constitutional provision? The late
Justice Black was, in this sense of the word, "biased" in favor of a
literal construction of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and made no bones about saying so. But it cannot
be this sort of "bias" which would disqualify a judge, else it
would be the rare case in which a quorum of a court could be
mustered for decision.
I would suggest that the true distinction is between the
concept of attitude or outlook, which is not disqualifying, and the
concept of "favoritism," which is disqualifying. Favoritism to me
means a tendency or inclination to treat a particular litigant more
or less generously than a different litigant raising identical
issues."

258. See supra notes 172-205 and accompanying text.
259. William H. Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, in 28 RECoRD
OF Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 694,708 (1973). It may be pertinent to
note that one person's mere "inclination of temperament or outlook" may be another
person's partisanship.

MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

Quaere whether Justice Black's ,"bias" in favor of a literal
construction of the First Amendment could be expressed in a judicial
election campaign without running afoul of the "or issues" phrase of the
"commit or appear to commit" clause of the proposed Wisconsin
Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3)(b)."
3. Paragraph (c) "Misrepresentations"
Let no young man choosing the law for a calling for a moment
[The author] describes her work as an analysis of Chief Justice William Rehnquist's
"legal philosophy by utilizing his judicial opinions ... with the goal of understanding
his methods and values and the way they translate into judicial opinions.... [An)
aspect of the Court's contemporary work that makes it hazardous to write about a
Justice's legal philosophy is the politicization of constitutional law. One could
account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist's bottom-line results
by looking, not at anything in the United States Reports, but rather at the platforms
of the Republican Party.. .[H]er analysis of [his] opinions and votes leads her to
conclude that he places the highest value on federalism, somewhat less value on the
protection of private property, and even less value on the protection of individual
rights other than property. I take it that this is not hot news. Nor, in itself, could it
possibly disconfirm the political hypothesis, for that ranking of values is the one
contained in Republican party platforms as well.... [D]avis' account of Rehnquist's
ranking of values and his approach to adjudication gives us no reason to reject the
view that he is, simply, a Republican judge.
Mark V. Tushnet, A Republican ChiefJustice, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1326 (1990) (reviewing SUE
DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989)).
260. The Commentary to Canon 5 of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct states:
The Seventh Circuit points out in Buckley that, even with this change [restricting the
prohibition to matters likely to come before the court] the ABA provisions may run
afoul of First Amendment protections. For example, read too broadly, a Section
that prohibits a judge from making any pledge or promise (other than to do a good
job) could be used as a basis for disciplinary action against a judicial candidate who
declared that he or she believed the courts should actively pursue sentencing
alternatives to imprisonment. Conceivably, this same provision could subject a
judge to discipline for declaring, as Ruth Ginsberg told the Senate Judiciary
Committee on July 20, 1993... "My approach [to service on the supreme court] is
rooted in the [belief] that the place of the judiciary... in our democratic society [is]
third in line behind the people and their elected representatives" - - a comment that
might be construed as a pledge to broadly construe the powers of the legislative
branch and to narrowly circumscribe the reach of the Bill of Rights as a check on
legislative activity. The Code should be interpreted in a manner that does not
infringe First Amendment rights.
ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

original).

Canon 5A Cmt. (1999) (all but first alterations in
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yield to the popular belief [that lawyers are necessarily
dishonest]-resolve to be honest at all events; and if in your own
judgment you cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve to be honest
without being a lawyer. Choose some other occupation, rather
than one in the choosing of which you do, in advance, consent to
be a knave."'
[Todd Robert Murphy, a political consultant in a 1999 judicial
campaign] observed that "sometimes candidates want to be
loved, but in politics and political consulting, our job is to win."
Not at all cost, but to win, he added. 62
In the ordinary judicial election in Wisconsin, there is scant reason to
be concerned about misrepresentations by judicial candidates. There
are at least two reasons for this. First, there is no reason to believe that
judges are any less honest than other lawyers, and as Abraham Lincoln
suggested, lawyers do not deserve the belief that they are necessarily
dishonest. Secondly, most candidates for judicial office, other than
supreme court justice, run unopposed, a circumstance that considerably
reduces the occasion of sin. Not all judicial elections, however, feature
only one candidate. When two or more candidates vie for the same
judgeship, judicial selection may easily and naturally degenerate into
raw politics, an expensive "winner takes all" game in which the winner
may be determined by factors other than qualifications. Those who
disfavor the popular election of judges would probably consider H. L.
Mencken not far from the mark when he observed:
After damning politicians up hill and down dale for many years,
as rogues and vagabonds, frauds and scoundrels, I sometimes
suspect that, like everyone else, I often expect too much of them.
Though faith and confidence are surely more or less foreign to
my nature, I not infrequently find myself looking to them to be
able, diligent, candid, and even honest. Plainly enough, that is
too large an order, as anyone must realize who reflects upon the
manner in which they reach public office. They seldom if ever
get there by merit alone, at least in democratic states.
Sometimes, to be sure, it happens, but only by a kind of miracle.
They are chosen normally for quite different reasons, the chief of
261. Abraham Lincoln, "Notes for a Law Lecture (Julyl, 1850)," COLLECrED WORKS II
80 (1953) (quoting THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 98 (Charles M. Haar, ed. 1965)).
262. David Umhoefer and Richard P. Jones, Election 99: In School and Court Races,
Attack Ads Were All the Rage, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, April 11, 1999, at 1.
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which is simply their power to impress and enchant the
intellectually underprivileged.o
The votes of Mencken's "intellectually underprivileged" count no
less than the votes of the cognoscenti and the challenge facing judicial
candidates, like that facing candidates for other public offices, is how to
"impress and enchant" enough of them to end up with one vote more
than the opponent has. In strongly contested elections in urban,
regional and state campaigns, impressing and enchanting are done by
means of television, and to a much lesser extent, print advertisements.
Endorsements still count for something, especially organizational
endorsements, and it may be the case that some votes can be picked up
by handshaking at factory gates or shopping malls, breakfast or
luncheon appearances, or by bumper stickers and yard signs, but the
battlefield on which the decisive skirmishes will be fought is the
television screen.2
The decisive weapon is the thirty second spot
advertisement. The principles that govern the deployment and payload
of the weapon are the same principles that govern the sale of soap, the
creation of a desired corporate image, or the "spinning" of a
controversial government policy or occurrence. The game is a game of
persuasion or manipulation of a mass market designed to cause viewers
to embrace certain beliefs or to adopt certain attitudes so as to induce or
manipulate them to act in a desired way: to choose this soap rather than
others; to harbor positive rather than neutral or negative feelings
toward a certain company or organization; to accept (or reject), for
example, the Administration's "spin" on any given matter; or to vote for
this candidate rather than the other for judicial office.
263. H. L. MENCKEN, A MENCKEN CHRESTOMATHY 148-49 (H. L. Mencken ed. 1982).
It seems fair to note that Mencken's opinion of university professors (of whom the author of
this article is, alas, one) was perhaps even lower than his opinion of elected officials.
The stray student of genuine intelligence must find life in the great rolling-mills of
learning very unpleasant, and I suppose that he seldom stays until the end of his
course. He must see very quickly that the learning on tap in them is mainly formal
and bogus-that it consists almost wholly of feeble nonsense out of text-books, put
together by men who are unable either to write or to think. And he must discover
anon that its embellishment by the faculty is almost as bad - that very few college
instructors, as he encounters them in practise (sic), actually know anything worth
knowing about the subject they presume to teach.

H. L. Mencken, A SECOND

MENCKEN CHRESTOMATHY

379 (Terry Teachout ed. 1995).

264. This observation is, of course, less true in geographically small, thinly populated
electoral districts, but those venues are not the principal trouble spots in electoral behavior.
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Like other contests, the persuasion game is played both offensively
("Vote for me!") and defensively ("Don't vote for her!"). It may be
played positively ("I am terrific!") or negatively ("My opponent is
dangerous!") but usually is played both ways. The tenor and tone of a
modem electronic election campaign is described in the following
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel feature article about the April, 1999,
nonpartisan elections in Milwaukee and Wisconsin.
In case you tuned out completely this spring, here's some
political news: We just elected a pro-child-molester Supreme
Court justice and a Milwaukee School Board member in favor of
letting students tote guns and smoke crack.
We defeated a defense attorney who should be ashamed
because she represented violent criminals and a lawyer with
questionable ethics. Also vanquished: a school candidate who
thinks laptop computers will solve poor science scores.
We did all that if the impressions from TV ads run by
candidates and their supporters are to be believed.
Sure, the public is fed up with bickering politicians. But
personal, cutting, distorted, negative, 30-second spots not only
remain a campaign staple, their circle of influence has expanded
to once-tame judicial races and local school contests, the recent
elections showed.
Crime-who's "tough" on it and who's not is the issue at the
heart of the trend.
The whys are easy: In the right place at the right time, a
compelling television spot can remake a race in days. Candidates
need to shout louder over the tube's commercial din. Big money
which pays for media consultants is finding its way into races all
levels. Crime is still at or near the top of voters' concers.
If the seasoned political reporters who wrote this feature piece are
correct, "distorted... 30 second spots" are now a staple of "once tame"
judicial races; a "compelling television spot can remake a [judicial] race
in days;" big money media consultants are present in races at all levels;
and the effectiveness of television spots is determined (at least in part)
by whether the spot "shout[s] louder" than the surrounding din.
H. L. Mencken's sardonic comments about "the power to impress
and enchant the intellectually underprivileged" were made in a lecture

265. Umhoefer and Jones, supra note 262.
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before the Institute of Arts and Sciences at Columbia University in
1940.26 Quaere whether we have progressed or regressed in the last six
decades. Quaere what challenges these developments create for judicial
hopefuls. Quaere what these developments portend for proposers and
promulgators of judicial ethics rules. 67
The Commission's attempt to deal with some of the challenges is
found in the proposed rule on misrepresentation. The rule consists of
six parts.
The first sentence is a hortatory provision intended to restrain the
"personal, cutting, distorted, negative" ads referred to the Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel feature. The rule provides that a candidate for judicial
office "should restrict his or her comments concerning an opposing
candidate to matters which are relevant to the opponent's integrity,
impartiality, judicial philosophy and temperament, legal ability and
industry." With respect to incumbent candidates, the rule is related to
the proposed SCR 60.06(3)(b) which would prohibit statements which
commit or appear to commit a candidate in advance with respect to any
case, controversy or legal issue likely to come before the court. To what
extent may a challenger of an incumbent judge or justice criticize a
266.
267.
proposed
Fairchild,

See H. L. Mencken, supra note 263 at 148.
On May 30, 1999, the author of this article forwarded the submission drafts of the
rules and of the Final Report to the Commission chairperson, Judge Thomas E.
writing:

I was dismayed (I suppose "appalled" would be a more accurate term) by some of
the campaign behavior in this spring's election season. Indeed, as I sat at my
computer and drafted the proposed rules and Final Report, I wondered more than
once whether this effort is doomed to futility, whether "the rules that count" will be
devised by the professional campaign managers and media consultants and not by
the supreme court. I wondered then, and I wonder now, if we are not trapped in a
headlong "race to the bottom" in which carefully crafted appeals to fear and to
ignorance determine who our judges will be. The incentives are strong and the
opportunities many to deceive and mislead the voters. The disincentives are few,
although they are the very qualities we would hope for in a judge: a sense of honor,
integrity, decency, self-respect and respect for others - even when there is a price to
be paid. To many political professionals, Vince Lombardi was right: winning is the
only thing. If judges have that attitude, however, it's not mere rhetoric to say the
people's lives and fortunes are at risk. Moral compromises that candidates make to
gain elected office will inevitably be followed by moral compromises to retain the
office gained. Judicial independence is not needed for the judges, it is needed for
the people.
Letter from Charles D. Clausen, Reporter, Commission on Judicial Elections and Ethics, to
Judge Thomas E. Fairchild, Chairperson, Commission on Judicial Elections and Ethics (May
30, 1999) (on file with author).
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decision or opinion of the incumbent? The considerable advantage of
incumbency is usually burdened by the disadvantage of a record. It may
be precisely the record of the incumbent that induces a challenger to
oppose the incumbent's reelection. If the challenger cannot criticize the
decisions or opinions of the incumbent, how can the electors cast
informed votes? On the other hand, focusing on one or two or even a
few decisions may amount to demagoguery and threaten judicial
independence and the rule of law. The Reporter's Note to proposed
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3)(b) points out:
It is most difficult to codify a line between a challenger's criticism
of a judge's past decision or opinions (or a candidate's
demonstration of position on legal issues) which is relevant to
that judge's (or candidate's) judicial philosophy and such
criticism which is an attempt to exploit emotional public
response to such decisions or opinions (or positions). Because of
that difficulty and the need to preserve the protections of the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, [the
Commission does] not attempt to draw that line. Transforming
an election into an electoral review of a judge's opinion,
conscientiously arrived at, is an attack on the independence of all
our judges. Moreover, an attack on a past decision or opinion
almost always implies a promise that the challenger would decide
or vote differently on similar issues in future cases and thus
violates Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3)(b).'
The second part of the proposed misrepresentation rule would
prohibit a candidate from knowingly making representations that,
although true, are misleading.
[H]e said likewise,
That a lie which is half a truth is ever
the blackest of lies,
That a lie which is all a lie may be met
and fought with outright,
But a lie which is part a truth is a harder
matter to fight.29

268. Appendix A, infra.
269. ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, The Grandmother,st. VIII in COMPLETE POLITICAL
WORKS 387 (1864).
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Any governmental rule that restrains the uttering of true statements
is inherently suspect and it will not be surprising if this proposed rule
encounters opposition. The gravamen of the rule, however, is not the
uttering of truths, but the knowing, which is to say, intentional
misleading of voters. The Commission advised the supreme court in its
Initial Report:
The ABA Model Code does not require "fairness" in judicial
campaigns, only that candidates not "knowingly misrepresent"
facts concerning the candidate or his or her opponent. Even
truthful statements, however, can be seriously misleading,
through incompleteness, innuendo, or otherwise. When the
electorate is misled, the electorate is disserved, whether the
misleading occurs through conscious false statement or carefully
crafted half-truths, smears, irrelevancies, or distortions.'
While it may attempt too much to try to hold judicial candidates in
this era to campaign behavior satisfying "the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, ,2"it seems nonetheless appropriate to expect candidates
for judicial office to rise above the "morals of the marketplace" m by
eschewing intentionally misleading statements. As Judge Posner stated
in Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, "Judges remain different

from legislators and executive officials, even when all are elected, in
ways that bear on the strength of the state's interest in restricting their
freedom of speech. , 273 Indeed, this proposed rule prohibiting knowingly
misleading statements seems but a particular application of proposed
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 60.06(3)(a)'s requirement that judicial
candidates maintain "in campaign conduct and otherwise, the dignity
appropriate to judicial office." 274
The third part of the proposed rule prohibits judicial candidates
from "knowingly mak[ing] statements that are likely to confuse the
public with respect to the proper role of judges and lawyers in the
270. Initial Report, Appendix D, infra at 144.
271. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Chief Judge Benjamin
Cardozo, referring to the fiduciary duties owed by and to joint venturers, wrote: "A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Id.
272. Id.
273. 997 F.2d at 228.
274. Appendix A, infra at 75.
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American adversary system.' ' 5 There are at least two areas of
campaign conduct where this rule would operate.
The first pertains to campaign themes or promises. Judges, of
course, are only judges. They are not legislators or executive branch
officials. Judges do not pass laws nor do they execute them, except
indirectly by judgments and orders applying the law in particular cases
A judicial candidate who campaigns on themes that are appropriate
only for legislative or executive contests is soliciting votes by deception,
holding out promises that cannot be fulfilled. Such a candidate attempts
to take advantage of that segment of the electorate that Mencken rather
cruelly called the "intellectually underprivileged" and to exploit voter
ignorance of how American, three-branch, government works.z 6 The
potential wielder of judicial power becomes simply another of
Mencken's "rogues and vagabonds, frauds and scoundrels."
The second is campaign speech that urges voters to vote against a
candidate because the candidate represents unpopular citizens,
especially citizens accused of crime. Such conduct wrongly conflates a
lawyer with her client, an attorney for an accused with the accused. It
tends to validate and reinforce the suspicion that one who represents a
bad person is a bad person herself. It undermines entirely the salutary
provisions of Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 20:1.2(b) that:
"A
lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by
appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
political, economic, social or moral views or activities." This kind of
rhetoric discourages good lawyers, both those with judicial aspirations
and those with none, from representing citizens entitled by the
Constitution to counsel and from accepting appointments to represent
unpopular clients. Finally, such rhetoric inevitably raises questions as to
whether persons accused of crime, and their lawyers, will be treated
275. Id
276. The Commission's Initial Report to the supreme court pointed out, without
embracing it, the other side to the argument:
On the other hand, "[lt could also be argued that restrictions on legal and political
debate cut off discussion that could enliven judicial campaigns. No one suggests that
liveliness be purchased at any cost, but restrictions on legal and political debate
arguably exacerbate the already serious problem of voter apathy in judicial
elections. Set against these concerns is the state's interest, and indeed the public
interest, in preserving the independence and integrity of the judiciary, and in
assuring that the electorate is not misled about the nature of the judicial office."
Initial Report, Appendix D, infra at 142, quoting MCFADDEN, supra note 176, at 86.
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fairly and impartially in the candidate's court, if the candidate is elected.
Unfortunately, there is reason to believe that this particular type of
campaign rhetoric is particularly effective. "n
The fourth part of the proposed rule, essentially identical to related
provisions in the ABA Model Code'S and Beilfuss-DeWitt
recommendations, 9 prohibits a judicial candidate from "knowingly
misrepresent[ing] the identity, qualifications, present position or other
fact concerning the candidate or an opponent."'w
The fifth part of the proposed rule, derived from the Ohio Code of
Judicial Conduct,.1 consists of a list of ten specific kinds of campaign
conduct which are forbidden either due to falsity or to misleading
character. The litany of lies and half-truths include:
[U]sing the title of an office not currently held in a manner
that suggests incumbency;
using the title "judge" when one is a candidate for another
judicial office without identifying the court on which the
candidate currently serves;
277. The Milwaukee JournalSentinel feature article on the Spring 1999 election contains
the following:
Milwaukee Municipal Judge John Siefert, seeking a promotion to Circuit Court,
stunned lawyers with a TV ad ripping Ann Bowe for representing murder
defendants. The message seemed clear: She represents bad people, so how can she
be a judge, much less a tough one?
The spot and another highlighting Bowe's view that representing violent
defendants was fulfilling work led directly to the defeat of Bowe, who had run well
ahead of Siefert in the primary election, observers agree.
The murder-defendant ad left Bowe's 9 year old daughter in tears, her mother said.
For her part, Bowe said she naively felt that a judge would not attack defense
lawyers, who are key links in the justice system and are supposed to be competent
advocates for the accused.
Siefert acknowledges now that the murder-defendant ad left the misimpression that
he believed defense work was dishonorable. He didn't write the ad, he said.
He meant to focus on Bowe's revealing "judicial philosophy," he said. Bowe says
that her passion for advocacy in her present job should not be confused with her
judicial philosophy.
Umhoefer and Jones, supra note 262.
278. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii) (1990). Canon
7B(1)(c) of the 1972 Model Code prohibited a candidate, including a sitting judge, from
"misrepresent[ing] the identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact."
279. See Beilfuss-DeWitt, supranote 43, at Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii).
280. Appendix A, infra at 75.
281. OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcT Canon7D (1999).
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using the term "re-elect" when the candidate has never been
elected to the office sought;
making a false statement regarding schooling, training, and
awards;
making a false statement regarding professional or
occupational licensure or past employment;
making a false statement about an opponent's history in the
criminal justice system or in a professional disciplinary system;
making a statement about an opponent's involvement in the
criminal justice or professional disciplinary systems without
disclosing the outcome of all pending or concluded proceedings;
making a false statement that a candidate has a record of
treatment or confinement for mental disorder;
making a false statement that a candidate has been subjected
to military discipline for criminal misconduct or dishonorably
discharged from the armed services; and
falsely identifying the source of a statement, issuing
statements under the name of another person without
authorization, or falsely stating the endorsement of or opposition
to a candidate for judicial office by a person, organization,
political party, or publication.'
The last part of the proposed rule derived in large measure from
concern about independent expenditures. It provides:
A candidate for judicial office is under no duty to monitor
statements made by others not subject to his or her control, but a
candidate who knows of material misrepresentations or material
misleading statements by third parties concerning himself or
herself or his or her opponent, which statements are likely to
confuse or mislead the electorate, should publicly disclaim such
statements.
From its earliest deliberations, the Commission recognized that the
tenor and tone of judicial election campaigns are not within the sole
control of judicial candidates and their committees. Although they were
focusing on legislative rather than judicial races, the words of Michael J.
Malbin and Thomas L. Gais are instructive:

282. Appendix A, infra at 76.
283. Id. at 78.
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For more than two decades, campaign finance regulation has
been based on the assumption of a candidate-centered system for
financing elections and conducting election campaigns. During
the 1996 election campaign, it became obvious to everyone just
how fallacious that premise has become. The point was well
stated in the opening paragraph of a 1997 report issued by a Task
Force on Campaign Finance Reform sponsored by the University
of Southern California's Citizens' Research Foundation:
For the last generation or more, candidates have controlled their
own campaigns as long as they could raise the money necessary
to pay for them .... However, the candidate-centered campaign
no longer occupies center stage .... In 1996, the campaigns
exploded well beyond what we used to think of as their
boundaries - at least the boundaries the authors of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1974 assumed and within which
regulation [since then] has gone forward. 4
Candidates and their committees may not be the only advocates in a
judicial campaign. There may also be individuals and interest groups
making independent expenditures expressly advocating the election or
defeat of particular candidates or purchasing air time or print space for
"issue ads" which are designed to contribute to the election or defeat of
particular candidates. These advertisements may contain statements
that, if made by the candidate or by someone subject to the control of
the candidate, would violate the proposed Wisconsin Supreme Court
Rule 60.06(3). From the point of view of the public welfare, that is, the
effect on the electorate, it would seem to make little difference whether
the voters are misled by a candidate or by a person or organization
making an independent expenditure. As the Commission advised the
supreme court in the Initial Report:
Candidates may scrupulously avoid misrepresentations during a
campaign but nonetheless benefit from misrepresentations made
through independent expenditures. The misrepresentation may
relate either to the candidate or to the candidate's opponent or
both. To the extent the public is deceived, whether by a
candidate or her agents or by others acting independently, the
284.

MICHAEL J. MALBIN &THOMAS

L. GAIS,

THE DAY AFrER REFORM: SOBERING

CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 4 (1998) (quoting Citizens'
Research Foundation, NEW REALITIES, NEW THINKING: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 1 (1997)).
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public interest is impaired.
The issue is whether judicial
candidates should be expected to monitor public representations
made through independent expenditures and to disclaim those
the candidate knows to be false.
Under the proposed rule, judicial candidates would be under no duty
to monitor or to disclaim statements made by others not subject to their
control. The rule encourages candidates, however, to publicly disclaim
material misrepresentations or material misleading statements which are
likely to confuse or mislead the electorate.
E. ProposedWisconsin Supreme CourtRule 60.06(4): Contributions.
Roughly three-quarters of those who answered the [National
Survey on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System],
which was funded by the Hearst Corporation, expressed
confidence in both the U. S. Supreme Court and their local
courts. In a somewhat contradictory finding, an equal number of
respondents believed that outside influences affected the judicial
process. Nearly eighty percent felt that judges were influenced
by political considerations and campaign fund raising.m
The gross temptation of a bribe may not allure a man to a
flagrant violation of his oath, though the secret promptings of
self-interest, the desire of pleasing a powerful friend, the hope of
obtaining a reappointment to a lucrative office, may bias his
reason in insensible degrees, and finally lead to a judgment as
iniquitous, as if it had been openly purchased in court. Virtue is
usually sapped and mined, not taken by storm.2
The proposed rule on solicitation and acceptance of campaign
contributions is similar to, but less restrictive than, the counterpart rules
in the ABA Model Code and in the Beilfuss-DeWitt recommendations.
All three versions of the rule, as well as the current Wisconsin rule'
prohibit judicial candidates from personally soliciting and accepting

285. Initial Report, Appendix D, infra at 145.
286. Kathryn McCabe, Focus: And the survey says... American public is polled for
opinions on justice system, 82 JUDICATURE 292 (May/June 1999).
287. The Independence of the Judiciary, North American Review 403 (1843) quoted in
THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAw 149 (Charles M. Haar ed. 1965).
288. See SCR 60.06(4). See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(2)

(1990) and Beilfuss-DeWitt supranote 43, at Canon 5C(2).
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campaign contributions. The Model Code and Beilfuss-DeWitt rules
expressly permit the solicitation and acceptance of funds from lawyers.
The current code is silent on that issue, although lawyer contributions to
judicial campaigns are commonplace and accepted. The proposed rule
differs from the ABA Model Code and the Beilfuss-DeWitt rules in that
(1) it applies to judges-elect as well as to judges and judicial candidates;
(2) it prohibits the knowing solicitation and acceptance of contributions
from a litigant with a case before the court to which election is sought;
(3) it places no restriction on the amount of contributions by lawyers;
and (4) it places no restriction on the time periods before and after
elections when contributions may be solicited and accepted.
The Model Code (prior to the August, 1999 amendments) and
Beilfuss-DeWitt rules provide that lawyers may make "reasonable"
contributions to judicial campaigns. The maximum amount of money
that any citizen may contribute to judicial candidates is controlled by
statute in Wisconsin.'
The Commission declined to propose further
limiting lawful contributions by lawyers to an amount that was
"reasonable."'° The data on contributions to supreme court candidates
demonstrate that the vast majority of contributions are quite modest.
Anecdotal evidence from judges supports the judgment that excessive
contributions to judicial campaigns, from lawyers or other sources, are
not a significant problem in Wisconsin. Indeed, it may be argued that
the larger problem is the inadequacy of contributions to cover the cost
of a contested election, requiring some judicial candidates to devote
substantial amounts of their own resources to finance the cost of a
campaign. This fact discourages many capable potential candidates
from seeking judicial office and tends to produce a plutocratic judiciary.
Unlike the Model Code and the Beilfuss-DeWitt proposal, 1 the
289. See WIs. STAT. §11.26 (1995-96) (limiting contributions to a candidate for the
supreme court to $10,000, to a candidate for the court of appeals to $3,000 (district having a
county with population over 500,000) or $2,500 (other counties), and to circuit court
candidates to $3,000 (circuits having a population over 300,000) or $1,000 (other circuits)).
290. The author of this article also authored the Final Report of the Commission which
is printed as Appendix B to this article. In the Report, I wrote "A majority of the
commissioners believe that the dollar limitations found in §11.26, Wis. STATS., are themselves
reasonable, and that relying on dollar limitation on lawyers' (and others') contributions is
preferable to reliance on an indeterminate "reasonable" standard." Final Report, Appendix
B, infra at 88. The second clause of that sentence is accurate but the first is, at best, poorly
drafted. The commissioners were not polled on whether they considered the maximum
contributions prescribed by § 11.26 to be "reasonable." Judge Fairchild called this sentence
to my attention before the Final Report was submitted but through oversight in the final
editing process I failed to delete or redraft the language.
291. Beilfuss-DeWitt proposed rule 5C(2) provided in part: "A candidate's committee
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proposed rule does not limit the time periods before and after an
election when contributions may be solicited and accepted. Such
limitations are at best controversial and at worst unconstitutional.
The most controversial aspect of this Section proved to be the
suggested time period for election fund-raising. The 1990 Code
suggests a longer period (one year instead of ninety days) for
pre-election fund-raising than did the 1972 Code. The 1990 Code
Committee intended that each jurisdiction should adopt time
limits for pre-election and post-election (if any) fund-raising that
best suit local conditions. The Committee was aware of the
increasing cost of judicial election campaigns, and while critical
of this trend, believed the Code should not put incumbents at a
serious disadvantage in this regard. Persuaded that in many
judicial campaigns, post-election fund-raising is a necessary evil,
particularly where a candidate must respond to an unforeseen,
last-minute onslaught by the opposing candidate, the Committee
decided not to restrict fund-raising to the pre-election period.
The Committee believed that it was preferable for a successful
candidate to have a brief time after the election to retire
campaign debts than to remain burdened by campaign debts
while in office. Even so, the Committee added Commentary
urging campaign committees to avoid, to the extent possible,
incurring deficits that might necessitate post-election fundraising. An amendment proposed by the American Judicature
Society on the floor of the House of Delegates to prohibit all
post-election fund-raising was defeated.'
In Zeller v. Florida Bar,293 the court held that the Florida canon that
provided that "[a] candidate should not expend funds in furtherance of
his or her judicial campaign or establish a committee to solicit
contributions or public support earlier than one year before the general
election" unconstitutionally deprived plaintiffs of their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.2' Plaintiffs complained that the rule
forbade expenditure of campaign funds, solicitation of public support,
and solicitation of contributions more than one year before the

may solicit contributions for the candidate's campaign for a reasonable period of time before
and after the last election in which the judicial candidate participates."
292. MILORD, supra note 19, at 54-55.
293. 909 F. Supp. 1518 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
294. Md at 1520.
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election. 295 The defendants, the state bar and the Florida Judicial
Qualifications Commission, conceded that the first two restrictions were
unconstitutional under Buckley v. Valeo.2" The court found that the
restriction on soliciting and accepting contributions was also
unconstitutional. 29' The court rejected the defendants' argument that
permitting sitting judges to accept contributions during their entire term
of office "would, at a minimum, have the appearance of corruption." 29'
"[T]he fact that contributors can give the same sum of money to judicial
candidates within the one year period prior to an election, which they
cannot give outside that period, demonstrates that Canon 7C(1) does
not further the State's compelling interest in preventing corruption. ''
In striking down the canon, the court stated:
In the instant case, two distinct First Amendment rights are
being restricted by the prohibitions contained in Canon 7C(1).
First, the Canon prohibits Supporters from soliciting the Public
for contributions to judicial campaigns earlier than one year
prior to an election. This prohibition directly implicates rights of
political expression. Second, the Canon prohibits Supporters
from contributing funds to judicial campaigns earlier than one
year prior to an election. This prohibition implicates rights of
political association, akin to the limitations on contributions
addressed in Buckley. Both of these prohibitions necessarily
have an impact on the amount of the Candidates' campaign
expenditures. Although Buckley explicitly laid out a distinction
between expenditures and contributions and found that
expenditures were subject to a higher level of scrutiny, both of
the Canon's prohibitions would be unconstitutional under even
the less stringent level of scrutiny applied to ceilings on
contributions.
The Commission did not believe that mid-term or post-election or
nonstop fund-raising by judges or other judicial candidates has been a
significant problem in Wisconsin. In light of that judgment, as well as
the constitutional concerns reflected in Zeller and other cases,,o' it
295. See id. at 1521.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 1523.
See id. at 1527-28.
Id.
Id. at 1525.
Id. at 1524 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 637 N.E.2d 213
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proposed no regulation.'
Among the issues identified by the Commission in its Initial Report
were whether the code of judicial conduct should encourage or require
recusal or disqualification of judges based on campaign contributions by
lawyers or litigants or service on a judge's campaign committee or that
of the judge's opponent.m The Commission proposed no new rule in
this area, preferring to rely on the broad provisions of Wisconsin
Supreme Court Rule 60.04(4) which requires recusal under certain
specified circumstances and also "when reasonable well-informed
persons knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the justice
system and aware of the facts and circumstances the judge knows or
reasonably should know would reasonably question the judge's ability to
be impartial. "m This standard, of course, could hardly be less precise
and unhelpful as a practical matter.' On the other hand, neither the
1990 Model Code nor the Beilfuss-DeWitt proposed rules contained any
(Mass. 1994); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999).
302. The ABA Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions views the problem
differently:
"Warchests" are deemed one of the major problems in the current campaign finance
scene generally. We believe they are even more problematic in judicial campaigns,
as explained in the Task Force Report:
"In our current system, judges and judicial candidates have many incentives to
raise every dollar they can, which increases the pressure on lawyers to contribute.
Even candidates without opponents, or candidates who have reached the sum they
expect to spend, often continue trying to raise all they can. And why not, since any
excess funds can be retained for a later campaign?
... [Flor a judicial candidate to campaign actively although unopposed, is to
blur the vital distinction between judges and politicians seeking other offices."
ABA Ad Hoe Comm. on Judicial Campaign Finance, Report and Recommendation (Jan.
1999) Appendix B, infra.
303. See Initial Report, Appendix D, infra at 137-38.
304. See Wis. STAT. § 757.19(2)(g) (1995-96). This statute also requires a judge to
"disqualify himself or herself from any civil or criminal action or proceeding when ... [the]
judge determines that, for any reason, he or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in
an impartial manner."
305.
[A]lthough the test was meant to be objective, one court has noted that it is
inherently subjective. (Citation omitted.) ... In reality, there is no objective
standard to determine the appearance of partiality, but it is clear that the
appearance of partiality is to be decided from the viewpoint of a disinterested
observer, and not from the subjective viewpoint of the judge in question.
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, et. al, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHics 143 (1990)(citation omitted).
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more guidance in this area than the equally imprecise Commentary
against which Justice Roland Day inveighed in the 1992 majority
opinion rejecting the Beilfuss-DeWitt recommendations.
After the Commission completed its work, the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association approved amendments to the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct. The amendments had been developed by an
Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Campaign Finance and the Task Force
on Lawyers' Political Contributions. The amendments are quite
significant. They include:
o amending Canon 5C to require judicial candidates to
instruct their campaign committees "not to accept campaign
contributions for any election that exceed, in the aggregate" a
sum of money to be determined by the jurisdiction adopting the
rule;
o amending Canon 3E(1)(d) so as to require disqualification
of a judge when "the judge knows that a party or a party's lawyer
has within the previous [time period selected by the adopting
jurisdiction] ... made contributions to the judge's campaign in an

amount greater than [reasonable and appropriate] [$ -] for an
individual [$ -] for an entity.]"'
o amending Canon 3 by adding a subsection prohibiting a
judge from appointing a lawyer to perform services for the court
if the judge knows or learns by a timely motion that the lawyer,
during a time period determined by the adopting jurisdiction,
contributed more than a threshold amount to the judge's election
campaign, unless the position is substantially uncompensated, or
the lawyer has been selected in rotation from a list of qualified
and available lawyers compiled without regard to their having
made political contributions, or no other lawyer is willing,
competent and able to accept the position.
o adding to the Terminology section of the Code a definition
of "aggregate" in relation to campaign contributions as
"denot[ing] not only contributions in cash or in kind made
directly to a candidate's committee or treasurer, but also, except
306. The Commentary to MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(2) (1990)
and the equivalent provision in the Beilfuss-DeWitt rules stated, in part: "Though not
prohibited, campaign contributions of which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers... who
appear before the judge, may be relevant to disqualification under Section 3E." See supra
note 55 and accompanying text.
307. A jurisdiction choosing the "reasonable and appropriate" option, rather than the
discrete dollar amount option, will invite the kind of criticism Justice Roland Day leveled
against the Beilfuss-DeWitt proposal in 1992. See text accompanying note 55.
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in retention elections, all contributions made indirectly with the
understanding that they will be used to support the election of
the candidate or to oppose the election of the candidate's
opponent."
The Report of the Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions
noted:
Concerns were raised by some Committee members and
commentators on the Discussion Draft that the addition of
specific contributions limits triggering disqualification (unless
remitted) could result in lawyers or parties contributing to a
judge's campaign solely in order to disqualify that judge.
Proposals to prohibit this practice considered by the Committee
were found unworkable because of the structure of the
Disqualification and Remittal of Disqualification provisions in
the Code. As soon as a judge has knowledge gained from any
source that an excessive contribution by a lawyer or party has
been made, the provisions become applicable. Jurisdictions
adopting this provisions [sic] are cautioned to consider this
problem.
Considering the admissions in the antepenultimate and
penultimate sentences of this paragraph, the advice in the ultimate
sentence appears to be a particularly felicitous example of buck-passing.
In any event, in addition to the problem of using contribution limitations
to manipulate disqualification of judges, there is the problem of the First
Amendment. The Standing Committee's Report to the House of
Delegates said:
Although the Standing Committee has on several past
occasions written model rules that implicated First Amendment
freedoms (e.g., rules regarding advertising and solicitation, or a
rule governing trial publicity), it has not previously directly
addressed lawyers' participation in the political process.
Directed by the House to develop a Model Rule that involved
lawyers' political "speech" in the form of making or soliciting
campaign contributions, the Committee undertook a review of
recent First Amendment jurisprudence treating legislativelyenacted campaign contribution limits. It found, not surprisingly
that limitations on the making and solicitation of political
contributions must be predicated on the need to protect a valid
state interest; that they must be narrowly drawn; and that their
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language must be sufficiently clear as to provide fair notice of
when and how they operate, thereby satisfying the requirements
of due process.
Although most of the comments received by the Committee
concerning the constitutionality of its first two draft proposals
suggested that those proposals probably would survive a First
Amendment attack, the Committee was advised that its
proposals differed from the regulations cited by the
commentators as examples of constitutionally permissible
restrictions on campaign contributions. Moreover, a lengthy
analysis of the proposal by Professor Van Alstyne confirmed that
"there are nontrivial First Amendment issues that could be-and

indeed have been-raised with respect to both of the draft
proposals."
He and other constitutional experts agreed,
nevertheless, that a narrowly limited rule should pass First
Amendment scrutiny.' (Emphasis added).
In considering these 1999 amendments to the Model Code, it seems
relevant to note the long-standing opposition of the American Bar
Association to the popular election of judges. The Report to the House
of Delegates recommending the amendments stated:
The Task Force [on Lawyers' Political Contributions] Report
pointed out that "the United States is all but unique in having
judges stand for election," with the only other places electing
their judiciary being Russia and Switzerland... [T]he
Committee... urges that the Association to reemphasize, as a
first order of priority, its strong support for the concept of merit
selection of judges.
This record of the Association's endorsement for merit
selection procedures has stood for over a half-century, having
first been adopted in 1937. A key consideration in the long
history of support for merit selection has been the array of
problems that inevitably arise when judicial candidates are
obligated to raise funds for their campaigns. Significant among
those problems is the likelihood that the public may have cause
to question the impartiality of judges whose election to office is
too closely tied to their economic reliance on lawyers who before

308. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Section of Business
Law, Section of State and Local Government Law, Report with Recommendations to the
House of Delegates (August, 1999) availableat [< www.abanet.org/scripts>].
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them pleading a client's cause.3
As noted in the Commission's Final Report, a number of
commissioners share the concerns of the ABA.310 Nonetheless,
Wisconsin has had an elected judiciary since the adoption of the state
constitution in 1848, and it does not seem likely that the constitution will
be amended soon to provide for a merit selection system. Quaere
whether the 1999 amendments to the Model Code, if adopted by states
with an elected judiciary, will increase public trust and confidence in the
impartiality of the judges or simply discourage potential candidates who
are not able or willing to finance their campaigns out of their own
resources. Clearly, one way to deal with the unseemliness of judicial
fund-raising is to make it ever more difficult for judicial candidates (or
their proxies) to solicit or accept contributions. That seems to be the
approach of the ABA."' Another solution would be adequate public
funding of the costs of the campaign. The Commission recommended
full public financing of supreme court races as soon as practicable and
public funding of court of appeals races thereafter."'
309. Id.
310.
"Several commissioners believe the fund-raising, campaign content, and other
ethical problems encountered in electing judges and justices cannot be effectively
solved, and they would prefer selection by a system often referred to as the Missouri
Plan, i. e., appointment by the governor from a list created by a representative panel,
and periodic votes by the people on whether the judge should be retained."
Final Report, Appendix B, infra at 83-84.
311. One view of contributions by lawyers to judicial campaigns is to consider the
contributions a means of influence-seeking. The ABA seems to embrace this view. In a
competing view, contributing to the election of able and upright judges and to the defeat of
poor judges is a civic contribution and a fulfillment of professional responsibility on the part
of lawyers as "public citizens." See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibility. For those who embrace the latter view and reject the
former view, the ABA's position on lawyers' contributions to judicial campaigns may be seen
as but another illustration of the adage "no good deed goes unpunished."
312. Final Report, Appendix B, infra at 85. The ABA Task Force on Lawyers' Political
Contributions and Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Campaign Finance support public funding
of judicial campaigns:
The Committee believes that until merit selection of judges has become the rule,
rather than the exception, the Association must continue to urge that the funding of
judicial election campaigns proceed with the least practical likelihood of harm to the
integrity and independence of judicial candidates and judges. The Committee notes
that the Task Force urged consideration of public funding and found a very strong
case for extending such funding to judicial campaigns in states that already provide
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F. Proposed SCR 60.06(5): Endorsements

To date, Wisconsin has not had any rule restricting the solicitation
and acceptance of endorsements by judges and judicial candidates.
Judges and other candidates have been endorsed by partisan and
nonpartisan officeholders, other judges, lawyers, and organizations.
Under both the 1972 version313 and the 1990 version314 of the Model
Code, candidates are prohibited from personally soliciting publicly
stated support, but this was one of the provisions that was rejected by
the Beilfuss-DeWitt committee." 5 The Fairchild commissioners were
rather evenly split on the question of whether a judge or judicial
candidate should be prohibited from soliciting endorsements from
partisan officeholders, interest groups, and from lawyers who have
matters pending before the court to which election is sought. Because
the Commission was divided on these matters, no rule was proposed.
There was also insufficient consensus to support proposing any rule
restricting the practice of judges and judicial candidates publicly
supporting or publicly opposing candidates for elective public office,
including judicial office. Supreme Court Rule 60.06(2) prohibits judges,
but not non-judge judicial candidates, from endorsing partisan
candidates, but the current rules are silent with respect to endorsement
or public opposition of nonpartisan candidates, including judicial
candidates. The Beilfuss-DeWitt rules would have permitted judges and
judicial candidates publicly to endorse or oppose, and to make
contributions to, judicial candidates.3 6
Wisconsin is one of a handful of states that permit judges and
judicial candidates publicly to endorse or oppose judicial candidates.1
funding for other offices... Because there are difficult issues that require further
study in connection with public funding of judicial election campaigns, however, the
Committee recommends that the questions regarding public funding of judicial
elections be considered by the Special Committee on Judicial Independence and the
Judicial Division ....
"
313. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 7B(2) (1972).
314. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5C(2) (1990).
315. Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at proposed rule § 5C(2). "A candidate may solicit
oral or written endorsements directly or by committee. The solicitation or oral or written
endorsements is restricted to the same reasonable period of time controlling the solicitation
of funds. A judge should not solicit oral or written endorsements while engaging in official
duties or while in the courthouse." Id.
316. See Beilfuss-DeWitt, supra note 43, at Canon 5A(1)(b), (e).
317. See generally, CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 5A(2); MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUcr § 5B(2); MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 7A(1)(b); N. C. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT §7A(5). Canon 5D of the Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that a judge subject to retention election may, at any time, publicly endorse or oppose a judge
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The 1990 Model Code generally prohibits judges and judicial candidates
from publicly endorsing or publicly opposing another candidate for
public office,318 but permits judges and judicial candidates, 319 "to publicly
endorse or publicly oppose other candidates for the same judicial office
in a public election in which the judge or judicial candidate is
running. 1 32 Several states have adopted this exception to the "no
endorsement" rule.?' A substantial majority of the states, however,
prohibit judges and judicial candidates from publicly endorsing or
publicly opposing candidates for other elective offices.
In its Final Report to the supreme court, the Commission reported:
There is a widely held belief that in the 1999 supreme court
campaign public endorsement of candidates by present justices
tended to damage the standing of the supreme court in the eyes
of the public. Although some members of the Commission favor
a rule making it unethical for any judge to make a public
endorsement in a campaign for election to any judicial position,
such a rule does not have the support of a substantial majority of
the Commission, and for that reason has not been included in the
proposed rules.3 "
Anecdotal evidence encountered by the author of this article

standing for retention or a candidate for appointment to the court of which the judge is a
member. Maine prohibits endorsements by judges other than judges of probate, who are free
to endorse or oppose any candidate for public office. See ME. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
§§ 5A(1)(b), 5C(2)(d)(1999).
318. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(1)(b) (1990).
319. The Terminology section preceding the canons define "Candidate":
A candidate is a person seeking selection for or retention in judicial office by
election or appointment. A person becomes a candidate for judicial office as soon
as he or she makes a public announcement of candidacy, declares or files as a
candidate with the election or appointment authority, or authorizes solicitation or
acceptance of contributions or support. The term "candidate" has the same
meaning when applied to a judge seeking selection or appointment to non-judicial
office.
320. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(1)(b)(iv) (1990).
321. See, e.g., KANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 7A(1)(b)(iv)(1999); NEV. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 5C(1)(b)(iv); N. D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 5C(1)(b)(iii);
OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 5C(1)(d). In Illinois, judicial candidates are free to
publicly endorse or publicly oppose "other candidates in a public election in which the judge
or judicial candidate is running." ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 7B(1)(b)(1999).
322. Final Report, Appendix B, infra at 104.
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suggests that the Final Report was understated about this issue. Public
endorsement and public opposition of the incumbent candidate and of
the challenger by sitting justices, coupled with highly controversial
campaign advertising, combined to occasion a outpouring of negative
comments about the court by the press, members of the bar and
judiciary and by other members of the public. Quaere whether the
public and the judiciary would be better served by a rule prohibiting
judges and judicial candidates from engaging in public endorsement and
opposition of other candidates for judicial office, and restricting their
political activity to their own candidacies? 3
III AFrERTHOUGHTS
[L]aw was superb as a code.

And the more perfect and

logical a code was, the more magnificent it was. But this was at
the cost of increased artificiality, rendering it less capable of
existing in reality. Hence the opportunity to study and reflect on
law offered the greatest satisfaction while the requirement to
implement it was the saddest or most painful fate that could
befall one. The practice of law led either to cynicism or madness.
We could see examples of the former all around us, and as for
the latter, suffice it to recall Kafka, who, though few realized it,
was a Prague lawyer.
Ivan Klima, JUDGE ON TRIAL (A.G. Brain trans., 1993)
In the salad days of law school, the beginning lawyer encounters The
Judge as an abstraction, a construct, a hypothetical logician, social
scientist, policy analyst, philosopher, and seer. This is The Judge about
whom the professor asks "What would The Judge do?" and "How
should The Judge rule?" Hardly any attention is devoted to The Judge
as politician and office-seeker, the individuated, flesh-and-bones, human
being ambitiously and usually competitively seeking selection for or
retention in a prestigious and powerful governmental office. For
American judges, the selection processes, whether elective or
appointive, are all, in larger or smaller measure, political 24 Thus, there
323. Matthew 6:34.
324. Professor Charles W. Wolfram has written:
It would be difficult to imagine anything other than strong political interest in
control of the judicial selection process, whatever shape the process might take.
Judges exercise governmental powers that are of great interest to politically
powerful segments of society. Judges enjoy great public and professional prestige,
solely because of the aura of the office. Accordingly, most judgeships are ardently
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is an inevitable Alice in Wonderland quality to ethical rules that try to
make the persons with the most to gain and to lose in the political
selection process--judges and judicial candidates-not only nonpartisan
but nonpolitical. One wonders whether the good judge under some
political and election campaign ethical rules is not a real person, but
rather The Judge, an abstraction or construct, a disincarnate tabula rasa.
Real judges, however, are real people and always, to some extent at
least, real politicians. As the Ivan Klima epigraph suggests, rules that
treat them otherwise lead either to ubiquitous cynicism or a Kafkaesque
madness. Machiavelli aptly teaches that reality can be ignored only at
peril.
Since... it has been my intention to write something of use to
the understanding reader, it has seemed wiser to me to follow the
real truth of the matter rather than what we imagine it to be.
Imagination has created many principalities and republics that
have never been seen or known to have any real existence; for
how we live is so far different from how we ought to live that he
who studies what ought to be done rather than what is done will
learn the way to his downfall rather than to his preservation.'
Whether to adopt, reject, or modify any of the rules proposed by the
Fairchild Commission will be a political decision by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. The members of the court will have the benefit of the
thinking of the commissioners, of their own considerable experience "in
the trenches," and of the input of undoubtedly many judges, lawyers,
and other citizens. The experience with the work of the Beilfuss-DeWitt
committee and an appreciation of the inherent difficulties in crafting
these rules suggest caution in predicting how the court will act. The
words of the sagacious eponym of the city where the issues will be
sought after by a large number of lawyers. Judgeships thus serve as highly visible
and valuable rewards or incentives for political activity by lawyers, which makes
judgeships very valuable as patronage, because lawyers are very useful to politicians
as aides and backers.
Given the governmental nature of the workings of the judicial branch, it is
probably futile to think of a selection process that is not vested in some organ of
government. In the end, the best hope of reformers is probably to remove as much
of the crassness from the process, and as many incompetents from among the people
that it selects, as is possible.
WOLFRAM, supra note 243, at 960.
325. NICCoLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE, CH. XV.
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considered and the decisions made seem appropriate.
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should
be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.'
Will the rules proposed by the Fairchild Commission, if adopted by
the supreme court, be helpful "auxiliary precautions" to convert
contested judicial elections from manipulative exercises designed "to
impress and enchant the intellectually underprivileged"' " into
democratic processes designed responsibly to inform the electorate?
Will they be helpful in moving away from "personal, cutting, distorted,
negative" campaigning' towards campaigns worthy of an honorable
and dignified judiciary? Will they be helpful in insulating Wisconsin
judges from public perceptions of partiality based on campaign
contributions? 9 Will they be helpful in encouraging the best potential
candidates to seek judicial office and in discouraging "rogues and
vagabonds, frauds and scoundrels"?
These are questions that the supreme court will surely consider as it
deliberates upon the proposed rules. They are also questions that
Wisconsin judges, lawyers, and other citizens should consider so as to
permit informed and reasoned input to the court in advance of its
action on the proposed rules.
No judicial ethics rules are more difficult or contentious than those
concerning politics and elections. These rules not only impinge upon
two of the most treasured liberties of American citizens, rights of free
speech and association, but also affect the ability of incumbents to hold
on to remunerative and prestigious offices and of hopefuls to gain what
326.
327.
328.
329.

THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
See MENCKEN, note 263, at 148-49.
See Umhoefer and Jones, supra note 262.
See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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incumbents fear to lose. Some of the rules will be viewed by challengers
as unfairly favoring incumbents; others may be viewed by incumbents as
unfairly burdening incumbents. It should come as no surprise that on a
great many regulatory issues the Fairchild Commission proposed no rule
because the members were rather equally divided on the desirability of
regulation. The issues are inescapably difficult and often intractable, as
is demonstrated by the "long and winding road" the state has traveled to
get this far.

APPENDIX A
ProposedRules
SCR 60.06. A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain From
Inappropriate Political Activity.
(1) Candidate for Office. A judge shall not become a candidate for
a federal, state, or local nonjudicial elective office without first resigning
his or her judgeship.
Reporter's Note
No change from the current rule is proposed.
(2) Party membership and activities. A judge or candidate for
judicial office or judge-elect shall not
(a) be a member of any political party; or
(b) participate in the affairs, caucuses, promotions, platforms,
endorsements, conventions or activities of a political party or of a
candidate for partisan office; or
(c) make or solicit financial or other contributions in support of a
political party's causes or candidates; or
publicly endorse or speak on behalf of its candidates or platforms.
(d) Nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit a judge or candidate
for judicial office or judge-elect from attending, as a member of the
public, a public event sponsored by a political party or candidate for
partisan office, or by the campaign committee for such a candidate. If
attendance at such an event requires the purchase of a ticket or
otherwise requires the payment of money, the amount paid by a judge
or candidate for judicial office or judge-elect shall not exceed an amount
necessary to defray the sponsor's cost of the event reasonably allocable
to such attendance.
Reporter's Note

The rule prohibits political party membership and activities by
judges, nonincumbent candidates for judicial office, and judges-elect.
When one becomes a candidate for judicial office is determined by the
terms of SCR 60.01(2) which defines "candidate" as "a person seeking
selection for or retention of a judicial office by means of election or
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appointment who makes a public announcement of candidacy, declares
or files as a candidate with the election or appointment authority, or
authorizes solicitation or acceptance of contributions .... The rule
prohibits judicial candidates and judges-elect as well as judges from
making or soliciting contributions to the party or its candidates and from
publicly endorsing or speaking on behalf of partisan candidates or
platforms.
Although the rule contemplates the continuance of
nonpartisanship on the part of Wisconsin judges and those seeking
judicial office, judges are not expected to lead lives of seclusion. As
members of the public and as public officeholders, judges should be
encouraged to attend public events, even those sponsored by political
parties or candidates, so long as the attendance does not constitute the
kind of partisan activity prohibited by this rule. The last two sentences
of this rule are designed to make this clear. The judge, judicial
candidate or judge-elect is responsible for so conducting herself or
himself that her or his presence at the sponsored event is not made to
appear as an endorsement or other prohibited political activity. The
judge, judicial candidate, or judge-elect should also exercise care that
the price of his or her ticket to any such event does not include a
prohibited political contribution.
(3) Campaign Rhetoric. (a) In General. While holding the office of
judge or while a candidate for judicial office or a judge-elect, every
judge, candidate for judicial office and judge-elect shall maintain, in
campaign conduct and otherwise, the dignity appropriate to judicial
office.
Reporter's Note
This subsection is new. It states a rule generally applicable to judges,
candidates for judicial office, and judges-elect.
(b) Promises and commitments. A judge or judicial candidate shall
not do or authorize others to do in his or her behalf anything which
would commit or appear to commit the judge or judicial candidate in
advance with respect to any particular case, or controversy, or legal
issue likely to come before the court to which election or appointment is
sought, or which suggests that, if elected or chosen, the judge or judicial
candidate would administer his or her office with partiality, bias or
favor. Nothing herein shall restrict a judge or judicial candidate from
making statements of position concerning court rules or administrative
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practices or policies.
Reporter's Note
The rule modifies SCR 60.06(3) by eliminating the reference to
appeals to cupidity or partisanship and, with respect to acts by actors
other than the judge or candidate, by substituting the word "authorize"
for "permit" to make it clearer that a judge or candidate cannot be held
responsible for unauthorized statements of third parties not subject to
the control of the judge or candidate. The last sentence, coupled with
the earlier reference to "legal issues", makes it clear that candidates are
free to take campaign positions concerning court rules, policies and
practices not related to legal issues before the court or likely to come
before the court. Furthermore, the rule is not intended to nor does it
prohibit judicial candidates from commenting on a particular
"controversy, or legal issue likely to come before the court", but rather
from committing or appearing to commit in advance with respect to
outcomes or decisions.
It is most difficult to codify a line between a challenger's criticism of
a judge's past decision or opinions (or a candidate's demonstration of
position on legal issues) which is relevant to that judge's (or candidate's)
judicial philosophy and such criticism which is an attempt to exploit
emotional public response to such decisions or opinions (or positions).
Because of that difficulty and the need to preserve the protections of the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, we do not
attempt to draw that line. Transforming an election into an electoral
review of a judge's opinion, conscientiously arrived at, is an attack on
the independence of all our judges. Moreover, an attack on a past
decision or opinion almost always implies a promise that the challenger
would decide or vote differently on similar issues in future cases and
thus violates SCR 60.06(3)(b).
(c) Misrepresentations. A candidate for judicial office should
restrict his or her comments concerning an opposing candidate to
matters which are relevant to the opponent's integrity, impartiality,
judicial philosophy and temperament, legal ability and industry. A
candidate for judicial office shall not knowingly make representations
that, although true, are misleading, or knowingly make statements that
are likely to confuse the public with respect to the proper role of judges
and lawyers in the American adversary system. A candidate for judicial
office shall not knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth
misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or any other
fact concerning the judge or candidate or his or her opponent. Such a
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candidate shall not:
1. use the title of an office not currently held by a judicial candidate
in a manner that implies that the judicial candidate does currently hold
that office,
2. use the term "judge" when a judge is a candidate for another
judicial office and does not indicate the court on which the judge
currently serves,
3. use the term "re-elect" when the judicial candidate has never
been elected to the office for which he or she is a judicial candidate,
4. make a false statement concerning the formal schooling or
training completed or attempted by a judicial candidate; a degree,
diploma, certificate, scholarship, grant, award, prize or honor received,
earned or held by a judicial candidate; or the period of time during
which a judicial candidate attended any school, college, program or
institution,
5. make a false statement concerning the professional, occupational,
or vocational licenses held by a judicial candidate, or concerning any
position a judicial candidate held for which he or she received
compensation,
6. make a false statement that a candidate for judicial office has
been arrested, indicted, charged with or convicted of a crime or accused
of by a legally competent authority or found by a legally competent
authority to have violated professional, ethical, or other standards
applicable to the candidate,
7. make a statement that a candidate for judicial office has been
arrested, indicted, charged with or convicted of a crime or accused by a
legally competent authority or found by a legally competent authority to
have violated professional, ethical, or other standards applicable to the
candidate, without disclosing the outcome of all pending or concluded
legal proceedings resulting from the arrest, indictment, charge,
conviction, accusation, or finding,
8. make a false statement that a candidate for judicial office has a
record of treatment or confinement for mental disorder,
9. make a false statement that a candidate for judicial office has
been subjected to military discipline for criminal misconduct or
dishonorably discharged from the armed services,
10. falsely identify the source of a statement, issue statements under
the name of another person without authorization, or falsely state the
endorsement of or opposition to a candidate for judicial office by a
person, organization, political party, or publication.
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A candidate for judicial office is under no duty to monitor
statements made by others not subject to his or her control, but a
candidate who knows of material misrepresentations or material
misleading statements by third parties concerning himself or herself or
his or her opponent, which statements are likely to confuse or mislead
the electorate, should publicly disclaim such statements.
Reporter's Note
This subsection is new. It has no counterpart either in the present
Code of Judicial Conduct or its predecessor. The 1967 Code contained
sec. 60.01 ("Standards") which included sub. (10): "A judge should
always bear in mind the need for scrupulous adherence to the rules of
fair play." It is not clear, however, that the subsection was drafted with
election conduct in mind. The language in the proposed rule is derived
in large measure from Canon 7(D) of the Ohio Code of Judicial
Conduct (1998-99).
The first and last sentences are hortatory and aspirational. Thus,
"should" is used rather than "shall." The remaining standards are
mandatory. Intentional and reckless misrepresentations are prohibited,
as are statements that are knowingly misleading, though true, and
statements that are likely to confuse the electorate about the proper role
of judges and lawyers in the American adversary system. Examples of
the latter kinds of statements may include campaign rhetoric which
suggests that voting for a particular candidate will effect law reform or
other results which are constitutionally committed to the political and
nonjudicial branches of government. Candidates are not responsible for
misrepresentations or misleading statements made by third parties not
subject to the control of the candidate, e.g., through independent
expenditures by interest groups. However, when a candidate knows of
such statements which are likely to confuse or mislead the electorate,
the candidate is called upon to disclaim them.
(4) Solicitation and Acceptance of Campaign Contributions. A
judge or candidate for judicial office or judge-elect shall not personally
solicit or accept campaign contributions. A candidate may, however,
establish a committee to conduct a campaign for the candidate through
media advertisements, brochures, mailings, candidate forums and other
means not prohibited by law. The committee may solicit and accept
lawful campaign contributions and manage the expenditure of funds for
the candidate's campaign. The committee is not prohibited from
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soliciting and accepting lawful campaign contributions from lawyers
and other contributors, provided, however, that the committee shall not
knowingly solicit or accept contributions from any litigant with a case
before the court to which election is sought. A judge or candidate for
judicial office or judge-elect may serve on the committee but should
avoid direct involvement with the committee's fundraising efforts.
Reporter's Note
This subsection reflects long-standing practice in Wisconsin.
Committees are prohibited from knowingly soliciting or accepting
contributions from litigants with a case before the court to which
election is sought. The rule does not impose an obligation on candidates
or committees to cull campaign mailing lists for names of current
litigants or to search the court's calendar or docket to identify all
litigants throughout the campaign. Especially in courts with heavy case
volume and dockets that change daily through new filings and
dismissals, imposing a duty to search and identify all current litigants
and to cross-check against mailing lists would be onerous. Only
knowing solicitation and acceptance of contributions from litigants are
prohibited.
(5) Solicitation and Acceptance of Endorsements. A judge or
candidate for judicial office may solicit or accept endorsements
supporting his or her election or appointment personally or through his
or her committee. The committee is not prohibited from soliciting and
accepting endorsements from lawyers and others, provided, however,
that no judge, candidate for judicial office, or committee shall knowingly
solicit or accept an endorsement from any litigant with a case before the
court to which election or appointment is sought. In soliciting or
accepting an endorsement, a judge or candidate for judicial office should
be mindful of the values underlying SCR 60.03.
Reporter's Note
This subsection is new. In light of the restrictions on campaign
rhetoric under SCR 60.06(3), the receiving of endorsements is an
important method of informing the electorate of broad-based and
presumably informed support for a particular candidacy. As with the
solicitation and acceptance of campaign contributions, knowing
solicitation and acceptance of endorsements from current litigants are
prohibited. Neither culling nor cross-checking of names on mailing lists
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or dockets is required.
SCR 60.07 Applicability.
(1) General. Subject to sub. (2), all judges shall comply with this
chapter. Candidates for judicial office and judges-elect shall comply with
SCR 60.06.
(2) Part-time Judicial Servicel A judge who serves on a part-time
basis, including a reserve judge, a part-time municipal judge and a parttime court commissioner, is not required to comply with the following:
SCR 60.05(3)(a), (b), (c)L.b., 2.a, and c., (4)(a)L.b., (b), (c), (d) and (e),
(5), (6), (7) and (8).

Reporter's Note
Candidates for judicial office and judges-elect are subject to the
requirements of SCR 60.06.

APPENDIX B
FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND ETHICS
CREATION, MEMBERSHIP, AND MISSION

The Commission on Judicial Elections and Ethics was created by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin on March 7,1997. The Honorable Thomas
E. Fairchild of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was appointed chairperson of the Commission and Professor
Charles D. Clausen of Marquette University Law School was appointed
as Reporter. The members of the Commission, in addition to the Chair
and Reporter, are:
* Attorney Carl Ashley of Milwaukee
* Professor Gordon Baldwin, University of Wisconsin Law School,
Madison
* Attorney Linda Balisle of Madison
* Ms. Ruth Clusen of Green Bay
* Fr. Robert Cornell of St. Norbert College, De Pere
* Mr. Tim Cullen of Milwaukee
* Mr. Ron Domini of Madison
* Circuit Judge Timothy Dugan of Milwaukee
* Court of Appeals Judge Charles P. Dykman of Madison
• Ms. Patricia Finder-Stone of De Pere
* Mr. Roger L. Fitzsimonds of Milwaukee
* Circuit Judge Ramona Gonzales of LaCrosse
* Municipal Judge James A. Gramling, Jr., of Milwaukee
* Attorney Michael W. Grebe of Milwaukee
* Circuit Judge Charles D. Heath of Marinette
* Representative Gregory B. Huber of Wausau
* Mr. Fred Luber of Milwaukee
* Attorney John MacIver of Milwaukee
* District Attorney E. Michael McCann of Milwaukee
* Attorney Maureen A. McGinnity of Milwaukee
* Mr. Rod Nilsestuen of Madison
* Circuit Judge Sarah B. O'Brien of Madison
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Senator Mary Panzer of West Bend
Attorney George K. Steil, Sr., of Janesville
Ms. Barbara Stein of Milwaukee, and
Ms. Carol Toussaint of Madison.

The Commission was assigned:
To review the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct
addressing political and campaign activity of judges and
candidates for judicial office, determine the extent to which those
provisions adequately address issues relevant to the Wisconsin
elective system in selecting members of its non-partisan judiciary,
and recommend provisions for inclusion in the Code of Judicial
Conduct that would better address the issues to which the
current Code's provisions are directed and to address relevant
issues the current Code does not address.
In accordance with the court's instructions, the Commission filed an
Initial Report on October 27, 1997.
In that Initial Report, the
Commission undertook to identify the political and campaign issues
inherent in the election of non-partisan judges and in the activity of
those judges while in office. On June 17, 1998, the supreme court
responded to the Initial Report and provided additional instruction to
the Commission.
In its response respecting the Initial Report's identification of
campaign finance issues, the court asked the Commission to address as
threshold questions (a) whether the Code of Judicial Conduct should
contain special rules regarding campaign financing for judicial elections
and (b) whether it would be unfair, counterproductive, or otherwise
undesirable to restrict candidates and their personal committees by
campaign finance rules that do not apply also to independent
expenditures. The court also instructed the Commission not to pursue
as an issue whether there should be limits on a judge's or candidate's
contribution to the candidate's own campaign. The court asked the
Commission to state its observations and recommendations concerning
public financing of judicial elections.
Regarding campaign content issues, the court asked the Commission
to address each of the seven issues identified in the Initial Report.
Regarding the Initial Report's identification of issues involving
political, civic, and charitable organizations, the court cautioned the
Commission that the Commission is not to consider overturning long-
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standing rules governing judge and judicial candidate conduct, but
invited the Commission to examine the identified issues listed in the
Initial Report. The court asked the Commission to address how the
terms "membership" and "active participation" should be defined. The
court instructed the Commission to address each of the issues identified
with respect to civic and charitable organizations, but to limit its inquiry
to the specified conduct as it relates to "interest groups." The court also
asked the Commission to undertake to define what constitutes an
"interest group" and to consider how judicial conduct in relation to
them should be regulated.
The court asked the Commission to address the issue of whether
part-time municipal judges should be permitted to hold other
nonpartisan offices.
The court asked the Commission to address all the endorsement
issues identified in the Initial Report!
Lastly, the court asked the Commission to consider whether the
rules related to judicial elections and ethics should be mandatory or
aspirational, whether they should apply with equal vigor to all
candidates, and whether they should apply to candidates for judicial
appointment as well as candidates for election.
THE COMMISSION'S PROCESS
After receiving the court's response, our task became to consider
further the many issues we had identified in our Initial Report, and to
recommend rules where we found regulation appropriate. The Chair
requested the Reporter to prepare a survey of the commissioners to
ascertain their views on the many issues identified in the Initial Report.
The Survey that was drafted consisted of 201 survey items so drafted as
to permit "yes", "no" and "no opinion" responses.2 Responses to the
survey were received from most of the commissioners. Consistent with
our experience in earlier meetings of the full Commission and of the
three committees, there was a considerable range of opinion among the
commissioners. Several commissioners believe the fund-raising,
campaign content, and other ethical problems encountered in electing
judges and justices cannot be effectively solved, and they would prefer
1. The last issue in the endorsement section of the Initial Report related to the issue of a
judge becoming a candidate for another elective office during the judge's term of judicial
office. The issue is controlled by SCR 60.01 and the court instructed the Commission not to
further consider the matter.
2. A copy of the Survey instrument is submitted to the court with this Report.
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selection by a system often referred to as the Missouri Plan, i.e.,
appointment by the governor from a list created by a representative
panel, and periodic votes by the people on whether the judge should be
retained Other commissioners favor a minimum or substantial absence
of mandatory rules, believing that the problems encountered in electing
judges is simply the price we pay for choosing to elect judges.
The Commission reconvened in Madison on January 18, 1999 to
discuss the survey results and consider how to proceed further. Varying
numbers of commissioners were (and are) of the opinion that regulation
would be appropriate to deal with many of the issues identified in our
Initial Report but not addressed in the proposed rules we have
submitted to the court. Nonetheless, there was (and is) consensus that
the Commission should recommend to the court only those rules which
have the support of all or of a substantial majority of the
commissioners.! Thus, at the January 18, 1999 meeting, the Reporter
was instructed to attempt to write tentative draft rules that reflected the
will of the Commission insofar as that will was reflected in the responses
to the 201 item survey. The commissioners present also decided, largely
by consensus, (1) to endorse full public financing of supreme court
elections, at least on an experimental basis, and (2) to decline to attempt
any regulation with respect to "interest groups."
The Reporter prepared and distributed tentative draft rules which
were discussed at a April 23, 1999 Commission meeting held in the
Milwaukee and Madison offices of Quarles & Brady, with the
commissioners
communicating by teleconferencing
equipment.
Following that meeting, the Reporter prepared and distributed
Tentative Final Drafts of revisions to SCR 60.06 and 60.07 and a
Tentative Draft of this Report which were considered by the
Commission at a meeting on May 14, 1999 in the Madison and
Milwaukee offices of Quarles & Brady. At the May 14 meeting, the
commissioners considered, amended, and approved the drafts of the
rules and of this Report The final submission drafts of proposed rules
and of this Report were made after the May 14, 1999 meeting and
3. Several other commissioners strongly oppose such a system and for a variety of
reasons (for example, because they favor full electoral participation in judicial selection and
retention, or because retention elections present the electorate with no alternative candidate).
4. Accordingly, we have not proposed rules supported only by a bare majority of the
commissioners.
5. At this meeting, the commissioners also expanded their recommendation concerning
public financing of judicial races to include campaigns for the court of appeals and for other
courts of record. See page 5, infra.
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distributed to the commissioners on May 19.

The Commission's

proposed rules accompany this Report.
CAMPAIGN FINANCE

The Commission Recommends Full Public Financingof Supreme
Court Elections as Soon as Practicable,Full Public Financingof
Court of Appeals Elections Thereafter, and Serious Consideration
of PublicFinancingof JudicialElectionsfor all Courts of Record.
In their responses to the Survey of Commissioners, the
commissioners were rather evenly divided on the general issue of public
financing of judicial elections. Substantial support exists, however, for
full public financing of supreme court and court of appeals races. The
cost of statewide races has escalated dramatically over the last several
elections, almost certainly exceeding $1 million for the last race and
$867,000 for the preceding race. This fact places enormous strain on the
candidates and their committees and other supporters to raise money
from all available sources: personal resources, individual contributors
(many of whom will be lawyers), and interest groups. The fundraising
inevitably raises questions of bias and partiality and judicial
independence which tend to undermine public confidence in the
integrity of judicial officers and the judicial process. The potential of
independent expenditures by special interest groups, some of them
single issue advocacy groups, creates additional financial challenges for
judicial candidates, especially at the state-wide level. Court of Appeals
races are not as expensive as supreme court races, but candidates for
these judgeships must contend with escalating costs of media in high
population areas, the costs of campaigning in many different counties, or
both. The need for public financing at the state-wide level is perceived
by a majority of the commissioners to be immediate and urgent. For the
reasons stated above and in the following paragraph of this report, the
majority of the commissioners also believe that serious consideration
should be given to public financing of all judicial campaigns for courts of
record.
6. Any commissioner who wished to prepare a Separate Statement for submission with
this Report was invited to submit the statement to the Reporter by May 27, 1999.
7. Question 42 in the Survey simply inquired: "Do you favor some form of public
financing of judicial election campaigns? If so, on a separate response sheet or in a cover
letter returning the survey response sheet, please indicate what kind of plan you favor." The
Survey did not inquire separately with respect to supreme court races, court of appeals races,
and other judicial races.
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The Code of Judicial Conduct should Contain Special Rules
Regarding Campaign Financing for Judicial elections.
The Commission believes that a central problem with an elected
judiciary is the difficulty of preserving both the fact and the appearance
of judicial independence. Judicial independence is essential, not for the
sake of the holders of judicial office, but for public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process and in the Rule of Law. The
Commission notes, with regret, that across the nation and in Wisconsin,
judicial election campaigns are becoming more expensive, more
combative, and more driven by professional media and political
consultants. The need to raise money to finance a contested judicial
election is, for most judges at least, a curse. Soliciting money from
others, most of whom will be lawyers who practice in the court to which
the candidate seeks election, inevitably compromises the judicial
candidates' appearance of independence. Pro tanto, the public's
confidence in the impartiality, integrity, and independence of the courts
is compromised. Candidates for legislative and executive offices are
free to raise money from contributors with relative freedom from
reputational harm and accusation of impropriety. Indeed, the ability to
generate broad-based financial support from the electorate may be
considered a sign of widespread public approval of a partisan candidate.
Judges are in a different position. They cannot realistically expect to
generate broad public financial support for judicial campaigns. The
same requirements of impartiality and independence that support public
respect for the judiciary work at cross purposes when it comes to raising
campaign money. The judge ought not appeal to any "special" interest.
The judge ought not promise behavior in office other than the impartial
fulfillment of his or her oath to apply the law fairly and impartially. As
a practical matter, the judge's campaign treasury must be nourished
mainly by the judge's own funds and by funds contributed by those with
a professional interest in the administration of justice, i. e., mostly
lawyers.
The knowing solicitation or acceptance of campaign
contributions from litigants with cases before the court to which election
is sought would create insuperable problems in terms of perceptions of
bias, undue influence, and coercion that are unacceptable in our system
of justice. Rules will not make the inherent problems go away but rules
can help to avoid unnecessary erosion of public confidence in the honor,
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
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Judicial Candidates and Their Committees Should Be Subject to
Campaign Finance Rules Even Though The Rules May Not
Apply to Independent Expenditures.
In its Initial Report, the Commission noted
A recurring focus of discussion during the Commission's
deliberations was the growing impact in election processes of
independent expenditures by advocacy groups or even
individuals.
Restrictions on judicial candidates and their
committees that would be justifiable if only the candidates and
committees were active in the election process may be unfair,
counterproductive, or otherwise undesirable if substantial
independent expenditures are made in an attempt to influence
the outcome of the election. If independent expenditures are
beyond the reach of the court's regulatory powers, under
Buckley v. Valeo, or if it is in any event undesirable to attempt to
regulate independent expenditures, care must be taken in
crafting any rules applicable only to candidates and their
committees...
Initial Report, p. 5-6
A substantial majority of the commissioners share the view that,
as a policy matter, campaign finance rules that are applicable to judicial
candidates and their committees should also apply to individuals or
The Commission has
groups making independent expenditures.
concluded that it cannot effectively navigate the shoals of the First
Amendment in this area. A majority of the commissioners believe that
even if rules cannot or do not apply to independent expenditures, it is
not unfair, counterproductive, or otherwise undesirable to restrict
candidates and their committees. As is reflected in the proposed SCR
60.06(5), however, a majority of the commissioners are not in favor of
extensive regulation of campaign finance.
There Should Be No Limits on ContributionsBy Lawyers Other
Than Those PrescribedGenerally By the Legislature.'

8. This paragraph responds to the issue that the court restated as: "Should judges,
judicial candidates, and personal committees be limited on the amount of contributions they
may accept from lawyers?"
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Although a sizable minority of the commissioners favors limitations
on the amount of lawyer contributions to judicial campaigns, the
majority of the commissioners favor no restriction on the amount of
money that may be contributed by a lawyer other than limits on
campaign contributions generally applicable under §11.26, Wis. Stats.
The Beilfuss/DeWitt recommendation to the court was that judicial
campaign committees could accept "reasonable" contributions from
lawyers, a provision also found in the 1990 ABA Model Code [§ 5C(2)].
A majority of the commissioners believe that the dollar limitations
found in §11.26, Wis. Stats., are themselves reasonable, and that relying
on dollar limitations on lawyers'
(and others') contributions is
preferable to reliance on an indeterminate "reasonable" standard.
Judges, Judges-elect, and Nonincumbent Candidates for Judicial
Office Should Be Prohibited from Personally Soliciting or
Accepting Campaign Contributions.
A substantial majority of the commissioners are of the view that a
judge ought not personally to solicit campaign contributions from
anyone. One who has or seeks judicial power ought not be seen with his
or her hand out to contributors. The most likely targets of campaign
solicitation are too likely to be subject to perceptions of undue influence
or coercion on the part of the judge or would-be judge. The dignity,
honor, and independence that should attend and characterize the
judiciary would be badly impaired by judges doing their own campaign
fund-raising.
Campaign Committees should be Permitted to Solicit and Accept
Lawful Contributions to Judicial Campaigns From Lawyers and
Other Contributors. Contributions Should not Knowingly be
Solicited or Accepted From Litigants with Matters Before the
Court To Which Election is Sought.
By reason of experience or professional associations or both, lawyers
are often better able to assess judicial qualifications in candidates for
judicial office.
Because of their professional interest in the
administration of justice, lawyers are also the most likely contributors to
judicial election campaigns which are becoming increasingly expensive
(in some cases alarmingly so). Restricting contributions from lawyers
would remove from the judicial campaign finance picture the potential
contributors who are both the best informed and the most likely to

1999]

APPENDIX B

contribute. It would also tend to restrict potential candidates for judicial
office to those who can fund their campaigns from their own wealth
without resort to broad-based financial and other support. Candidates
who may have outstanding qualifications for judicial office but little
personal wealth would be less likely to offer themselves to the electorate
for public service.
A substantial majority of the commissioners share the belief that
litigants with matters before the court to which election is sought ought
not to be solicited for contributions, nor should contributions be
accepted from such contributors. Both the solicitation and acceptance
of contributions from current litigants would be at best unseemly.
Worse, it would create undesirable pressure on their adversaries to
make "compensating contributions" and inevitably raise questions as to
the impartiality of the recipient of such contributions, perhaps leading to
wasteful disqualifications or recusals.
On the other hand, the
commissioners are aware of the fact that many Wisconsin courts have
crowded dockets that change every day as new cases are filed and others
are dismissed. The commissioners are also aware that the names of the
"real parties in interest" (economically or otherwise) in many cases may
not appear on the papers filed in court. It is not expected that
candidates will have to cull docket lists and case files to identify all
litigants before the court and to crosscheck the information against
mailing lists and contributors lists. The Commission believes that a rule
prohibiting the knowing solicitation or acceptance of contributions from
litigants with matters before the court is sufficient.
A number of the commissioners, though not a majority, share the
view that contributions should not be solicited or accepted from lawyers
with current cases before the court to which election is sought. The
majority disfavor restricting solicitation and acceptance of contributions
by lawyers for the reasons stated on the preceding page. There is a
danger of both the perceptions of and the reality of coercion and undue
influence when a lawyer with a matter before the court is solicited for a
campaign contribution, but the danger is lessened by the requirement
that such a solicitation may not be made by the judge himself or herself,
but only by the committee.
Under the rule proposed by the
Commission, the judge may serve on his or her committee, but should
avoid direct involvement in its fundraising efforts. The commissioners
were almost evenly divided on the issue whether judges and candidates
ought to be prohibited from serving on their own committees, but a
solid majority favored a rule that exhorted such judges and candidates
to avoid direct involvement in the committee's fundraising efforts.
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The Commission Disfavors Rules Restricting Membership on
Campaign Committees or The Choice of Campaign Consultants
or Managers.
Among the issues identified by the Commission in its Initial Report
was whether rules should limit membership on personal campaign
committees or the choice of campaign consultants or managers so as to
avoid the identification of judges or judicial candidates with political
partisans or advocacy groups. Judicial elections in Wisconsin are
nonpartisan. Political partisanship in judges is viewed as a serious threat
to judicial independence and to the fact and appearance of judicial
impartiality. Hence the rules restricting political activities by judges9
and the proposed rules restricting political activities by candidates for
judicial office.'0 The nonpartisan nature of a judicial campaign may be
compromised by the composition of personal campaign committees and
by the choice of campaign managers and consultants. The same may be
true with respect to personals closely identified with controversial
political issues likely to come before the court. Nonetheless, the
substantial majority of the commissioners disfavor regulation in this
area. The great majority, if not all, candidates for judicial office in
Wisconsin seek to obtain broad nonpartisan and bipartisan support for
their candidacies. Some supporters (and committee members and
consultants and managers) may be associated with one political party or
interest group while other supporters may be associated with competing
groups. Identification with particular parties or interest groups often
works against the interests of candidates and is not considered by the
majority of commissioners to be a problem inviting regulatory control
by the court. It should be noted that the issues addressed under this
heading are not unrelated to the issues involving endorsements. The
substantial majority of the commissioners disfavored restrictions on
endorsements.
Special Rules on Disqualificationor Recusal Are Not Recommended.
It is unknown to what extent judges recuse themselves from matters
because of campaign activities by lawyers or litigants. Recusals are not
litigated; only refusals to recuse are litigated. Furthermore, judges who
recuse themselves are not required to state the reason for recusal.
9. See SCR 60.06(2)
10. See pp. 16-20, infra.
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Recusal generally is governed by SCR 60.04(4)11 which requires recusal
under certain specified circumstances and also "when reasonable, wellinformed persons knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the
justice system and aware of the facts and circumstances the judge knows
or reasonably should know would reasonably question the judge's
ability to be impartial." The Commission's Initial Report pointed out
that this test may be so imprecise in the campaign financing and support
area as to be unhelpful, both to judges and to litigants and their
attorneys.12 The Beilfuss/DeWitt committee stated in its Commentary to
its proposed Section 5C(2): "Though not prohibited, campaign
contributions of which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers or
others who appear before the judge, may be relevant to disqualification
under [the committee's version of SCR 60.04(4)]." The Commission
agrees with this statement of the Beilfuss/DeWitt committee. The
commissioners are divided, however, on the general issue of whether
special rules are required with respect to disqualification or recusal
based on campaign contributions or campaign activities. It should be
noted that a substantial majority of the commissioners disfavored a rule
that would require disqualification or recusal when an attorney or
litigant has contributed more than a specified dollar amount to the judge
or judge's opponent. A substantial majority also disfavored a rule that
would require disqualification or recusal when an attorney or litigant
has served as a member of the judge's campaign committee or the
committee of the judge's opponent. Thus, no new rule is proposed.
No New Rule is ProposedRespecting the Timing of JudicialCampaign
Fundraising.
The ABA Model Code and a number of state codes of judicial
conduct restrict the time within which a judicial candidate may solicit
and accept campaign funds. The ABA Model Code provides that a
candidate's committee may solicit contributions and public support for

11. Additionally, § 757.19, Wis. Stats. sets forth the circumstances under which a judge is
required by law to disqualify himself or herself and establishes the procedure for
disqualification and waiver.
12. "[A]ithough the test was meant to be objective, one court has noted that it is
inherently subjective. (Citations omitted.) That is because the appearance of partiality
depends upon one's standard of observation, which will vary from individual to individual. In
reality, there is no objective standard to determine the appearance of partiality, but it is clear
that the appearance of partiality is to be decided from the viewpoint of a disinterested
observer, and not from the subjective viewpoint of the judge in question." JEFFM. SHAMAN,
ET AL, JUDICIAL CONDUCI AND ETHICS 144 (1990).
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the candidate's campaign no earlier than one year before an election
and no later than ninety days after the last election in which the
candidate participates during the election year. The Beilfuss/DeWitt
Committee recommended that solicitation of contributions and public
support be permitted "for a reasonable period of time before and after
the last election in which the candidate participates during the election
year." A substantial majority of the commissioners disfavor regulation
in this area. There was very little support, for example, for a rule that
would restrict campaign fundraising by an incumbent until active
opposition develops or for a rule that would prohibit all fundraising
after an election. The commissioners were more evenly split on the
issue of whether fundraising should be prohibited except for a specified
period of time before an election and a specified period of time after an
election. Thus, no rules are proposed.
No Special Rules Are Recommended Respecting the Use of
Judicial CampaignFunds.
The Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee recommended a rule similar to the
ABA Model Code respecting use of campaign funds: "A candidate shall
not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private
benefit of the candidate or others.', 13 The Committee added a
recommended prohibition on transferring funds already collected for a
partisan campaign to a judicial campaign committee or otherwise using
such funds for a judicial campaign. The Commission notes that the use
of campaign funds has been addressed by the legislature in § 11.25, Wis.
Stats. The commissioners were divided on the issue of whether the rules
of judicial conduct should address explicitly the proper uses of campaign
funds, including excess campaign funds. Thus, no new rule is proposed.
CAMPAIGN CONTENT

The Rules Should Prohibit Campaign Rhetoric that Commits or
Appears to Commit a Candidatefor Judicial Office with respect to
ParticularCases, Controversies, or Issues Likely to Come Before
the Court. Campaign Rhetoric Concerning Court Rules or
Administrative Practicesand PoliciesShould Not Be Restricted.
At least since the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, campaign
13. The Model Code refers to "the private benefit of the candidate or others." Model
Code of Jud. Conduct Canon 5 (1998).
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promises by judicial candidates have been considered problematic. The
1924 Canons proscribed promises appealing to "cupidity or prejudices of
the appointing or electing power" and forbade a candidate's announcing
in advance "his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class
support." The 1972 Model Code forbade promises of conduct in office
"other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office" and announcing "his views on disputed legal or political issues."
The 1990 Code repeated the proscription of promises other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office and
forbade campaign statements "that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to
come before the court." The Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee recommended
a rule that proscribed promises that "would appeal to the partisanship of
the electorate" and statements that commit or appear to commit a
candidate with respect to "cases or controversies that were likely to
come before the court." The Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee omitted the
ABA language about "issues" that were likely to come before the court,
commenting: "The drafters specifically omitted the words "or issues" in
the ABA Model Code to allow the voters to receive valuable
information in judicial elections."
A substantial majority of the commissioners favor a rule like the
1990 ABA rule Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) which prohibits campaign rhetoric
that "commits or appears to commit" a candidate "with respect to cases,
controversies, or issues likely to come before the court" to which the
candidate seeks election or appointment. The Commission would add
to that rule, however, a provision that candidates are not prohibited
from making statements of position concerning court rules or
administrative practices or policies.
The Rules Governing Judicial Elections Should Explicitly
ProhibitMisrepresentationsby Candidates, As Well As Rhetoric
that is Knowingly Misleading or Knowingly Likely to Confuse the
Electorate with Respect to the ProperRole of Judges and Lawyers
in the American Adversary System
Prohibitions of misrepresentations by judicial candidates are
commonplace throughout the U. S. Difficult issues arise as to whether
such prohibitions should be limited in scope or broad. The 1990 ABA
Model Code Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii) and the Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee
recommendation by their express terms prohibited only knowing
misrepresentation of "the identity, qualifications, present position or
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other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent." SCR 20:8.2(a), on
the other hand, prohibits lawyer candidates from making statements
"that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its
truth of falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge... or
of a candidate for election or appointment to a judicial... office." The
New Mexico code section 21-800B(4)(d) omits "knowingly" from its
prohibition of misrepresentations by judicial candidates and limits its
prohibition to "material facts". Section 12.05, Wis. Stats., provides: "No
person may knowingly make or publish, or cause to be made or
published, a false representation pertaining to a candidate or
referendum which is intended or tends to affect voting at an election."
Violation may result in a fine not to exceed $1,000 or imprisonment not
more than 6 months, or both.
The Commission proposes a rule [proposed SCR 60.06(3)(a) and (c)]
that consists of several elements. The proposed SCR 60.06(3)(a) calls
upon every judge, judge-elect, and candidate for judicial office to
"maintain, in campaign conduct and otherwise, the dignity appropriate
to judicial office."
Conduct amounting to misrepresentation or
intentional misleading or confusing of the electorate is presumably not
consistent with the dignity appropriate to judicial office.
SCR 60.06(3)(c) deals expressly with misrepresentations or other
wrongful statements. The first sentence is hortatory, urging all
candidates for judicial office to restrict his or her comments concerning
an opposing candidate to matters which are relevant to the opponent's
integrity, impartiality, judicial philosophy and temperament, legal ability
and industry.
The second sentence addresses statements that are true but
knowingly misleading or knowingly likely to confuse the public
respecting the proper function of judges and lawyers in the American
adversary system. The American electorate received an education in
statements that are arguably true but intentionally misleading in the
recent presidential impeachment proceedings. Whether the electorate is
knowingly and intentionally misled by a simple lie or by a craftily parsed
truth amounts to a distinction without a difference: the electorate has
been knowingly misled. Neither judges nor candidates for judicial office
should engage in such conduct. Nor should judicial candidates
knowingly engage in campaign rhetoric that is likely to confuse the
electorate about the proper role of judges and lawyers in the American
adversary system. Campaign literature or ads that urge the public to
vote against a candidate because the candidate represents citizens
accused of crime wrongly conflates the accused and the attorney, the
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client and the lawyer. Such campaign rhetoric tends to discourage
attorneys from representing citizens entitled by the Constitution to
counsel and is likely to lead nonlawyers to think that one who represents
a bad person is a bad person. Similarly, campaign rhetoric that suggests
that voting for a particular judicial candidate will result in reforms that
can only be effected by the legislature or the executive or other agencies
or departments of the government is misleading, confusing, and wrong.
Such conduct would be proscribed by the second sentence of the
proposed SCR 60.06(3)(c).
The third sentence in the proposed rule (with its list of 11 proscribed
behaviors) is derived in large measure from the Ohio Code of Judicial
Conduct Canon 7(D).
Both intentional misrepresentations and
misrepresentations made with reckless disregard for the truth are
proscribed.
The last sentence in the proposed rule is intended to deal with
material misrepresentations made not by the candidate or by one
authorized by the candidate, but by third parties, e.g., through
independent expenditures.
If the candidate knows of the
misrepresentation, and if the misrepresentation is material, and if the
misrepresentation is likely to confuse or mislead the electorate, then the
candidate is exhorted to disclaim the statement. The proposed rule
expressly provides that candidates are under no duty to monitor
statements made by third parties not subject to the control of the
candidate.
To the Extent Practicable,the Rules Governing JudicialElections
Should Specify What Areas of Campaign Speech Are and Are Not
Ethically Permissible.
Rules drafted in broad language are necessarily imprecise and
provide relatively little guidance to candidates as to what is permissible
and what is impermissible campaign speech. Candidates thus speak at
their peril when speaking of matters that may be held to be within
proscribed areas or outside such areas. In light of the inherent tension
between the public good of informing the electorate as to a candidate's
views and the public good of not creating the appearance of partiality or
prejudgment of cases or issues, judicial candidates and the public could
benefit from rules that more clearly outline permissible and
impermissible areas of campaign speech.
The AJS monograph
ELECTING JUSTICE points out that under the 1972 ABA Model Code,

ethics advisory committees suggested that each of the following topics
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should not be discussed in a judicial campaign: pre-trial release, plea
bargaining, sentencing, capital punishment, abortion, gun control, equal
rights amendment, drug laws, gambling laws, liquor licensing, dram shop
legislation, labor laws, property tax exemptions, regulation of
condominiums, court rules, prior court decisions (both of other courts
and of the candidate's own court), and "for good measure, specific legal
questions and hypothetical legal questions."
Id. at 86-87. The
Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee recommended a rule that proscribed
candidates from making statements that appeared to commit the
candidate with respect to "controversies that are likely to come before
the court" but permitted, inferentially at least, statements that appeared
to commit the candidate with respect to "issues" that were likely to
come before the court. It may be questioned whether candidates can
reasonably be expected to distinguish the permissible from the
impermissible under such a rule.
Chief Judge Richard Posner has written "Two principles are in
conflict and must, to the extent possible, be reconciled. Candidates for
public office should be free to express their views on all matters of
interest to the electorate. Judges should decide cases in accordance with
law rather than with any express or implied commitments that they may
have made to their campaign supporters or to others. The roots of both
principles lie deep in our constitutional heritage." Buckley v. Illinois
JudicialInquiry Bd, 997 F.2d 224, 227 (71h Cir. 1993). Requiring judicial
candidates to reconcile these principles on the hustings on the basis of
broadly stated rules such as the ABA rules may disserve both the
candidates and the public.
Thus, as an ideal proposition at least, the majority of the
commissioners favor rules that identify with some specificity those areas
of campaign speech that are ethically permissible and those that are
ethically impermissible. The difficulty is in writing such rules. Not only
is it nigh impossible to identify all the areas or subjects that might
become grist in an election mill, but also the rule-maker must be
sensitive to First Amendment concerns. Thus, the Commission submits
to the court only the broadly stated rules respecting promises and
commitments in the proposed SCR 60.06(3)(b) and the more detailed
rules respecting misrepresentations, misleading and confusing rhetoric
in the proposed SCR 60.06(3)(c).
No Special Rule is Proposed Respecting CampaignSpeech About
Decisions of a Sitting Judge or Decisions of an Appellate Court.
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A substantial majority of the commissioners disfavors proposing
rules specifically addressing campaign speech about decisions of a sitting
judge or decisions of an appellate court. This issue is inherently
Some observers argue that incumbent judges are
problematic.
especially vulnerable to unfair or misleading campaign attacks focusing
only on, e.g., one unpopular decision or opinion."4 The problem, they
argue, is exacerbated if the sitting judge is prohibited from commenting
on the case because it is still pending in some respect or likely to come
before the judge again in some form.15 Others argue that elections of
judges are meaningless if candidates cannot take issue with the acts of
an incumbent. Rules limiting campaign speech addressing decisions of a
sitting judge will inevitably be seen as unfairly favoring incumbents. On
the other hand, permitting challengers of sitting judges a free hand in
attacking decisions of sitting judges (and of appellate courts) implicates
the provisions of proposed SCR 60.06(3)(b) prohibiting candidates from
making commitments in advance with respect to particular cases,
controversies, or legal issues likely to come before the court. These
issues implicate the tension between reasonably informing the electorate
of differences between candidates and the need to preserve judicial
independence and impartiality, qualities no less important in an elected
judiciary than in an appointed one. Because of the difficulty or
impossibility of accommodating these often conflicting goals by rule, a
majority of the commissioners prefer to propose no special rules but to
rely on the general provisions of proposed SCR 60.06(3)(b).
OTHER POLITICAL ACTITIES
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Judges, candidates for judicial office and judges-elect should be
prohibitedfrom membership in a politicalparty during the term of
14. Unpopularity of a particular judicial decision is never relevant to the desired judicial
qualities of integrity, impartiality, judicial temperament, legal ability or industry. Although it
may be possible to point to a judge's decisions which taken together demonstrate a judicial
philosophy with which an opponent can legitimately differ; this will be rare.
15. AJS'ELEcTING JUSTICEnoted: "Sitting judges are constrained by ethics rules from
engaging in ex parte communications or commenting on pending or impending cases, and by
more general injunctions to maintain the integrity, independence and impartiality of the
judiciary. Consequently, they are often foreclosed, or believe themselves foreclosed, from
discussing their own records in office, either in a positive way or in response to criticism. In
reality, sitting judges can say quite a lot about their records in office... It is true, nonetheless,
that sitting judges labor under a disadvantage when they are criticized for their actions in
pending or impending matters." I at 82-3.
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office or when a candidate or judge-elect; office holding or
leadership of a politicalparty during the term of office or when a
candidate or judge-elect; and activeparticipationin the affairs of a
politicalparty during the term of office or when a candidate.
A substantial majority of the commissioners favor retaining the
existing prohibitions on political party membership, leadership, and
active participation by judges. Indeed, the substantial majority believe
that the prohibition should be extended to candidates for judicial office
during their candidacy and to judges-elect. Extending the prohibition to
nonincumbent candidates for judicial office would create a burden on
such candidates who, during their candidacy, hold a partisan office, such
as assembly person or senator. The proposed rule would require the
candidate to resign his or her party membership and to cease
participation in party activities and caucuses, and thus may be viewed as
a ballot access restriction. In Clements v. Fashing,457 U.S. 957 (1982),
the United States Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the
Texas constitution which limited a public official's ability to become a
candidate for another public office did violate the First Amendment or
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
The court asked the Commission to address how the terms
"membership" and "active participation" should be defined. The
Commission suggests that "membership" should be understood in its
common sense of being a formal part of the political organization,
carried on its rolls and mailing lists, entitled to be present at meetings of
the members and entitled to vote on matters on which members vote,
and paying dues. No definition is suggested for "active participation"
since the kinds of activities in which a political party member may
engage are difficult to enumerate in any comprehensive way. The
Commission has proposed SCR 60.06(2) which is based in large measure
on the existing rule, but which makes it clear that judges, candidates for
judicial office, and judges-elect are not prohibited from attending public
events sponsored by political parties or partisan candidates so long as
their cost to attend does not constitute a prohibited political
16. In Clements, the Court considered two ballot access limitations in the Texas
constitution. The first provided that no judge of any court or other person holding a federal,
state, or foreign "lucrative office" shall, during the term for which the person was elected or
appointed be eligible for the Texas legislature. The second provided that if any one of certain
specified state and county officers becomes a candidate for any state or federal office other
than the office then held, at any time when the unexpired term of the office then held shall
exceed one year, such candidacy shall constitute an automatic resignation of the office then
held. See Clements, 457 U.S. at 960.
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contribution.
Judges, Candidatesfor Judicial Office, and Judges-Elect Should
be ProhibitedFrom Speaking Publicly on Behalf of or In Support
of a PoliticalParty or Party Candidate.
A very substantial majority of the commissioners favor prohibiting
judges as well as candidates for judicial office and judges-elect from
speaking publicly on behalf of or in support of a political party or its
candidates. The 1967 Code prohibited judges [but not non-judge
candidates or judges-elect] from "publicly endors[ing] or speak[ing] on
behalf of [a political party's] candidates or platform."
The
Beilfuss/DeWitt
committee
recommendations
continued
the
prohibitions.
Judges, Candidates For JudicialOffice, and Judges-Elect Should
Be Prohibited
From Contributing to A Political Party or Its
17
Candidates.
A majority of the commissioners favor prohibiting judges,
candidates for judicial office, and judges-elect from making
contributions to political parties. The commissioners were rather evenly
split on the issue whether contributions to partisan candidates should be
prohibited."s
Judges, Candidates for Judicial Office and Judges-Elect Should
Not Be ProhibitedFromAttending PublicMeetings Sponsored by
a PoliticalParty or by a PartisanCandidate.If the Purchase of a
Ticket or Other Payment of Money is Required, the Judge or
Candidatefor Judicial Office or Judge-Elect May Pay No More
Than the Cost of the Event Reasonably Allocable to His or Her
Attendance.
It is not desirable that judges live lives of seclusion.

As public

17. The final draft of the proposed SCR 60.06(2) contains the same prohibition on
contributions to partisan candidates that is found in the current rule.
18. The 1967 Code prohibited judges [but not non-judge candidates] from making
contributions in support of a political party's causes. The Beilfuss/DeWitt committee
recommendations would have continued the prohibitions except to permit a judge and
candidate, when a candidate for election, to purchase tickets for and attend political
gatherings.
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officials and public citizens, it is good for judges to participate in the life
of the community. Moreover, if judges are to be elected, it is reasonable
that they attend gatherings and functions that voters attend. Many
judges are elected in low turnout election years and the most ardent
voters are generally those involved with political parties, community
groups and charitable organizations. Judicial candidates must seek
endorsements from political leaders, community leaders, labor
organizations, and other politically active members of the community.
Many of these individuals gather at political events, non-judicial
campaign events, fundraising dinners for their organization, and
charitable events. It has long been the case that "pre-candidates"
appear at these events making contacts with potential supporters and
campaign workers while making contributions to the organizations.
Currently, judges are substantially prohibited from engaging in these
same activities.
The Commission proposes a rule that would level the playing field.
Judges and nonincumbent candidates alike would be prohibited from
engaging in proscribed conduct, while likewise being permitted to
attend public events sponsored by political parties or partisan
candidates. The rule would require that no part of any money paid for
attendance could constitute a prohibited political contribution and the
comment to the rule advises attendees to so conduct themselves at such
events that their conduct will not be made to appear as an endorsement
or other prohibited political activity. 9
Judges, Candidates for Judicial Office, and Judges-Elect Should
be ProhibitedFrom Giving Speeches at Public Events Sponsored
by a PoliticalParty or PartisanCandidate.
In their responses to the Survey, a quite substantial majority of the
commissioners favored the prohibition of speeches by judges and
judicial candidates at partisan events.20 The Survey item to which the
19. "In states that explicitly prohibit or restrict endorsements, the real problem has been
to determine what constitutes an "endorsement." A public statement of support for another
candidate clearly qualifies, but less direct statements, and some actions, can constitute
endorsements as well. Advisory bodies appear to agree that a judicial candidate's simple
appearance at a political function held for another candidate does not constitute an improper
endorsement, but any greater involvement has raised objections... Between the extremes of
passive attendance and active participation in the campaign events of others lies a large gray
area of activity whose ethical status remains uncertain." ELECTING JUSTICEat 95.
20. A small majority of those responding to the Survey of Commissioners favored a rule
that would permit speech-making so long as all candidates were invited to address the
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commissioners were responding, however, did not define "speeches". 1
It should be noted that there is nothing in the proposed SCR 60.06(2)
itself that broadly prohibits judges and judicial candidates from speaking
at party-sponsored public events. Proposed SCR 60.06(2)(d) specifically
prohibits judges and judicial candidates and judges-elect from publicly
endorsing or speaking on behalf of a party's candidates or platforms.
Proposed SCR 60.06(2)(b) prohibits them from "participating" in the
"affairs... or activities of a political party or of a candidate for partisan
office", but the concluding sentences of proposed SCR 60.06(2) would
permit judges and candidates for judicial office and judges-elect to
attend "as a member of the public" and at cost public events sponsored
by a political party or partisan candidate. The commissioners discussed
the question of what if any public comments or greetings, of a
nonpartisan nature, a judge or judicial candidate may make at such a
gathering, but did not attempt to draft a rule governing this conduct
beyond the strictures of SCR 60.06(2)d). The proposed rule would
cover nonincumbent candidates for judicial office and judges-elect.
There was no substantial support for having different rules obtain in
election years and non-election years.
CIVIC AND CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

The Commission Proposes No Special Rules for Interest Group
Activities.
In the Initial Report, the Commission noted that although the
supreme court had not asked the Commission to consider SCR 60.05
relating to extra-judicial activities in civic and charitable organizations,
some of those organizations may have controversial legal or political
agendas that would raise concerns similar to those raised by a judge's
involvement in political organizations.' Subject to certain exceptions
not germane here, SCR 60.05(3)(c) permits judges to serve as officers,
directors, trustees or nonlegal advisors of "nonprofit educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal, sororal, or civic organizations." Issue
gathering.
21. For example, item 91 inquired: "Should judges be prohibited from giving speeches at
party sponsored public meetings?" See also items 92-94.
22. The 1990 ABA Model Code defines "political organization" as "a political party or
other group, the principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of
candidates to political office." Civic and charitable organizations typically do not have such a
principal purpose.
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advocacy groups are typically nonprofit and have educational missions.
While a substantial majority of the commissioners believe that serious
problems could arise from a judge's activities in some kinds of interest
groups, the general rule stated in SCR 60.05(1), requiring a judge so to
conduct his or her extrajudicial activities so they do not cast reasonable
doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially, demean the judicial
office, or interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties, is
sufficient. The Commission makes special note of the difficulty of
defining the concept of "interest groups" in a way that is useful and of
drawing regulatory and ethical lines in this area of extra-judicial activity.
Accordingly, the Commission proposes no rules in addition to SCR
60.05(1) with respect to extrajudicial activities in interest groups.
The Commission Proposes No Change in the Prohibitionof PartTime MunicipalJudges' Holding OtherNonpartisanOffices.
In the responses to the Survey of Commissioners, a majority of the
commissioners favored permitting part-time municipal judges to hold
other nonpartisan office. The office that was mentioned early on in the
Commission's work was that of school board member. At the April 23,
1999 meeting of the Commission, however, the commissioners present
noted that there are a number of nonpartisan offices in Wisconsin
government and that there would be a palpable potential for conflicting
interests and roles with a municipal judge simultaneously holding
different offices. There is also a potential for a municipal judge to use
or exploit his or her judicial office in seeking the other nonpartisan
office. Thus, no change is proposed.
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

ENDORSEMENTS

Judges and Candidatesfor Judicial Office Should Be Permittedto
Solicit and Accept Endorsements From Other Judges, Other
Public Office Holders, Lawyers, and Interest Groups. Judges and
Candidatesfor Judicial Office (and Their Committees) Should be
Prohibited From Knowingly
Soliciting or Accepting
Endorsements From Litigants with Cases Currently Before the
Courtto which Election is Sought.
The current Code of Judicial Conduct and its 1967 predecessor are
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silent on the issues of whose endorsement a judge or judicial candidate
may solicit or accept. In practice, judges have been endorsed by other
judges, partisan and nonpartisan public office holders, lawyers, and
organizations, including special interest groups. The Commission
considered a wide variety of issues related to the solicitation and
acceptance of endorsements. As a general matter, the Commission
proposes no change from current practice, except to recommend an
explicit prohibition of knowing solicitation or acceptance of an
endorsement from a litigant with a matter currently before the court to
which the candidate seeks election.
The Commission was rather evenly split on the issue of whether a
judge or candidate for judicial office should be prohibited from soliciting
an endorsement from partisan office holders, and from lawyers who
have matters currently before the court to which the judge or candidate
seeks election, and from interest groups.' In those areas where a clear
majority favoring rule-making did not exist, no new rules were
proposed. Even in these areas where perhaps half of the commissioners
favored restrictions on solicitation, considerably fewer favored any
restriction on accepting endorsements or requiring disavowal of
unsolicited endorsements.
Judges and Candidatesfor Judicial Office should Be Permitted
Personally to Solicit Endorsements, Subject to the Prohibition
Respecting Litigants With Cases Before the Court.
The commissioners were rather evenly divided on the issue whether
a judge should be prohibited from seeking endorsements personally,
rather than through his or her committee.' Thus no rule is proposed.
23. "Another questionable source of endorsements are special interest groups.
Acceptance of the endorsement.., of a group such as Right to Life may be construed as a
pledge of conduct in office, and therefore place a candidate in violation of [ABA 1990 Model
Code] Canon 5A(3)(d)(I). A New York State Bar Association opinion states that a judicial
candidate may accept the endorsement... of the Right to Life Party provided he or she
refrains from expressing a view on abortion and further provided that the endorsement... is
not conditioned on the candidate's view on that topic." SHAMAN, ET AL., JUDICIAL
CONDUCr AND ETHICS 382 (2d ed. 1995)(citation omitted).
24. The 1990 ABA Model Code, Canon 5C(2) prohibits judicial candidates, judge and
nonjudge, from personally soliciting publicly stated support. The BeilfusslDeWitt committee
recommended that candidates be permitted personally to solicit endorsements, but not
contributions. The proposed rule restricted the solicitation of endorsements to "a reasonable
period of time before and after" the election and prohibited judges, but not nonjudge
candidates, from soliciting endorsements "while engaging in official duties or while in the
courthouse."
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Judges, Candidates for Judicial Office, and Judges-Elect Should
Not Be Permitted to Endorse Partisan Candidates for Other
Offices.
No Restriction is Proposed With Respect to
Endorsements of Other Judges and Candidates for Other
Nonpartisan Offices.
Both the current and the proposed SCR60.06(2) prohibit judges
from endorsing partisan candidates.' The proposed rule extends the
prohibition to candidates for judicial office and judges-elect. There is a
widely held belief that in the 1999 supreme court campaign public
endorsement of candidates by present justices tended to damage the
standing of the supreme court in the eyes of the public. Although some
members of the Commission favor a rule making it unethical for any
judge to make a public endorsement in a campaign for election to any
judicial position, such a rule does not have the support of a substantial
majority of the Commission, and for that reason has not been included
in the proposed rules.
Judges, Candidates for Judicial Office, and Judges-Elect Should
Not Be Permitted to Contribute to Partisan Candidatesfor Other
Offices.
No Restriction is Proposed With Respect to
Contributions to the Campaigns of Other Judges and Candidates
for Other NonpartisanOffices.
Both the current and the proposed SCR60.06(2) prohibit judges
from making contributions to the campaigns of partisan candidates. The
proposed rule extends the prohibition to candidates for judicial office
and judges-elect. The majority of the commissioners do not favor
restricting judges, candidates for judicial office or judges-elect from
making contributions to the campaigns of other judges or of candidates
for nonpartisan offices.
Applicants for Appointment to a Judicial Vacancy Should Be
Bound By EthicalRules.
A substantial majority of the commissioners share the view that
applicants for appointment to a judicial vacancy should be bound by

25. The Beilfuss/DeWitt proposal would have prohibited public endorsement or
opposition of "another candidate for any nonjudicialoffice."
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rules applicable to other candidates for judicial office. The code defines
"candidate" as "a person seeking selection for or retention of a judicial
office by means of election or appointment who makes a public
announcement of candidacy, declares or files as a candidate with the
election or appointment authority, or authorizes solicitation or
acceptance of contributions."
The Beilfuss/DeWitt proposal prohibited candidates for
appointment to judicial office from soliciting or accepting funds to
support the candidacy. Additionally, it prohibited "any political activity
to secure the appointment" except to permit communications by the
candidate to the appointing authority and screening committees, and
seeking support from organizations that regularly make
recommendations for appointment. Support could be sought from
individualsonly "to the extent requested or required by" the appointing
authority or screening committee.
Information concerning the
qualifications of the candidate for the judicial office sought could be
provided only to the appointing authority, screening committee,
organizations regularly making recommendations to the appointing
authority, and individuals as requested or required by the appointing
authority, screening committee, or organization regularly making
recommendations. These recommendations parallel the 1990 ABA
Model Code Canon 5B(2) provisions.
The Beilfuss/DeWitt committee rejected the Model Code provisions
that permitted non-judge candidates for appointment to retain an office
in a political organization, attend political gatherings, and continue to
pay ordinary assessments and ordinary contributions to a political
organization or candidate and purchase tickets for political party
dinners or other functions. The committee Commentary on the rule
noted that the change was intended "to insure that all candidates,
judicial and nonjudicial, have the same restrictions on their political
activities when they become candidates for judicial appointment."
The Commission has not proposed special rules for candidates for
appointment to judicial office. Such candidates are bound by the
provisions of SCR 60.06(2), as well as the other applicable provisions,
for example., SCR 60.06(3).
Judges, Candidatesfor Judicial Office, and Judges-elect Should
Be Permitted to Endorse and write Letters of Support for an
Applicant for Appointment to JudicialOffice.
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There was almost unanimous agreement on this matter.2
No Special rules are Proposedfor Judges, Candidatesfor Judicial
Office or Judges-Elect Whose Spouse or Family Member is
Seeking or Holds a Partisanor NonpartisanElected Office.
The Commission did not devote substantial attention to the
problems of the increasing number of judicial office holders with a
spouse or close family member holding another elective office.
The Commission ProposesNo Definition of "Endorsement".
In the Initial Report, the Commission invited the court's attention to
the following
in the American Judicature Society monograph
ELECTING JUSTICE:

In states that explicitly prohibit or restrict endorsements, the real
problem has been to determine what constitutes an "endorsement." A
public statement of support for another candidate clearly qualifies, but
less direct statements, and some actions, can constitute endorsements as
well. Advisory bodies appear to agree that a judicial candidate's simple
appearance at a political function held for another candidate does not
constitute an improper endorsement, but any greater involvement has
raised objections... Between the extremes of passive attendance and
active participation in the campaign events of others lies a large gray
area of activity whose ethical status remains uncertain." ELECTING
JUSTICE at 95.
Because of time constraints and feasibility concerns, the Commission
has not attempted to draw ethical lines in the "large gray area".
COMMON ISSUES
The Commission ProposesRules governingJudicialElections and
26. SCR 60.03(2) provides, in part: "A judge may not lend the prestige of judicial office
to advance the private interests of the judge or of others or convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge." The Comment
states, in part: "Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by cooperatingwith
appointing authorities and screening committees seeking names for consideration and by
respondingto official inquiries concerning a person being considered for a judgeship." Most
commissioners are of the opinion that this language, limiting a judge to a responsive role, is
unnecessarily restrictive.
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Ethics That Are In Some Measure Mandatory and In Some
Measure Hortatory and Aspirational.
The rules proposed by the Commission are in the main mandatory,
like the other rules in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Proposed SCR
60.06(3)(c) contains two hortatory sentences, one urging that comments
concerning an opposing candidate be limited to matters directly related
to qualifications for office and one urging the disclaiming of materially
misleading statements by third parties that are likely to confuse the
electorate. In proposed SCR 60.06(4), judges, candidates, and judgeselect are exhorted to avoid direct involvement in their committee's
fundraising efforts. Finally, in proposed SCR 60.06(5) judges and
candidates for judicial office are exhorted to be mindful of the values
underlying SCR 60.03 ["A judge shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities."] in soliciting
and accepting an endorsement.
The Rules GoverningJudicialElections Should Apply With Equal
Vigor to All Candidates.
Currently, some rules apply to candidates who are judges but not to
candidates who are non-judge lawyers. Candidates who are lawyers are
subject to SCR Ch. 20, including SCR 20:8.2(b) and 8.4, but non-lawyers
are not. Even the rule that appears to "level the playing field" for judge
and non-judge lawyer candidates does so only partially and
inadequately. SCR 20:8.2(b) requires lawyer candidates for judicial
office to "comply with the applicable rules of the code of judicial
conduct." The code of judicial conduct defines "candidate" as persons
seeking election or appointment to judicial office, whether an incumbent
judge or not. Some restrictions, however, apply by their terms only to
judge candidates even though the policy or policies sought to be
forwarded appear to require compliance by any candidate for judicial
office. For example, only candidates who are judges are forbidden to
make promises or suggestions of conduct in office which appeal to
cupidity or partisanship or to do anything which appears to commit the
judge in advance with respect to any particular case or controversy
(SCR 60.06(3)). The public interest justifying the rule is found in the
need for both the fact and the appearance of integrity and impartiality in
the judiciary. No reasonable basis seems to justify treating judge and
nonjudge candidates differently with respect to "promise or commit"
rules. A substantial majority of the commissioners believe that the rules
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should apply to judge and nonjudge candidates alike, as well as to
successful nonjudge candidates during the period between their election
and their taking office.
Dated this 4th day of June, 1999.

Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild
Chairperson

Professor Charles D. Clausen
Reporter

APPENDIX C
SURVEY OF COMMISSIONERS
CAMPAIGN FINANCING ISSUES

1. Is there a compelling reasonto have special rules regardingcampaign
financingfor judicialcampaigns?
2. As a policy matter,should campaignfinance rules that are applicable
to judicialcandidatesand their committees also apply to individuals
or groups making independent expenditures?
3. If rules cannot or do not apply to independent expenditures, is it
unfair, counterproductive,or otherwise undesirableto restrict
candidates?
4. Should judges, judicialcandidates,and personalcommittees be
limited on the amount of contributionsthey may acceptfrom lawyers?
4a. If you answered #4 "yes", what should be the maximum amount?
5. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom solicitingcontributionsfrom
lawyers?
6. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom solicitingcontributionsfrom
lawyers?
7. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom accepting contributionsfrom
lawyers?
8. Should a judge's committee be prohibitedfrom soliciting
contributionsfrom lawyers ?
9. Should a judge's committee be prohibitedfrom accepting
contributionsfrom lawyers?
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10. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom solicitingcontributionsfrom
lawyers with matters currentlypending before the judge?
11. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom accepting contributionsfrom
lawyers with matters currentlypending before the judge?
12. Should a judge's committee be prohibitedfrom accepting
contributionsfrom lawyers with matters currently pending before the
judge's court?
13. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom soliciting contributionsfrom
litigants currently appearingbefore the judge's court?
14. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom acceptingcontributionsfrom
litigants currently appearingbefore the judge's court?
15. Should a judge's committee be prohibitedfrom soliciting
contributionsfrom litigants currently appearingbefore the judge's
court?
16. Should a judge's committee be prohibitedfrom accepting
contributionsfrom litigants currently appearingbefore the judge's
court?
17. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom solicitingcontributionsfrom
litigantslikely to appearbefore the judge's court?
18. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom accepting contributionsfrom
litigantslikely to appearbefore the judge's court?
19. Should a judge's committee be prohibitedfrom soliciting
contributionsfrom litigantslikely to appearbefore the judge's court?
20. Should a judge's committee be prohibitedfrom accepting
contributionsfrom litigantslikely to appearbefore the judge's court?
21. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
soliciting contributionsfrom litigantslikely to appearbefore the
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prevailingcandidate'scourt?
22. Should judges be prohibitedfrom serving on their own committees?
23. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom serving
on their committees?
24. If service on one's own committee is not to be prohibited,should
judicialcandidatesbe exhorted to avoid involvement in their
committee's fundraisingefforts?
25. Should rules limit membership on personalcampaign committees to
avoid identificationofjudicial candidateswith politicalpartisans?
26. Should rules limit membership on personalcampaign committees to
avoid identificationofjudicial candidateswith advocacy groups
representingparticularposition on controversialpoliticalissues likely
to come before the court?
27 Should rules restrictthe choice ofpaid campaignconsultants to avoid
identification ofjudicial candidateswith such advocacy groups?
28. Should rules restrictthe choice ofpaid campaignconsultants to avoid
identification ofjudicialcandidateswith politicalpartisans?
29. Should rules requiredisqualificationor recusal on account of a
judge's previous campaignfundraisingconduct?
30. Should rules requiredisqualificationor recusal on account of a
judge'sprevious campaignconduct unrelated to fundraising?
31. Should rules encouragedisqualificationor recusalon account of a
judge'sprevious campaignfundraisingconduct?
32. Should rules encouragedisqualificationor recusalon account of a
judge's previous campaignconduct unrelatedto fundraising?
33. Should the code provide specific rules on when recusal is
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appropriate?
34. Should rules requiredisqualificationor recusal when an attorney or
litiganthas contributedmore than a specified dollaramount to the
judge or the judge's opponent?
35. Should rules requiredisqualificationor recusal when an attorney or
litiganthas served as a member of the judge's campaign committee or
the committee of the judge's opponent?
36. Should rules prohibitcampaignfundraisingby an incumbent until
active opposition develops?
37. Should fundraisingbe prohibitedexcept for a specified period of time
before an election?
38. Should fundraisingbe prohibitedentirely after an election?
39. Should fundraisingbe restrictedto a specified period of time after an
election?
40. Should the rules address the properuses of campaignfunds?
41. Should the rules specifically address the proper uses of excess
campaignfunds?
42. Do you favor some form of public financing ofjudicial election
campaigns? If so, on a separateresponse sheet or in a cover letter
returning the survey response sheet, please indicate what kind ofplan
you favor.
CAMPAIGN CONTENT ISSUES

43. Should rules prohibitcampaignrhetoric that "commits or appears to
commit" a candidatefor judicial office with respect to a particular
case?
44. Should rules prohibitcampaignrhetoric that "commits or appearsto
commit" a candidatefor judicial office with respect to a particular
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controversy?
45. Should rules prohibit campaign rhetoricthat "commits or appearsto
commit" a candidatefor judicialoffice with respect to issues likely to
come before the court to which the candidateseeks election or
appointment?
46. Should campaignrhetoricrespecting the adoption, modification, or
repeal of court rules or administrativepracticesbe subject to a
different rule from other issues likely to come before the court?
47. Should rules governingjudicialelections explicitly prohibit
misrepresentationby candidatesfor judicialoffice?
48. If there is to be a ruleprohibitingmisrepresentation,should the
prohibitionbe limited in scope [e. g., restrictedto misrepresentations
of the qualificationsof the candidateand of his/her opponent]?
49. If there is to be a ruleprohibitingmisrepresentation,should the
prohibitionbe broad[e. g., applicableto any misrepresentationof
fact]?
50. If there is to be a broadprohibitionof misrepresentation,should there
be a materiality restriction?
51. If misrepresentationis to be prohibited,should the prohibition apply
only to intentionalmisrepresentation?
52. If misrepresentationis to be prohibited,should the prohibitionapply
to intentionalmisrepresentationsand to misrepresentationsmade with
reckless disregardfor truth or falsity?
53. If misrepresentationis to be prohibited, should the prohibitionsapply
even to negligent or innocentmisrepresentations?
54. Should rules identify with some degree of specificity what areas of
campaignspeech are ethically permissible?
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55. Should rules identify with some degree of specificity what areasof
campaignspeech are not ethically permissible?
56. Respecting campaign speech limitations,is itpreferable to "paintwith
a broad brush" ratherthan attempting to draft rules addressing
specific types of campaign rhetoric?
57. Should rules address campaignspeech regardingdecisions of a sitting
judge?
58. Should rules address campaignspeech regardingdecisions of an
appellate court?
59. Should the code contain a hortatoryprovision that ideally a candidate
should restricthis or her comments on the record of an opponent to
matters which are clearly relevant to the integrity, impartiality,judicial
temperament,judicialphilosophy, legal ability, or industry?
60. Should rules address candidaterepresentationsthat, though true, are
misleading?
61. Should rules address candidaterepresentationsthat, though true and
not misleading, are otherwise unfair?
62. Should rules addressjudicialcampaign rhetoricfocused on legislative
or executive branch issues, i. e., issues constitutionallycommitted to
branches of government other that the judiciary?
63. Should candidatesbe prohibitedfrom announcing their views on
disputedpoliticalissues?
64. Should rules address campaign rhetoriclikely to confuse the public
concerning the properroles of judges and lawyers in the American
adversarysystem ofjustice?
65. Should rules requirethat candidatesdisclaim misrepresentationsor
otherwise unfair assertions made through independent expenditures?
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66. Should reasonablemonitoring by candidatesof representations
through independent expenditures be required?
OTHER POLInCAL ACTIVITY

PoliticalOrganizations
67 Should judges be prohibitedfrom membership' in a politicalparty
during a term of office?
68. Should judges be prohibitedfrom membership in a politicalparty
when a candidatefor judicialoffice?
69. Should judges be prohibitedfrom holding office in a politicalparty
duringa term of office?
70. Should judges be prohibitedfrom holding office in a politicalparty
when a candidatefor judicialoffice?
71. Should judges be prohibitedfrom activeparticipation2 in the affairs of
a politicalparty during a term of office?
72. Should judges be prohibitedfrom activeparticipationin the affairs of
a politicalparty when a candidatefor judicialoffice?
73. Should nonincumbent candidatesbe prohibitedfrom membership in a
politicalparty when a candidatefor judicialoffice?
74. Should nonincumbentcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom holding office in
a politicalparty when a candidatefor judicialoffice?

1. The supreme court has asked the Commission to address how the terms
"membership" and "active participation" should be defined in terms of affiliation with
political parties. If you have considered how these terms should be defined, please share your
thoughts on such definitions on a separate survey response sheet or in a cover letter returning
your responses.
2. The supreme court has asked the Commission to address how the terms
"membership" and "active participation" should be defined in terms of affiliation with
political parties.
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75. Should nonincumbent candidatesbe prohibitedfrom active
participationin the affairs ofa politicalparty when a candidatefor
judicialoffice?
76. Should judges be prohibitedfrom speakingpublicly on behalfof or in
support of a party or party candidates?
77. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
speakingpublicly on behalf of or in supportof a party or party
candidates?
78. Should judges be prohibitedfrom contributingto a party?
79. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates be prohibitedfrom
contributingto a party?
80. Should judges be prohibitedfrom contributingto a partisan
candidate?
81. Should non judgejudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom contributing
to a partisancandidate?
82. If contributionsto partiesand/orpartisancandidatesarepermitted,
should the amount of contribution be regulated?
83. Should judges be prohibitedfrom attendingparty sponsoredpublic
meetings?
84. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
attendingparty sponsoredpublic meetings?
85. Should judges be prohibitedfrom attendingpartisancandidatefund
raisers?
86. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
attendingpartisancandidatefund raisers?
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87. Should judges be prohibitedfrom purchasingtickets as a member of
the publicfor a fundraisingevent for a party?
88. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
purchasingtickets as a member of the publicfor a fundraisingevent
for a party?
89. Should judges be prohibitedfrom attendingpartisanevents even as
guest of the judge's spouse or otherperson3 ?
90. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
attendingpartisanevents even as guest of the judge's spouse or other
person?
91. Should judges be prohibitedfrom giving speeches at party sponsored
public meetings?
92. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom giving
speeches atparty sponsoredpublic meetings?
93. Should judges be prohibitedfrom giving speeches at partisan
candidatefund raisers?
94. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom giving
speeches atpartisancandidatefund raisers?
95. Should there be different rules for election years and non-election
years?
96. Should speech-making be permitted so long as all candidatesare
invited to addressthe gathering?

3. Current SCR 60:05(4)(e) prohibits judges from accepting a gift, favor or loan from
anyone except in rather narrowly circumscribed circumstances identified therein.
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97. Should judges be prohibitedfrom membership in interestgroups
during the term ofjudicialoffice?
98. Should judges be prohibitedfrom membership in interestgroups
while a candidatefor judicialoffice?
99. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
membership in interestgroups while a candidatefor judicialoffice?
100. Should judges be prohibitedfrom holding office in an interest
group during the term ofjudicialoffice?
101. Should judges be prohibitedfrom holding office in an interest
group while a candidatefor judicialoffice?

102. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
holding office in an interestgroup while a candidatefor judicial

office?
103. Should judges be prohibitedfrom holdinga non-office leadership
position5 in an interestgroup during the term of office?
104. Should judges be prohibitedfrom holding a non-office leadership
position in an interestgroup while a candidate?

4. In its response to the Commission's Initial Report, the court asked that the
Commission "address each of the seven issues addressed in this session [sic] but limit its

inquiry to the specified conduct as it relates to "interest groups." The court "specifically
requests that the Commission undertake to define what constitutes an "interest groups" and
consider how judicial conduct in relation to them should be regulated." If you have
considered how "interest group" should be defined, please share your thoughts on such
definition on a separate survey response sheet or in a cover letter returning your responses.
5. This term if of course hardly self-defining. Officerships would presumably include the
traditional president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and such other positions as are
defined as officer positions under organizational constitutions, article, by-laws, etc. Non-office
leadership positions would seem to include committee leadership and the like, but could also
include formal or informal positions such as "advisor" or "consultant."
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105. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom hold
a non-office leadershippositionin an interestgroup while a
candidate?
106. Should judges be prohibitedfrom activeparticipationin the affairs
of an interestgroup during the term of office?
107. Should judges be prohibitedfrom activeparticipationin the affairs
of an interestgroup while a candidate?
108. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
activeparticipationin the affairs of an interestgroup while a
candidate?
109. Should judges be prohibitedfrom speakingpublicly on behalfof
or in support of interestgroups?
110. Should judges be prohibitedfrom speakingpublicly on behalfof
or in support of the goals and activities of interestgroups?
111. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
speakingpublicly on behalf of or in supportof interestgroups?
112. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
speakingpublicly on behalf of or in support of the goals or activities
of interestgroups?
113.

Should judges be prohibitedfrom contributingto interestgroups?

114. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
contributingto interestgroups while a candidate?
115. Should judges be prohibitedfrom participatingin fundraising
activities of interestgroups?
116. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
participatingin fundraisingactivities of interestgroups?
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Should judges be prohibitedfrom giving speeches atfundraising
activities of interestgroups?

118. Should nonincumbentjudicial candidatesbe prohibitedfrom
giving speeches atfundraisingactivities of interestgroups?
119. Should judges be prohibitedfrom attendingfundraisingactivities
of interestgroups?
120. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
attendingfundraisingactivities of interestgroups?
121. Should judges be prohibitedfrom purchasingtickets for
fundraisingevents of interestgroups, even as a member of the public?
122. Should nonincumbentjudicial candidatesbe prohibitedfrom
purchasingtickets for fundraisingevents of interestgroups, even as a
member of the public?
123. Should attendance at an interestgroup fundraisingevent be
permitted if a judge attends as the guest of the judge's spouse6?
124. Should attendance at an interestgroup fundraisingevent be
permitted if a nonincumbentjudicial candidateattends as the guest of
the candidate'sspouse or otherperson?
HOLDING NONPARTISAN OFFICE

125. Should municipaljudges be permitted to hold other nonpartisan
offices while serving as part-time municipaljudges?

6. In the Initial Report, the Commission phrased the issue in terms of attending as the
guest "of one's spouse or otherperson" (italics added). Attending a fundraising event as the
guest of a nonspouse other person may be prohibited as accepting a "thing of value".
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CAMPAIGN ACrIVITIES

Endorsements
126. Should judges be prohibitedfrom soliciting endorsementsfrom
otherjudges?
127. Should judges be prohibitedfrom accepting endorsementsfrom
otherjudges?
128. Should judges be requiredpublicly to disavow endorsementsfrom
otherjudges?
129. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates be prohibitedfrom
solicitingendorsementsfrom judges?
130. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
accepting endorsementsfrom judges?
131. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe requiredpublicly to
disavow endorsementsfrom judges?
132. Should judges be prohibitedfrom solicitingendorsementsfrom
partisanpublic office holders?
133. Should judges be prohibitedfrom accepting endorsementsfrom
partisanpublic office holders?
134. Should judges be requiredpublicly to disavow endorsementsfrom
partisanpublic office holders?
135. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
solicitingendorsementsfrom partisanpublic office holders?
136. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
accepting endorsementsfrom partisanpublic office holders?
137.

Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe requiredpublicly to
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disavow endorsementsfrom partisanpublic office holders?
138. Should judges be prohibitedfrom solicitingendorsementsfrom
nonpartisanpublic office holders?
139. Should judges be prohibitedfrom accepting endorsementsfrom
nonpartisanpublic office holders?
140. Should judges be requiredpublicly to disavow endorsementsfrom
nonpartisanpublic office holders?
141. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates be prohibitedfrom
soliciting endorsementsfrom nonpartisanpublic office holders?
142. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates be prohibitedfrom
accepting endorsementsfrom nonpartisanpublic office holders?
143. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates by requiredpublicly to
disavow endorsementsfrom nonpartisanpublic office holders?
144. Should judges be prohibitedfrom solicitingendorsementsfrom all
lawyers?
145. Should judges be prohibitedfrom accepting endorsementsfrom all
lawyers?
146. Should judges be requiredpublicly to disavow endorsementsfrom
any lawyer?
147

Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
solicitingendorsementsfrom all lawyers?

148. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom
accepting endorsementsfrom all lawyers?
149. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidatesbe requiredpublicly to
disavow endorsementsfrom any lawyer?
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150. Should judges be prohibitedfrom soliciting endorsementsfrom
7 appearbefore the judge's court?
lawyers who regularly
151. Should judges be prohibitedfrom accepting endorsementsfrom
lawyers who regularlyappear before the judge's court?
152. Should judges be requiredpublicly to disavow endorsementsfrom
lawyers who regularlyappear before the judge's court?
153. Should nonincumbent candidatesbe prohibitedfrom soliciting
endorsementsfrom lawyers who regularly appearbefore the court to
which the candidateseeks election?
154. Should nonincumbentcandidatesbe prohibitedfrom accepting
endorsementsfrom lawyers who regularly appearbefore the court to
which the candidateseeks election?
155. Should judges be permitted to seek endorsementsfrom lawyers
except lawyers who have a matterpending before the court at the time
of the solicitation?
156. Should judges be permitted to accept endorsementsfrom lawyers
except lawyers who have a matterpending before the court at the time
of the offered endorsement?
15Z Should judges be requiredpublicly to disavow endorsementsfrom
lawyers who have a matterpending before the court at the time of the
endorsement?
158. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates be permitted to seek
endorsementsfrom lawyers except lawyers who have a matterpending
before the court to which the candidateseeks election?
159. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates be permitted to accept
endorsementsfrom lawyers except lawyers who have a matterpending

7. What "regularly" means is, of course, hardly self-defining, but at least for crude
preliminary survey purposes, this survey question may have some utility.
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before the court to which the candidateseeks election?
160. Should nonincumbentjudicial candidatesbe requiredpublicly to
disavow endorsementsfrom lawyers who have a matterpending
before the court to which the candidateseeks election?
161. Should judges be prohibitedfrom soliciting endorsementsfrom
interestgroups?
162. Should judges be prohibitedfrom accepting endorsementsfrom
interestgroups?
163. Should judges be requiredpublicly to disavow endorsementsfrom
interestgroups?
164. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates be prohibitedfrom
solicitingendorsementsfrom interestgroups?
165. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates be prohibitedfrom
accepting endorsementsfrom interestgroups?
166. Should nonincumbentjudicialcandidates be requiredpublicly to
disavow endorsementsfrom interestgroups?
167. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom solicitingendorsements
personally as opposed to througha committee?
168. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
soliciting endorsementspersonallyas opposed to through a
committee?
169. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom endorsing a candidatefor
judicialoffice?
170. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
endorsinganother candidatefor judicial office?
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171. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom making speeches on behalf of
or in support of anothercandidatefor judicialoffice?
172. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
making speeches on behalf of or in supportof another candidatefor
judicialoffice?
173. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom endorsinga candidatefor a
non-partisan,non-judicialoffice?
174. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
endorsinga candidatefor a non-partisan,non-judicialoffice?
175. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom making speeches on behalf of
or in supportof a candidatefor a non-partisan,non-judicialoffice?
176. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
making speeches on behalf of or in supportof a candidatefor a nonpartisan,non-judicial?
17Z Should a judge be prohibitedfrom endorsinga candidatefor a
partisanoffice?
178. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
endorsinga candidatefor a partisanoffice?
179. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom making speeches on behalfof
or in supportof a candidatefor a partisanoffice?
180. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
making speeches on behalf of or in support of a candidatefor a
partisan?
181.

Does the concept of endorsement need to be defined?

182. Should there be any restrictionon a judge's signing of nomination
papersfor anotherjudicialcandidate?
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183. Should there be any restrictionon a nonincumbent candidate's
signing of nominationpapersfor anotherjudicialcandidate?
184. Should there be any restriction on a judge's signing of nomination
papersfor a non-partisan,non-judicialcandidate?
185. Should there be any restrictionon a nonincumbent candidate's
signing of nominationpapersfor a non-partisan,non-judicial
candidate?
186. Should there be any restrictionon a judge's signing of nomination
papersfor a partisancandidate?
187. Should there be any restrictionon a nonincumbentjudicial
candidate'ssigning of nominationpapersfor a partisancandidate?
188. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom making contributionsto other
judicialcandidates?
189. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
making contributionsto otherjudicialcandidates?
190. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom making contributionsto a nonpartisan,non-judicialcandidate?
191. Should a nonincumbentjudicial candidatebe prohibitedfrom
making contributionsto a non-partisan,non-judicialcandidate?
192. Should a judge be prohibitedfrom making contributionsto
partisancandidates?
193. Should a nonincumbentjudicialcandidatebe prohibitedfrom
making contributions to partisancandidates?
194. Should applicantsfor appointment to a judicialvacancy be bound
by any ethical regulationsor prohibitions?
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195. Should a judge be permitted to endorse an applicantfor judicial
appointment?
196. Should a judge be permitted to write a letter of supporton behalfof
an applicantfor judicialappointment?
19Z [Among the issues identified in the Commission's InitialReport is
what, if any prohibitionsshould be placed on a judge and a judicial
candidatewhose spouse orfamily member is seeking or hold a
partisanor non-partisanelected office. As formulated in the Initial
Report,this item does not lend itself to "yes/no" survey treatment,but
will requireattention during the Commission'ssubsequent
deliberations.]
COMMON ISSUES

198. Should rules governingjudicialelection be restrictedto rules
having the force of law orshould they include hortatory or
aspirationalstatements, e. g., voluntary guidelinesfor contributions
and expenditures,rules of civility forjudicialcampaignsand
restatementof standardsakin to those found in the former SCR 60.01
(Characteristicsof an idealjudge)?
199. Should rules governingjudicialelections apply with equal vigor to
all candidates,i.e., those who are incumbentjudges, those who are
lawyers, and those (in municipal elections) who are neitherjudges nor
lawyers?
200. Should the rules apply equally to successful and unsuccessful
candidates?
201. Should rules governing candidatein judicialelections apply with
equal vigor, insofar as they may be applicable,to candidatesfor
appointmentto judicialoffice?

APPENDIX D
INITIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND ETHICS
CREATION AND MISSION OF THE COMMISSION

On March 7, 1997, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin appointed a
Commission on Judicial Elections and Ethics under the chairmanship of
the Honorable Thomas E. Fairchild of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Commission was assigned:
to review the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct
addressing political and campaign activity of judges and
candidates for judicial office, determine the extent to which
those provisions adequately address issues relevant to the
Wisconsin elective system in selecting members of its nonpartisan judiciary, and recommend provisions for inclusion in
the Code of Judicial Conduct that would better address the
issues to which the current Code's provisions are directed and
to address relevant issues the current Code does not address.
The Commission's mission was bifurcated, the first task being:
to review the relevant provisions of the current Code of
Judicial Conduct, as well as the provisions recommended by
the Code of Judicial Ethics Review Committee in its report
filed wvith the court October 15, 1991, and the provisions of
the 1990 American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, and identify the political and campaign issues
inherent in the election of non-partisan judges and in the
activity of those judges while in office.
This Initial Report of the Commission responds to this first task.
After the court has an opportunity to review the issues identified in
this report, the court "will provide the Commission further direction as
may be appropriate."
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METHODOLOGY OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission convened in full session three times. The first two
meetings of the Commission occurred on April 16 and May 22, 1997.
During these sessions, Commission members engaged in a broad
discussion of many ethical and related issues inherent in an elected
judiciary. Since members of the Commission included appellate and trial
judges, state and municipal judges, business and labor executives, law
professors, and community leaders active in political and governmental
affairs, the discussion was informed and informative.
At the May 22 meeting, Judge Fairchild appointed three committees:
Campaign Financing,' Campaign Content2 , and Other Political Activity
Each of the committees met between May 22 and July 2 and developed
a list of issues appearing to fall within the ambit of the court's charge to
the Commission. These issues were compiled in the form of a draft
initial report and distributed by Commission member and Reporter
Prof. Charles Clausen for discussion at the July 31 meeting. Following
the discussion at the July 31 meeting, the draft report was revised and
distributed to Commission members. The forwarding letter asked
members to advise the Reporter of their opinion whether an additional
meeting was necessary before forwarding the report to the supreme
court. No member requested an additional meeting. Judge Fairchild
advised the Reporter that, although there had been discussion at
meetings of the Commission about potential issues under Article VII,
section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the tentative final draft of the
initial report made no reference to such discussion. Judge Fairchild
suggested additional text which the Reporter incorporated into this
Initial Report as issue #9 appearing at pages 26-27, infra.

1. Mrs. Ruth Clusen, Fr. Robert Cornell, Mr. Tim Cullen, Rep. Gregory B. Huber, Mr.
Fred Luber, Atty. John MacIver, Mr. Rod Nilsestuen, Hon. Sarah B. O'Brien, Sen. Mary
Panzer, and Atty. George K. Steil, Sr.
2. Atty. Carl Ashley, Atty. Linda Balisle, Hon. Charles P. Dykman, Ms. Patricia FinderStone, Mr. Roger L. Fitzsimonds, Hon. Ramona Gonzalez, Dist. Atty. E. Michael McCann,
Atty Maureen A. MeGinnity, and Ms Barbara Stein.
3. Prof. Gordon Baldwin, Mr. Ron Domini, Hon. Timothy Dugan, Hon. James A.
Gramling, Jr., Atty. Michael W. Grebe, Hon. Charles D. Heath, Ms. Carol Toussaint, and
Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild.
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THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH

The Commission considers the central question in considering any
regulation relating to judicial elections and campaigning to be how the
citizens of Wisconsin would benefit or suffer from the regulation. Any
rule proposed to or by the court must be justified on the basis of the
public interest in a competent, honorable, impartial judiciary.
Further, in considering rules governing conduct in judicial elections,
rule-makers and their advisors do not operate in a vacuum or write on a
clean slate. Any such regulation will be applied to Wisconsin's judicial
system where judges are elected in general nonpartisan elections in
which candidates must campaign for votes.
Substantial concerns regarding judicial elections and ethics arise
from current trends in such elections. Judicial campaigns are assuming a
more political tone, becoming areas of interest for independent interest
groups, and becoming more expensive, combative, complex, tactical
political campaigns.
The public interest dimensions of these
developments were noted in a recent publication of the American
Judicature Society.
...[Current trends in judicial elections have increased the
difficulty of ensuring judicial independence and impartiality.
Increasing expenses have pressured judicial candidates to
raise more money. How they can raise more money, from
more people, without compromising
their future
independence has become an important question.., the
campaign conduct of judicial candidates has become more
problematic. Candidates appear more willing to engage in
direct attacks on their opponents. They appear to have
become increasingly aggressive in stating their views on legal
and political matters, and in soliciting endorsements from
political parties and special interest groups. They appear
more willing to press the bounds of truth and fairness in their
campaign statements. Each of these developments erodes
public confidence in the impartiality, independence and
dignity of judicial officers.

Patrick M. McFadden, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS
OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 10 (American Judicature Society

1990). McFadden also describes another problem "[E]lectoral politics
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sometimes require that candidates act in ways that would be
inappropriate for sitting judges." Id. at 75 To prevail in a contested
election, judicial candidates must seek votes from the public. Some
recent elections, more notably in states other than Wisconsin but to a
lesser extent even in Wisconsin, have raised fears that judicial
candidates are "acting too much" like political candidates.
To the extent practicable, regulation of conduct in judicial election
campaigns must treat incumbent judges and judicial candidates equally,
giving neither an unfair or artificial advantage. Incumbency carries with
it some advantages and other disadvantages, as does non-incumbency.
Rules cannot be expected to change facts inherent in the electoral
process. The public interest in a well-informed electorate and concerns
of fairness to judicial candidates, both incumbents and challengers,
combine to prompt caution in rule-making lest rules tilt the "playing
field" unfairly or artificially.
The Commission had the benefit of a presentation by Commission
member Professor Gordon Baldwin on First Amendment and other
constitutional concerns. Following Professor Baldwin's suggestion,
however, the Commission has not attempted to engage in constitutional
analysis in developing the following list of election/ethics issues
requested by the court. Rather, the Commission has attempted simply
to identify the "good government" issues that appear to inhere in
judicial election processes. In this attempt, the Commission has been
keenly aware of the inherent tensions that come with an elected
judiciary. The election of judges is designed to make judges, as
government officials in a democracy, accountable to the citizenry.
Unless the electorate is reasonably informed about judicial candidates,
their qualifications and judicial philosophies, the intended benefits of
electing judges cannot be realized. Restricting campaign speech to
qualifications and judicial philosophies may cause the media to ignore
the contest. On the other hand, it can hardly be gainsaid that judges are
not like other government officials, and a campaign which exploits the
unpopularity of a particular decision, though honestly arrived at, can
easily compromise the independence of all judges in impartially
applying the law as they see it.
Although there were members of the Commission who believe that
the time has come to replace election of judges with the Missouri Plan
or a similar method of selection, or to provide full public funding of
judicial election campaigns, all recognized that consideration of such
proposals is not within our mandate.
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ISSUES CONCERNING CAMPAIGN FINANCING

1. Should the code contain special rules regarding campaign financing
for judicial elections?
Comment: The American Judicature Society monograph
ELECTING JUSTICE points out that "[J]udges should be
independent and impartial, neither indebted to nor favoring any
individual or group. Regular public elections, however, can
jeopardize that independence and impartiality. Public elections
require fundraising, and sometimes in large amounts. Judicial
candidates may find themselves indebted to those who finance
their elections or at least may give the appearance of such
indebtedness... Increasing expenses have pressured judicial
candidates to raise more money. How they can raise more
money, from more people, without compromising their future
independence has become an important question. Judicial
candidates are likely to turn to lawyers for the increased funds,
but funding by lawyers, especially lawyers who will later appear
before the candidate, raises obvious questions about the
candidate's future ability to remain impartial." Id. At 8, 10. That
some regulation of campaign financing for judicial campaigns is
necessary would seem to be beyond cavil. One could hardly
imagine, for example, a system in which it would be permissible
for a judge personally to solicit campaign contributions from the
bench or in chambers from lawyers and litigants appearing in the
judge's court. How much regulation, on the other hand, and of
what kind, are subjects on which reasonable minds may differ.
2. If campaign finance rules promulgated by the court for judges,
judicial candidates and personal committees cannot or in any event do
not apply to independent expenditures, is it unfair, counterproductive,
or otherwise undesirable to restrict candidates?
Comment: A recurring focus of discussion during the
Commission's deliberations was the growing impact in election
processes of independent expenditures by advocacy groups or
even individuals. Restrictions on judicial candidates and their
committees that would be justifiable if only the candidates and
committees were active in the election process may be unfair,
counterproductive, or otherwise undesirable if substantial
independent expenditures are made in an attempt to influence
the outcome of the election. If independent expenditures are
beyond the reach of the court's regulatory powers under Buckley
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v. Valeo, or if it is in any event undesirable to attempt to regulate
independent expenditures, care must be taken in crafting any
rules applicable only to candidates and their committees. On the
other hand, even if regulation of independent expenditures is
constitutionally proscribed, there may be an issue whether
judicial candidate relations with independent expenditure
committees and/or individuals should be subject to regulation.
3. Should there be limits on a judge's or candidate's contribution to his
or her own campaign?
Comment: Statutes or rules that restrict the amount of money
that may be contributed to a judicial or other campaign are
generally cast in terms of contributions by persons other than the
candidate himself or herself. Such restrictions create or permit
distortions in judicial election "marketplaces" when a wealthy
candidate opposes a candidate who is not wealthy. "Studies in
three jurisdictions found that judicial candidates, in the
aggregate, supplied from 10 to 30 percent of their own campaign
funds... There are, as might be imagined, some dramatic
instances of self-funding in judicial races... No state places
individual contribution limits on candidates' funding their own
campaigns, but half the states limit individual contributions by
others." ELECTINGJUSTICE at 29. Section 11.26(5) provides that
contribution limits do not apply to a candidate who makes
contributions to his or her own campaign for office from the
candidate's personal funds or property or such assets owned
jointly or as marital property with the candidate's spouse.
Additionally, Buckley v. Valeo is pertinent.
4. Should there be limits on the amount of contributions by lawyers?
Comment: By virtue of experience or professional associations or
both, lawyers may be better able to assess judicial qualifications
in candidates for judicial office. Lawyers may also be the most
likely group to contribute to judicial campaigns which are
increasingly expensive. Indeed, without lawyer contributions or
public financing, it is hard to imagine how candidates could raise
the funds necessary to mount a credible campaign for certain
contested judgeships.4 On the other hand, contributions by
lawyers may be perceived by the public, and by litigants and
4. "It is not surprising that attorneys are the principal source of contributions in a
judicial election... A candidate for the bench who relies solely on contributions from
nonlawyers must reconcile himself to staging a campaign on something less than a
shoestring." Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77,78 (Tex.Ct.App. 1983).
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lawyers, as little different from contributions by lobbyists to
partisan political candidates.5 The larger the contributions, the
greater the potential for an appearance of impropriety.6
5. Should judges and their committees be prohibited from soliciting
contributions from lawyers generally, or from lawyers with matters
currently pending before the court?
6. Should judges and their committees be prohibited from soliciting
contributions from litigants currently appearing or likely to appear
before the prevailing candidate's court?
Comment: Issue 4 focuses on limiting the maximum amount a
lawyer may contribute and a campaign committee may accept.
Issues 5 and 6 address whether solicitationof contributions from
lawyers and/or litigants should be prohibited. The appearance of
bias, unseemliness, and undue influence concerns are pertinent.
Also relevant are considerations based on the wide diversity of
judicial races in Wisconsin: one-judge circuits as compared to
multi-judge circuits, trial courts as compared to appellate courts,
etc.
7. Should the amount of contributions that may be solicited or accepted
be capped by supreme court rule or be addressed by non-binding
guidelines?
Comment: The legislature has enacted caps for contributions to
5. The Rocha case was described in a respected law review as follows:
Picture this. You lost as a plaintiff in Texas District Court. Your appeal is to the Texas Court
of Appeals, Fourth District, in San Antonio. The case is set for oral argument before a 3judge panel which includes Associate Justices Rudy S. Esquivel and Peter Tijerina. In the
past, opposing counsel Patrick Maloney has contributed thousands of dollars to the election
campaigns of the two justices; he provided 21.7 % of Justice Esquivel's campaign funds for
Esquivel's most recent race in 1980. After each election, victory celebrations for Justices
Esquivel and Tijerina are held at Maloney's office. Local newspapers frequently make
reference to Maloney's political power and his influence over judges in San Antonio. How
confident are you that the court will be unbiased?
In Rocha v. Ahmand, the Fourth District of the Texas Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, was
unanimous is denying appellant's motion to disqualify the two justices."
Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges From Cases Involving Campaign
Contributors,40 Stan. L. Rev. 449 (1988).
6. Michigan, for example, has limited the amount of money that may be solicited from
lawyers to $100. (Greater amounts may be accepted from lawyers, but not solicited.) The
Kentucky supreme court currently has before it a proposal from a committee appointed by
the chief justice to prohibit judges from accepting any contributions to judicial campaigns
from lawyers. If adopted, Kentucky would be the only state to ban such contributions.
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election campaigns in Section 11.26 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
The amounts vary from $10,000 for supreme court campaigns to
$3,000 and $1,000 for circuit court races in Milwaukee and other
counties, respectively. Canon 5C(2) of the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that campaign committees may solicit
and

accept

reasonable

campaign

contributions.

The

Beilfuss/DeWitt committee adopted the ABA position, with no
reference to the statutory caps found in Section 11.26.
Candidates, of course, are free to adopt voluntary caps lower
than statutory caps and opposing candidates may enter into
agreements to do so. The issue identified here is whether there
should be any caps in addition to the statutory caps in Chapter
11, Stats.
8. Should judicial campaign funds be solicited and accepted only by
campaign committees and not by judicial candidates themselves?
Should there be one rule for solicitation and another for acceptance?
Comment: Presumably, some part of the rationale for prohibiting
judicial candidates from soliciting and accepting campaign
donations is avoiding the appearance of bias. "[T]he [ABA
Model] Code attempts to insulate candidates from personal
contact with contributors which may lead to allegations of bias
when a contributor appears before the judge. Thus, candidates
are prohibited from personally soliciting or accepting campaign
funds, and commentary to the Code urges that, where possible,
candidates should not be told the identity of contributors. '' 7 In
light of the statutory requirement that public reports of
contributions over $20 must be filed with the Elections Board,
and in light of the widespread use of public endorsement lists, it
may be that this version of "don't ask, don't tell" is unrealistic. 8
On the other hand, (a) there is a "seemliness" rationale for the
prohibition and (b) the prohibition provides a degree of
protection to solicitees from potential embarrassment and (c)
may diminish perceptions of undue influence arising from judges
and judicial candidates asking for money from those most likely
7. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHics 341-42 (1990).
8. California, for example, has no restriction on fundraising by judges except in a
commentary to the code of judicial conduct: "Injudicial elections, judges are neither required
to shield themselves from campaign contributions nor are they prohibited from soliciting
contributions from anyone including attorneys. Nevertheless, there are necessary limits on
judges facing election if the appearance of impropriety is to be avoided. It is not possible for
judges to do the same sort of fund raising as an ordinary politician and at the same time
maintain the dignity and respect necessary for an independent judiciary." Cal. Code of Jud.
Ethics Canon 5A (1999).
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to be seeking judicial relief. A related issue is whether judicial
candidates should be precluded from personally soliciting
publicly stated endorsements. The issues may be practically
indistinguishable where an organizational endorsement carries
with it a virtually automatic campaign contribution.
9. Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from serving on
their own committees? If not prohibited, should they nonetheless be
exhorted to avoid involvement in their committee's fundraising efforts?
Comment: This "insulation" issue is related to the preceding one
and similar policy concerns obtain for both. It should be noted
that section 11.10(1), Wis. Stats., provides that candidates are
responsible for the accuracy of campaign finance reports for
purposes of civil liability under ch. 11, whether or not the
candidate certifies the reports personally. Section 11.27(2)
provides: "In civil actions under this chapter, the acts of every
member of a personal campaign committee are presumed to be
with the knowledge and approval of the candidate, until it has
been clearly proved that the candidate did not have knowledge
of and approve the same."
10. Should the rules limit membership on personal campaign
committees to avoid identification of judicial candidates with political
partisans and/or with advocacy groups representing particular positions
on controversial political issues likely to come before the court? Should
the rules restrict the choice of paid campaign consultants or managers to
avoid such identifications?
Comment: Judicial elections in Wisconsin are nonpartisan.
Political partisanship in judges is viewed as a serious threat to
judicial independence and to the fact and appearance of judicial
impartiality. Hence the rules restricting political activities by
judges and, in some cases, judicial candidates. See Issues
Concerning Other Political Activity, pp. 17-25, infra. The
nonpartisan nature of a judicial campaign may be compromised
by the composition of personal campaign committees and by the
choice of campaign managers and consultants. The same may be
true with respect to persons closely identified with controversial
political issues likely to come before the court.
11. Should the code require or encourage disqualification or recusal in
response to a judge's previous campaign fundraising or campaign
conduct? Should the code provide specific rules on when recusal is
appropriate, e.g., when an attorney or litigant has contributed more than
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a specified dollar amount to the judge or to the judge's opponent, or
when an attorney or litigant has served as a member of the judge's
campaign committee or the committee of the judge's opponent?
Comment: It is unknown to what extent judges recuse themselves
from matters because of campaign activities by lawyers or
litigants. Recusals are not litigated; only refusals to recuse are
litigated. Furthermore, judges who recuse themselves are not
required to, and usually do not, state the reason for recusal,
except as required by §757.19(5), Stats. Recusal generally is
governed by SCR 60.04(4) which requires recusal under certain
specified circumstances and also "when reasonable, wellinformed persons knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards
and the justice system and aware of the facts and circumstances
the judge knows or reasonably should know would reasonably
question the judge's ability to be impartial." This test may be so
imprecise in the campaign financing and support area as to be
unhelpful, both to judges and to litigants and their attorneys. 9
The Beilfuss/DeWitt committee stated in its Commentary to its
proposed Section 5C(2): "Though not prohibited, campaign
contributions of which a judge has knowledge, made by lawyers
or others who appear before the judge, may be relevant to
disqualification under [the committee's version of SCR
60.04(4)]."
12. Should campaign fundraising by an incumbent be prohibited until
active opposition develops? Should fundraising be prohibited except for
a period of three (four) (six) (twelve) months before a contested
election? Should fundraising be prohibited entirely after an election, or
alternatively, be restricted to a period of thirty (sixty) days after the
election?
Comment: A number of states restrict the time within which a
judicial candidate may solicit and accept campaign funds. The
ABA Model Code Canon 5C(2) provides that "a candidate's
committee may solicit contributions and public support for the
candidate's campaign no earlier than one year before an election
and no later than [ninety] days after the last election in which the
9. "[A]lthough the test was meant to be objective, one court has noted that it is
inherently subjective. (Citations omitted.) That is because the appearance of partiality
depends upon one's standard of observation, which will vary from individual to individual. In
reality, there is no objective standard to determine the appearance of partiality, but it is clear
that the appearance of partiality is to be decided from the viewpoint of a disinterested
observer, and not from the subjective viewpoint of the judge in question." SHAMAN, ET AL.,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 144 (1990).
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The
candidate participates during the election year."
Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee recommended that solicitation of
contributions and public support be permitted "for a reasonable
period of time before and after the last election in which the.
candidate participates during the election year."
"Several jurisdictions have addressed questions arising from the
differing rules regarding campaign committees for candidates
competing with other candidates, and for incumbents who do not
face competitors. One jurisdiction holds that an incumbent may
not establish a committee until opposition becomes apparent.
Another takes a middle view that such a candidate may form a
committee prior to opposition having developed, but that the
committee may not solicit funds until opposition appears.
Finally, a third state holds that to require a candidate to wait to
form a committee until the candidacy has been opposed would
be analogous to closing the barn door after the cows had
escaped. Therefore, this state permits any candidate, including
unopposed incumbents, to establish a campaign committee and
begin soliciting and collecting funds."
SHAMAN, ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS

389-90 (2d ed.

1995)(citations omitted).
13. Should the rules address explicitly the proper uses of campaign
funds, including excess campaign funds?
Comment: The Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee recommended a rule
similar to the ABA Model Code respecting use of campaign
funds: "A candidate shall not use or permit the use of campaign
contributions for the private benefit of the candidate or others."1"
The Committee added a recommended prohibition on
transferring funds already collected for a partisan campaign to a
judicial campaign committee or otherwise using such funds for a
judicial campaign.
ISSUES CONCERNING CAMPAIGN CONTENT

1. Should rules governing judicial election campaign conduct proscribe
campaign rhetoric that "commits or appears to commit" a candidate for
judicial office with respect to a [a] particular case, [b] particular

10. The Model Code Canon 5C(2) refers to "the private benefit of the candidate or
others."
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controversy, or [c] issues likely to come before the court to which the
candidate seeks election or appointment? Should issues respecting
adoption, modification, or repeal of court rules or administrative
practices be subject to a different rule from other issues likely to come
before the court?
Comment: At least since the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial
Ethics, campaign promises by judicial candidates have been
considered problematic. The 1924 Canons proscribed promises
appealing to "cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or electing
power" and forbade announcing in advance "his conclusions of
law on disputed issues to secure class support." The 1972 Model
Code forbade promises of conduct in office "other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office"
and announcing "his views on disputed legal or political issues."
The 1990 Code Canon 5A(3)(d) repeated the proscription of
promises other than the faithful and impartial performance of
the duties of the office and forbade campaign statements "that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court ....

"

The Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee recommended a

rule that proscribed promises that "would appeal to the
partisanship of the electorate" and statements that commit or
appear to commit a candidate with respect to "cases or
controversies that were likely to come before the court." The
Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee omitted the ABA language about
"issues" that were likely to come before the court, commenting:
"The drafters specifically omitted the words "or issues" in the
ABA Model Code to allow the voters to receive valuable
information in judicial elections."
None of the previous
treatments of the question have addressed whether there should
be different rules for issues that are likely to come before the
court in a litigation context as opposed to issues arising under the
court's rule-making or administrative powers.
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2.
Should rules governing judicial elections explicitly prohibit
misrepresentation by candidates for judicial office? If so, should the
prohibition be limited in scope (e.g., restricted to misrepresentations of
the qualifications of the candidate or his/her opponent) or should it be
broad, (e.g., applicable to any misrepresentation of fact)? If the latter,
should there be a materiality restriction? If misrepresentation is to be
explicitly prohibited, should the prohibition apply only to intentional
misrepresentation, or to representations made with reckless disregard
for truth or falsity, or even to negligent or innocent misrepresentations?
Comment: Prohibitions of misrepresentations by judicial
candidates are commonplace throughout the United States.
Difficult issues arise as to whether such prohibitions should be
limited in scope or broad. The 1990 ABA Model Code Canon
5(A)(3)(d) and the Beflfuss/DeWitt Committee recommendation
by their express terms prohibited
only
knowing
misrepresentation of "the identity, qualifications, present
position or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent."
SCR 20:8.2(a), on the other hand, prohibits lawyer candidates
from making statements "that the lawyer knows to be false or
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge.., or of a candidate for
election or appointment to a judicial... office.'" The New
Mexico code section 21-800B(4)(d) omits "knowingly" from its
prohibition of misrepresentations by judicial candidates and
limits its prohibition to "material facts". Section 12.05, Wis.
Stats., provides: "No person may knowingly make or publish, or
cause to be made or published, a false representation pertaining
to a candidate or referendum which is intended or tends to affect
voting at an election." Violation may result in a fine not to
exceed $1,000 or imprisonment not more than 6 months, or both.
Quaere whether the code should prohibit any violation of any
state statute by a judicial candidate in the course of a judicial
election campaign so as to bring violations of section 12.05, Wis.
Stats., within the court's disciplinary jurisdiction.
3. Should rules governing judicial elections identify with some degree of
specificity what areas of campaign speech are ethically permissible?
Should the rules identify with some degree of specificity what areas of
campaign speech are not ethically permissible? Is it, rather, preferable
to paint with a broad brush in this area?
Comment: Rules drafted in broad language are necessarily
imprecise and provide relatively little guidance to candidates as
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to what is permissible and what is impermissible campaign
speech. Candidates thus speak at their peril when speaking of
matters that may be held to be within proscibed areas or outside
such areas. In light of the inherent tension between the public
good of informing the electorate as to candidates' views and the
public good of not creating the appearance of partiality or
prejudgment of cases or issues, judicial candidates and the public
might benefit from rules that more clearly outline permissible
and impermissible areas of campaign speech.
The AJS
monograph ELECTING JUSTICE points out that under the 1972

ABA Model Code, ethics advisory committees suggested that
each of the following topics should not be discussed in a judicial
campaign: pre-trial release, plea bargaining, sentencing, capital
punishment, abortion, gun control, equal rights amendment, drug
laws, gambling laws, liquor licensing, dram shop legislation, labor
laws, property tax exemptions, regulation of condominiums,
court rules, prior court decisions (both of other courts and of the
candidate's own court), and "for good measure, specific legal
questions and hypothetical legal questions." Id. at 86-87. The
Beilfuss/DeWitt Committee recommended a rule that proscribed
candidates from making statements that appeared to commit the
candidate with respect to "controversies that are likely to come
before the court" but permitted, inferentially at least, statements
that appeared to commit the candidate with respect to "issues"
that were likely to come before the court. It may be questioned
whether candidates can reasonably be expected to distinguish the
permissible from the impermissible under such a rule.
An additional concern is the chilling effect on speech created by
rules that are broadly stated. Judge Richard Posner has written:
"Two principles are in conflict and must, to the extent possible,
be reconciled. Candidates for public office should be free to
express their views on all matters of interest to the electorate.
Judges should decide cases in accordance with law rather than
with any express or implied commitments that they may have
made to their campaign supporters or to others. The roots of
both principles lie deep in our constitutional heritage." Buckley
v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227 (70, Cir. 1993).
Requiring judicial candidates to reconcile these principles on the
hustings on the basis of rules as broadly stated as the ABA rules
may disserve both the candidates and the public.
4. What rule, if any, should be adopted with respect to campaign
speech regarding decisions of a sitting judge? Decisions of an appellate
court? Should the code contain a hortatory provision that ideally a
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candidate should restrict his or her comments on the record of an
opponent to matters which are clearly relevant to integrity, impartiality,
judicial temperament, legal ability, or industry?
Comment: Is there a need for specific rules respecting candidate
comment on the performance of a sitting judge? Are sitting
judges especially vulnerable to unfair or misleading campaign
attacks? Do the rules governing comment by judges unfairly
constrain candidates who are judges from countering attacks by
non-judge opponents? Is the public interest in the fair and
impartial administration of justice so likely to be compromised
by misleading or otherwise unfair attacks on sitting judges as to
justify rules governing attacks on sitting judges that would
inevitably be seen as incumbent-biased?
Like the issues raised in item 4, this set of related issues
implicates the tensions between reasonably informing the
electorate of differences between candidates and the need to
preserve judicial independence and impartiality, qualities no less
important in an elected judiciary than in an appointed one.
These issues also involve the problem of fashioning rules that do
not unfairly or artificially favor or disfavor incumbents. AJS'
ELECTING JUSTICE noted: "Sitting judges are constrained by
ethics rules from engaging in ex parte communications or
commenting on pending or impending cases, and by more
general injunction to maintain the integrity, independence and
impartiality of the judiciary. Consequently, they are often
foreclosed, or believe themselves foreclosed, from discussing
their own records in office, either in a positive way or in response
to criticism. In reality, sitting judges can say quite a lot about
their records in office... It is true, nonetheless, that sitting
judges labor under a distinct disadvantage when they are
criticized for their actions in pending or impending matters." Id.
at 82-3.
Unpopularity of a particular judicial decision is never relevant to
the desired judicial qualities of integrity, impartiality, judicial
temperament, legal ability or industry. Although it may be
possible to point to a judge's decisions which taken together
demonstrate a judicial philosophy with which an opponent can
legitimately differ, this will be rare.
5. Should rules governing judicial election campaign conduct address
candidate representations that, though true, are misleading or otherwise
unfair? Should rules address judicial campaign rhetoric focused on
legislative or executive branch issues, i.e., issues constitutionally
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committed to branches of government other than the judiciary? Should
candidates be prohibited from announcing their views on disputed
political issues?
Comment: The ABA Model Code Canon 5A does not require
"fairness" in judicial campaigns, only that candidates not
"knowingly misrepresent" facts concerning the candidate or his
or her opponent. Even truthful statements, however, can be
seriously misleading, through incompleteness, innuendo, or
otherwise. When the electorate is misled, the electorate is
disserved, whether the misleading occurs through conscious false
statement or carefully crafted half-truths, smears, irrelevancies,
or distortions. One form of misleading irrelevancy is judicial
campaigning on political issues constitutionally committed to
other branches of government, especially the legislature. The
voters may be misled "into believing that these views are
relevant, and thus a legitimate basis upon which to choose
between candidates.

. ."

ELECTINGJUSTICE at 85. On the other

hand: "It could also be argued that restrictions on legal and
political debate cut off discussion that could enliven judicial
campaigns. No one suggests that liveliness be purchased at any
cost, but restrictions on legal and political debate arguably
exacerbate the already serious problem of voter apathy in
judicial elections. Set against these concerns is the state's
interest, and indeed the public interest, in preserving the
independence and integrity of the judiciary, and in assuring that
the electorate is not misled about the nature of the judicial
office." Id. at 86.
6. Should rules governing judicial election campaign conduct
address campaign rhetoric likely to confuse the public concerning the
proper roles of judges and lawyers in the American adversary system of
justice?
Comment: This issue is related to the preceding set of issues.
Should a judicial candidate be able to campaign against an
opponent on the ground that the opponent, as a lawyer,
represented people accused of crime? Or campaign against a
sitting judge on the ground that the judge released a defendant
on bail or found a defendant in a serious crime case incompetent
to stand trial? Examples abound of judges being assailed for
doing what judges are supposed to do, i.e., following the law.
7. Should rules governing judicial election campaign conduct require
that candidates disclaim misrepresentations made through independent
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expenditures?
Should reasonable monitoring of representations
through independent expenditures be required?
Comment:
Candidates
may
scrupulously
avoid
misrepresentations during a campaign but nonetheless benefit
from
misrepresentations
made
through
independent
expenditures. The misrepresentations may relate either to the
candidate or to the candidate's opponent or both. To the extent
the electorate is deceived, whether by a candidate or her agents
or by others acting independently, the public interest is impaired.
The issue is whether judicial candidates should be expected to
monitor public representations made through independent
expenditures and to disclaim those the candidate knows to be
false.
ISSUES CONCERNING OTHER POLITICAL ACTIVITY

In analyzing issues of "Other Political Activity" in the context of
judicial elections, the commission considered two categories: (1)
Political Activities, and (2) Campaign Activities.
POLITICAL AcrIvITIES:

A. PoliticalOrganizations

1. Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from [a]
membership in a political party during the term of office or when a
candidate; [b] office holding or leadership of a political party during the
term of office or when a candidate; or [c] active participation in the
affairs of a political party during the term of office or when a candidate?
Comment: Regarding political activities by judges, the AJS
monograph is instructive: "No area of judicial campaign conduct
has been more difficult to regulate, or more lacking in regulatory
consensus. Disagreements have come at all levels: on how much
political involvement is ideal, on how much involvement must
realistically be tolerated, on what exactly is "political," and on
what set of rules will best reflect those ideal or tolerated levels of
political involvement... Even states with similar selection
systems vary markedly in what actions they prohibit in the cause
of restricting 'political activity."' ELECTINGJUSTICE at 100.
The issues raised above relate to [a] restrictions on membership,
leadership, and active participation in the affairs of political

parties and [b] whether restrictions, if any, should apply to both
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judges and other judicial candidates, and [c] whether restrictions,
if any, should be limited to campaign times. Wisconsin's 1967
Code of Judicial Ethics forbade party membership, participation
in party affairs, making or soliciting contributions in support of
party causes, and public support of candidates and platforms.
SCR 60.14. The Beilfuss/DeWitt committee recommendations in
large measure replicated the 1967 Code, except that they
permitted [a] public endorsement of and opposition to other
candidates for judicial office, [b] attending political party
meetings as a member of the public, [c] making contributions to
judicial candidates. Additionally, the Beilfuss/DeWitt committee
recommendations would permit judges and candidates, when a
candidate for election, [a] to purchase tickets for and attend
political gatherings, [b] to speak to gatherings on his or her own
behalf, [c] to appear in media advertisements supporting his or
her candidacy, and [d] to distribute campaign literature
supporting his or her own candidacy.
2. Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from speaking
publicly on behalf of a party or party candidates?
Comment: The 1967 Code prohibited judges [but not non-judge
candidates] from "publicly endors[ing] or speak[ing] on behalf
of [a political party's] candidates or platform."
The
Beilfuss/DeWitt committee recommendations continued the
prohibitions. The 1990 ABA Code [Section 5C(1)(a)] similarly
prohibits such activities, although it permits judges and
candidates subject to public election to identify themselves as
members of a political party and to contribute to political
organizations..
3.
Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from
contributing to a party or its candidates? [If contributions are permitted,
should the amount be regulated?]
Comment: The 1967 Code prohibited judges [but not non-judge
candidates] from making contributions in support of a political
party's
causes.
The
Beilfuss/DeWitt
committee
recommendations would have continued the prohibitions except
to permit a judge and candidate, when a candidate for election,
to purchase tickets for and attend political gatherings.
4. Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from attending
party sponsored public meetings or partisan candidate fund raisers?
From purchasing tickets as a member of the public, even if it is a
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fundraising event for the party? Should attending as the guest of one's
spouse or other person be permissible?
Comment: If judges are to be elected, arguably they must attend
gatherings and functions that voters attend. Many judges are
elected in low turnout election years and the most ardent voters
are generally those involved with political parties, community
groups and charitable organizations. Judicial candidates must
seek endorsements from political leaders, community leaders,
labor organizations, and other politically active members of the
community. Many of these individuals gather at political events,
non-judicial campaign events, fundraising dinners for their
organization, and charitable events. "Pre-candidates" appear at
these events making contacts with potential supporters and
campaign workers while making contributions to the
organizations. Currently, judges are substantially prohibited
from engaging in these same activities.
5. Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from giving
speeches at events described in #4? Should there be different rules for
election years and non-election years? Should speech-making be
permitted so long as all candidates are invited to address the gathering?
Comment: The current Code section 60.06(2) provides that
"[e]xcept for activities concerning his or her own election, a
judge shall not..,

participate

in

[a political party's] ...

activities." The Note to SCR 60.06 states: "This rule does not
preclude a judge from attending a political meeting ag a member
of the public, but he or she shall not attend as a participant."
The BeilfussfDeWitt committee and the 1990 ABA Model Code
would permit judges and candidates to "speak to gatherings
[presumably including political gatherings] on his or her own
behalf." Party meetings are, of course, gatherings of voters.
There may be no suggestion that a judicial candidate who
addresses a meeting either supports the party or is endorsed by
it.
B. Civic and CharitableOrganizations
The supreme court has not explicitly asked the Commission to
consider SCR 60.05 relating to extra-judicial activities as it has with
respect to SCR 60.06 relating to inappropriate political activities. The
Other Political Activities committee notes, however, that there is a
statutory prohibition of candidates, including candidates for judicial
office, offering or making contributions to religious, charitable, or
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fraternal causes or organizations and of the asking and receiving of such
contributions by such organizations.
Sec. 11.34, Wis. Stats.
Additionally, the committee notes that, subject to certain exceptions not
germane here, SCR 60.05(3)(c) permits judges to serve as officers,
directors, trustees or nonlegal advisors of "nonprofit educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal, sororal, or civic organization[s] .... "
Such organizations may have controversial legal and political agendas
though they would not seem to fall within the definition of "political
organization" under 1990 ABA Model Code terminology, i.e., "a
political party or other group, the principal purpose of which is to
further the election or appointment of candidates to political office."
(Emphasis supplied). On the other hand, issue advocacy groups, which
are typically nonprofit and educational in terms of mission, may have as
a principal purpose the advancing of highly controversial legal or
political positions, i.e., positions having widespread opposition within
the electorate. It may be that the general rule stated in SCR 60.05(1),
requiring a judge so to conduct his or her extrajudicial activities so they
do not cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially,
demean the judicial office, or interfere with the proper performance of
judicial duties, is sufficient. On the other hand, issues similar to the
political party issues may exist as to other groups which are significantly
though not primarily political in nature or purpose. As used below, the
terms "civic or charitable organization" refers to organizations whose
principal purposes do not include advancing particular legal or political
agendas and which do not generate widespread opposition. "Interest
groups" refers to organizations that, although nonprofit, educational,
religious, charitable, etc. under SCR 60.05(3)(c), have as a principal
purpose the advancing of controversial legal or political agendas.
1. Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from [a]
membership in civic or charitable organizations during the term of office
or when a candidate; or [b] holding office or a leadership position of
civic or charitable organizations during term of office or when a
candidate; or [c] active participation in the affairs of a civic or charitable
organization during term of office or when a candidate? Should any
such prohibition obtain with respect to interest groups?
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2. Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from speaking
publicly on behalf of civic or charitable organizations or their goals and
activities? On behalf of interest groups or their goals and activities?
3.
Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from
contributing to civic or charitable organizations beyond the prohibition
stated in sec. 11.34, Stats.? To interest groups?
4.
Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from
participating in fundraising activities of civic or charitable
organizations? Of interest groups?
5. Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from giving
speeches at events described in #4?
6. Should judges and judicial candidates be prohibited from attending
events described in #4? From purchasing tickets as a member of the
public, even if it is a fundraising event? Should attendance as the guest
of one's spouse or other person be permitted?
7. If the activities of judges and judicial activities with respect to interest
groups is to be subject to rules of judicial conduct, how should "interest
group" be defined?

C. Holding NonpartisanOffices

1. Should municipal judges' be permitted to hold other nonpartisan
offices while serving as part-time municipal judges.
CAMPAIGN ACrIVITIES
A. Endorsements

1. Whose endorsement may be solicited or accepted by judicial
candidates:
a. judges?
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b. public office holders - political, nonpartisan, or both?
c. lawyers - all lawyers - those not appearing regularly before the

judge?interest groups?
Comment: The current Wisconsin code is silent on these issues,
nor did the 1967 code address them. The 1990 ABA Model
Code Canon 5A(1)(b) prohibits endorsements by judges of
candidates for other offices, including judicial offices but
excluding "candidates for the same judicial office in a public
election in which the judge or judicial candidate is running."
Canon 5C(7)(b)(iv).
The Beilfuss/DeWitt committee
recommended this rule. There are no rules prohibiting soliciting
or accepting endorsements by lawyers, although the
Beilfuss/DeWitt committee would prohibit judges from soliciting
endorsements "while engaging in official duties or while in the
courthouse."
Another questionable source of endorsements are special interest
groups. Acceptance of the endorsement.., of a group such as Right to
Life may be construed as a pledge of conduct in office, and therefore
place a candidate in violation of [ABA 1990 Model Code] Canon
5A(3)(d)(i). A New York State Bar Association opinion states that a
judicial candidate may accept the endorsement.., of the Right to Life
Party provided he or she refrains from expressing a view on abortion
and further provided that the endorsement.., is not conditioned on the
candidate's view on that topic.
SHAMAN, ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCr AND

ETHics 382 (2d ed. 1995).

2. Should a judge and a judicial candidate be permitted "personally" to
seek endorsements or must the committee do so?
Comment: The AJS monograph ELECTING JUSTICE is
instructive:
The American Bar Association has long taken the position that
judges should be restricted in how they solicit endorsements.
Although the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics failed to address the
issue explicitly, the ABA's Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility interpreted those Canons to impose
some restrictions. ... Adumbrating regulations to come, the

same panel suggested that: "Ordinarily a judge should stand on
his official record and leave the promotion of his candidacy to
others." In 1965 the Committee found it improper for a judge to
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approach lawyers with pending cases, or to use official stationery
in the solicitation effort.
In 1972, the drafters of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
codified the suggestion that candidates leave the promotion of
their candidacies to others:
"A candidate... should not
himself... solicit publicly stated support, but he may establish
committees of responsible persons.., to obtain public
statements of support for his candidacy." Id. at 96.
The 1990 ABA Model Code, Canon 5C(2) prohibits judicial
candidates, judges and nonjudges, from personally soliciting
publicly stated support.
The Beilfuss/DeWitt committee recommended that candidates
be permitted personally to solicit endorsements, but not
contributions. The proposed rule restricted the solicitation of
endorsements to "a reasonable period of time before and after"
the election and prohibited judges, but not nonjudge candidates,
from soliciting endorsements "while engaging in official duties or
while in the courthouse."
3. Should a judge and a judicial candidate be permitted to endorse
and/or make speeches on behalf of:
a. judicial candidates?
b. nonpartisan, non-judicial candidates?
c. partisan candidates?
Does the concept of endorsement need to be defined? Should there be
any restriction on a judge's or judicial candidate's signing of nomination
papers of the types of candidates listed above?
Comment: The 1990 ABA Model Code Canon 5A(1)(b)
prohibits candidates from publicly endorsing or publicly
opposing another candidate for public office except to permit
judges and other candidates, when a candidate for election, to
publicly endorse or oppose "other candidates for the same
judicial office in a public election in which the judge or judicial
candidate is running." Canon 5C(1)(b)(iv). The Beilfuss/DeWitt
proposal would prohibit public endorsement or opposition of
"another candidate for any nonjudicialoffice".
In states that explicitly prohibit or restrict endorsements, the real
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problem has been to determine what constitutes an
"endorsement." A public statement of support for another
candidate clearly qualifies, but less direct statements, and some
actions, can constitute endorsements as well. Advisory bodies
appear to agree that a judicial candidate's simple appearance at a
political function held for another candidate does not constitute
an improper endorsement, but any greater involvement has
raised objections... Between the extremes of passive attendance
and active participation in the campaign events of others lies a
large gray area of activity whose ethical status remains uncertain.
ELECTING JUSTICE at

95.

5. Should a judge and a judicial candidate be permitted to make
contributions to:
a. judicial candidates?
b. nonpartisan-non judicial candidate?
c. partisan candidates?
Comment: The 1990 ABA Model Code Canon 5C(1)(a) permits
judges and candidates for public election to contribute to
political organizations, identify himself or herself as a member of
a political party, and purchase tickets for and attend political
gatherings. The Beilfuss/De.Witt committee recommendation
was considerably narrower, permitting judges and candidates,
only when a candidate for election, to purchase tickets for and
attend political gatherings and to speak to gatherings on his or
her own behalf.
6. Should applicants for appointment to a judicial vacancy be bound by
any regulations or prohibitions?
Comment: The Beilfuss/DeWitt proposal prohibited candidates
for appointment to judicial office from soliciting or accepting
funds to support the candidacy. Additionally, it prohibited "any
political activity to secure the appointment" except to permit
communications by the candidateto the appointing authority and
screening committees, and seeking support from organizations
that regularly make recommendations for appointment. Support
could be sought from individuals only "to the extent requested or
required by" the appointing authority or screening committee.
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Information concerning the qualifications of the candidate for
the judicial office sought could be provided only to the
appointing authority, screening committee, organizations
regularly making recommendations to the appointing authority,
and individuals as requested or required by the appointing
authority, screening committee, or organization regularly making
recommendations. These recommendations parallel the 1990
ABA Model Code provisions.
The Beilfuss/DeWitt committee rejected the Model Code
provisions that permitted non-judge candidates for appointment
to retain an office in a political organization, attend political
gatherings, and continue to pay ordinary assessments and
ordinary contributions to a political organization or candidate
and purchase tickets for political party dinners or other
functions. The committee Commentary on the rule noted that
the change was intended "to insure that all candidates, judicial
and nonjudicial, have the same restrictions on their political
activities when they become candidates for judicial
appointment."
7. Should a judge be permitted to endorse or write a letter of support on
behalf of an applicant for judicial appointment.
8. What, if any, prohibitions should be placed on a judge and a judicial
candidate whose spouse or family member is seeking or holds a partisan
or nonpartisan elected office.
9. Should the Code (1) prohibit a judge or justice from becoming a
candidate for a non-judicial office during the term for which elected, and
(2) prohibit a judge from becoming a candidate for a non-judicial
elective office without first resigning his judgeship?
Comment: Issue 9(1) derives from Article VII, section 10 of the
Wisconsin Constitution, which prohibits a judge from holding
any other office of public trust, except a judicial office, during the
term for which elected. See State v. McCarthy, 255 Wis. 234, 38
N.W.2d 679 (1949); State ex rel Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249
Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504 (1946). Issue 9(2) appears in present
SCR 60.06(1), in Canon 5(2)A(2) of the DeWitt-Beilfuss
Proposal, and in Canon 5A(2) of the 1990 ABA Model Code.
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COMMON ISSUES

1. Should rules governing judicial elections be located in a separate
chapter of the Supreme Court Rules?
Comment: It may be desirable to locate all the rules governing
judicial elections in one chapter of the Supreme Court rules, not
only for ease of reference, but also to permit publication in
pamphlet form for candidates and committee. Currently, most
rules are found in the Rules of Judicial Conduct, but some rules
are found in the Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys.
[non-lawyer, non-judge candidates]
2. Should rules governing judicial elections be restricted to rules having
the force of law or should they include hortatory or aspirational
statements, e. g., voluntary guidelines for contributions and
expenditures, rules of civility for judicial campaigns and restatement of
standards akin to those found in the former SCR 60.01 (Characteristics
of an ideal judge)?
Comment. In light of the threat of politicization of judicial
elections, it may be desirable to include aspirational statements
among rules governing conduct in judicial campaigns. The court
has recently promulgated standards of professional civility for
attorneys. The 1967 Code of Judicial Ethics contained an initial
section that set forth the "significant qualities of an ideal judge,"
many of which relate significantly to campaign conduct. (SCR
60.01 (1967)). For example, SCR 60.01(1) provided that "A
judge should be mindful that ours is a government of law and not
of men and should not permit his or her personal concept of
justice override the law. SCR 60.01(9) urges a judge to act with
dignity and decorum, while sub. (10) contemplates "scrupulous
adherence to the rules of fair play" and sub. (12) warns against
extreme, peculiar, spectacular, or sensational conduct. Although
violation of the standards found in SCR 60.01 was not subject to
sanctions unless "aggravated or persistent", the standards served
as reminders to judges (and candidates for judicial office) of how
judges are to comport themselves.
Including appropriate
hortatory or aspirational standards in rules governing judicial
elections may tend to raise the level of campaign conduct in such
elections.
3. Should rules governing judicial elections apply with equal vigor to all
candidates, i.e., those who are incumbent judges, those who are lawyers,
and those (in municipal elections) who are neither judges nor lawyers?

1999]

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Should the rules apply equally to successful and unsuccessful
candidates?
Comment: Currently, some rules apply to candidates who are
judges but not to candidates who are non-judge lawyers.
Candidates who are lawyers are subject to SCR Ch. 20, including
SCR 20:8.2(b) and 8.4, but non-lawyers are not. Even the rule
that appears to "level the playing field" for judge and non-judge
lawyer candidates does so only partially and inadequately. SCR
20:8.2(b) requires lawyer candidates for judicial office to "comply
with the applicable rules of the code of judicial conduct." The
code of judicial conduct defines "candidate" as persons seeking
election or appointment to judicial office, whether an incumbent
judge or not. Some restrictions, however, apply by their terms
only to judge candidates even though the policy or policies
sought to be forwarded appear to require compliance by any
candidate for judicial office. For example, only candidates who
are judges are forbidden to make promises or suggestions of
conduct in office which appeal to cupidity or partisanship or to
do anything which appears to commit the judge in advance with
respect to any particular case or controversy (SCR 60.06(3)).
The public interest justifying the rule is found in the need for
both the fact and the appearance of integrity and impartiality in
the judiciary. No reasonable basis seems to justify treating judge
and nonjudge candidates differently with respect to "promise or
commit" rules.
There are related issues that appear to be beyond the mandate of
the Commission relating to the appropriate locus of
enforcement authority for judge candidates, lawyer candidates,
non-judge and non-lawyer candidates, and non-candidates
making independent expenditures (single issue committees,
other advocacy groups and individuals). Section 757.83, Wis.
Stats., provides that the Judicial Commission has jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute cases of misconduct by judges and
court commissioners. Professional misconduct by attorneys,
including violations of SCR 20:8.2' and 8.412, are within the
11. SCR 20:8.2 JUDICIAL AND LEGAL OFFICIALS. (a) A lawyer shall not make a
statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal
officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions
of the code of judicial conduct.
12. SCR 20:8.4 MISCONDUCT. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
[a] violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
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jurisdiction of the Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility. Actions to recover civil penalties for violation of
chapter 11 may be brought by either the Elections Board or the
district attorney of the county where the violation is alleged to
have occurred.

Although the campaign regulations in most judicial ethics codes
apply by their terms to all judicial candidates, this does not
always work out in practice. Judicial ethics codes are enforced
by judicial conduct organizations, many of which, by statute or
internal regulation, exercise jurisdiction only over sitting judges.
Consequently, non-judge candidates who fail in their election
efforts, and thus never reach the bench, are never within such
organization's jurisdiction. Even non-judge candidates who are
elected may escape the organization's jurisdiction because it may
lack jurisdiction for a judge's pre-bench conduct. Lawyer
candidates, whether elected or not, will be subject to the code of
conduct for lawyers, but not all of these codes require that
lawyers adhere to the judges' code when they run for judicial
office. Without such a provision, non-judge candidates are
limited by only a few basic rules to tell the truth and obey the
law. Even with such a provision, lawyer discipline for campaign
conduct is exceedingly rare.
PATRICK

M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS

OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

116-17 (1990).

4. Should rules governing candidates in judicial elections apply with
equal vigor, insofar as they may be applicable, to candidates for
appointment to judicial office?
Comment: Under current rules, judges may not be a member of a
political party or participate in a party's affairs or activities,
"except for activities concerning his or her own election." A
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
[c] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
[f] violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court order or supreme court decision
regulating the conduct of lawyers; or
[g] violate the attorney's oath.
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judge who is a candidate for appointment to another judicial
office by the governor is provided no guidance by the current
rules as to permissible activity in connection with seeking the
appointment. The ABA Model Code permits a non-judge
candidate for judicial appointment to hold office in a political
organization, attend political gatherings, and to pay ordinary
assessment and make ordinary contributions to a political
organization, activities forbidden to a judge candidate. The
Beilfuss-DeWitt Committee, on the other hand, recommended
that candidates for appointment to judicial office be forbidden to
engage in any political activity to secure the appointment, except
for communications with the appointing authority and a
selection, nomination or screening committee, and seeking
make
regularly
organizations that
support
from
recommendations for appointments. Support could be sought
from individuals only to the extent requested or required by the
appointing authority or a selection, nomination, or screening
committee.
The Commission awaits further instruction from the court.
Dated at Madison, Wisconsin this 27th day of October, 1997.
Respectfully submitted,
Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild
Commission Chair
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Issue
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Rules

1997
Wisconsin
Code

BeilfussDeWitt
Proposals

ABA
Model
Code

1968
Wisconsin
Code

Rules
generally
applicable to

yes

no

yes

yes

no

yes

no

no

no

no

Party
membership
prohibited
Interest
group
membership
regulated
Resignation
of office to
run for other
Partisan
activities
restricted
Contribute to
political
party
Contribute to
partisan
candidate

yes
60.06(2)(a)

yes
60.06(2)

yes
5A(1)(d)

no
5C(1)(a)(ii)

yes
Rule 12

no, but see
60.02 and
60.03

no, but see
60.02 and
60.03

no, but see
Canon 2 and
Canon 3

no, but see
Canon 2 and
Canon 3

no

yes
60.06(1)

yes
60.06(1)

yes
5A(2)

yes
5A(2)

yes
Rule 3

yes
60.06(2)(b)

yes
60.06(2)

yes
5A(1)

yes
5A(1)

yes
Rule 12

no
60.06(2)(c)

no
60.06(2)

yes
5C(1)(a)

no
Rule 12

no
60.06(2)(c)

no
60.06(2)

yes
5C(1)(a)

no
Rule 12

Contribute to
judicial

yes
60.06(2)(c)

yes
60.06(2)

no
5A(1)(e), but
see 5C(1)(a)
no
5A(1)(e)
but see
5C(1)(a)
yes
5A(1)(e)

yes
5C(1)(a)

yes

no
5A(1)(e)

yes
5C(1)(a)
(iii)

yes

candidates

Rules
generally
applicable to

judges-elect

candidate
Contribute to
nonjudicial
nonpartisan
candidate

I_(iii)
yes
60.06(2)

yes
60.06(2)
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Issue

Proposed
Rules

1997
Wisconsin
Code

BeilfussDeWitt
Proposals

ABA
Model
Code

1968
Wisconsin
Code

Attend public
partisan
events as
member of
public
Purchase
ticket for
partisan
event
Endorse or
oppose
partisan
candidates
Endorse or
oppose
judicial
candidate
Endorse or
oppose
nonjudicial
nonpartisan
candidate
"Endorse"
defined
Make
speeches for
party or
candidate
Required to
encourage
family
compliance
Independent
expenditure
rules
Limits on
contributions
to own
campaign
Limits on
contributions
by lawyers
Limits on
solicitation of
contribution
by lawyers

yes
60.06(2)

see
60.06(2)

yes, any time
5A(1)(d)(ii)

yes, any time
5C(1)(a)(i)

?
Rule 12

yes, at cost
60.06(2)

see
60.06(2)

yes, when
candidate
5C(1)(a)

yes, any
time
5C(1)(a)

Rule 12

no
60.06(2)(d)

no
60.06(2)

no
5A(1)(b)

no
5A(1)(b)

no
Rule 12

yes
60.06(2)(c)

yes
60.06(2)

yes
5A(1)(c)

see
5C(1)(b)(iv)

yes
Rule 12

yes
60.06(2)(c)

yes
60.06(2)

no
5A(1)(b)

no
5A(1)(b)

yes
Rule 12

no

no

no

no

no

no
60.06(2)(d)

no
60.06(2)

no
5A(1)(c)

no
5A(1)(c)

no
Rule 12

no

no

yes
5A(3)(a)

yes
5A(3)(a)

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no, but see
§ 11.26

no, but see
§ 11.26

"reasonable"
5C(2)

"reasonable"
5C(2)

no

no

no

no

"reasonable"
Rule 8,
Comment
no
Rule 8 and
Comment
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Issue

Proposed
Rules

1997
Wisconsin
Code

BeilfussDeWitt
Proposals

ABA
Model
Code

1968
Wisconsin
Code

Knowing
acceptance of
contributions
by litigants
prohibited
Knowing
solicitation of
contributions
by litigants
prohibited
Soliciting of
contributions
by judge
prohibited
Campaign
committee
membership
regulated
Special
recusal rules

yes
60.06(4)

no, but see
60.02 and
60.03

no, but see
Canons 2
and 3

no, but see
Canons 2
and 3

?
Rule 8 and
Comment

yes
60.06(4)

no, but see
60.02 and
60.03

no, but see
Canons 2
and 3

no, but see
Canons 2
and 3

?
Rule 8 and
Comment

yes
60.06

yes
60.06(4)

yes
5C(2)

yes
5C(2)

?
Rule 8 and
Comment

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

no

Period for
fund-raising
limited

no

no

"reasonable"
5C(2)

Period for
endorsement
limited
Soliciting of
endorsement
by judge
prohibited
Courthouse
solicitation
prohibited
Commitment
re cases,
controversies
prohibited
Commitment
re "issues"
prohibited
Knowing
misrepresentation
prohibited

no

no

"reasonable"
5C(2)

yes,
Canon 3E
August, 1999
1 year before
90 days after
election
5C(2)
Iyear before
5C(2)

no
60.06(5)

no

no
5C(2)

yes
5C(2)

no

no, but see
60.02 and
60.03
yes
60.06(3)(b)

no, but see
60.02 and
60.03
yes
60.06(3)

yes
5C(2)

no

yes
5A(3)(d)(ii)

no, but see
Canons 2
and 3
yes
5A(3)(d)(ii)

yes
Rule 13

yes
60.06(3)(b)

no
60.06(3)

no
5A(3)(d)(ii)

yes
5A(3)(d)(ii)

no
Rule 13

yes,
60.06(3)(c)

no, but see
60.02 and
60.03

yes
5A(3)(d)(iii)

yes
5A(3)(d)(iii)

no

no

no
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Issue

Proposed
Rules

1997
Wisconsin
Code

BeilfussDeWitt
Proposals

ABA
Model
Code

1968
Wisconsin
Code

Reckless
misrepresentation
prohibited
Rules re
criticism of
past decision
Rules re
confusing
electorate re
attorney or
judicial role
True, but
knowingly
misleading
statements
prohibited
Disclaimer of
misleading
statements

yes
60.06(3)(c)

no

no
5A(3)(d)(iii)

no
5A(3)(d)(iii)

no

no

no

no

no

no

yes
60.06(3)(c)

no

no

no

no

yes
60.06(3)(c)

no

no

no

no

yes
60.06(3)(c)

no

no

no

no

by
independent
expenditure
encouraged

